Contractarianism, liberal neutrality, and epistemology

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 627-642

  Clarke, Simon ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039181623     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00221     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. See for example the essays collected in R. E. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds), Liberal Neutrality (London, Routledge, 1989) and in R. B. Douglass, G. M. Mara, and H. S. Richardson (eds), Liberalism and the Good (New York, Routledge, 1990).
2. See for example the essays collected in R. E. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds), Liberal Neutrality (London, Routledge, 1989) and in R. B. Douglass, G. M. Mara, and H. S. Richardson (eds), Liberalism and the Good (New York, Routledge, 1990).
3. This is the definition of neutrality given in J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 193, and T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 155, 166. Barry's description of neutrality is slightly different. He says that no conception of the good should be given a privileged position, based on its correctness or superiority over others, in the framework of social and political institutions. (See B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 142-3, 160.) This permits the government to implement policies based on some conception of the good, as long as they are arrived at through fair democratic procedures. Barry's description nevertheless amounts to the same conception of neutrality given in the text since the justification for such policies would refer to the fair democratic procedures and not the intrinsic superiority of the conception of the good.
4. This is the definition of neutrality given in J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 193, and T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 155, 166. Barry's description of neutrality is slightly different. He says that no conception of the good should be given a privileged position, based on its correctness or superiority over others, in the framework of social and political institutions. (See B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 142-3, 160.) This permits the government to implement policies based on some conception of the good, as long as they are arrived at through fair democratic procedures. Barry's description nevertheless amounts to the same conception of neutrality given in the text since the justification for such policies would refer to the fair democratic procedures and not the intrinsic superiority of the conception of the good.
5. This is the definition of neutrality given in J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 193, and T. Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 155, 166. Barry's description of neutrality is slightly different. He says that no conception of the good should be given a privileged position, based on its correctness or superiority over others, in the framework of social and political institutions. (See B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 142-3, 160.) This permits the government to implement policies based on some conception of the good, as long as they are arrived at through fair democratic procedures. Barry's description nevertheless amounts to the same conception of neutrality given in the text since the justification for such policies would refer to the fair democratic procedures and not the intrinsic superiority of the conception of the good.
6. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
7. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
8. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
9. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
10. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
11. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
12. The terms are from W. Kymlicka, 'Liberal individualism and liberal neutrality', Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 883-4. For different taxonomies of neutrality, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 192-3; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), pp. 114-5; S. Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality', Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (1991), p. 458; R. J. Arneson, 'Neutrality and utility', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), pp. 217-8; H. Brighouse, 'Neutrality, publicity, and state funding of the arts', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), p. 38; C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 43-4.
13. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 193; Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, pp. 43-4.
14. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 193; Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, pp. 43-4.
15. A problem with justificatory neutrality is that it does not rule out state policies that favour some conception of the good for reasons not related to the intrinsic superiority of that conception. For example, the government could support some religion not because it believes it is the true religion but because doing so somehow helps in the maintenance of social justice. I do not think that this shows that justificatory neutrality is implausible as an ideal. Rather, it shows that it can not be the whole story. There must be something more to the ideal of neutrality than only justificatory neutrality. But the latter is nevertheless an important part of the ideal and needs to be supported by an argument.
16. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
17. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
18. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
19. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
20. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
21. This idea is central to two books by B. Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), see especially section 35, and Justice as Impartiality, see ch. 3. T. Nagel uses the same notion in 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 221 and Equality and Partiality, p. 36. In his recent work, Rawls seems to endorse the same basic idea. See Political Liberalism, pp.23, 124, 137. This form of contractarianism is originally from T. M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982) (see especially p. 110), although Scanlon uses it as an account of morality rather than principles of justice.
22. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 1991, p. 33-4.
23. R. Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', in G. B. Peterson (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, IX (Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1990), p. 21.
24. Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', p. 22.
25. R. Sugden, 'The Contractarian Enterprise', in D. Gauthier and R. Sugden (eds), Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 3-4. It should be noted that Sugden's comment occurs in the context of his discussion of Gauthier-type contractarianism which is fundamentally different from the type being discussed in this paper. He may therefore not agree with the use I make of his comment.
26. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 223.
27. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 229.
28. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 230.
29. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 230.
30. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 232.
31. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 232.
32. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 233.
33. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 233.
34. This objection is made by J. Raz, 'Facing Diversity: the Case of Epistemic Abstinence', in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Clarendon, 1994), pp. 73-5 and Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 179-81.
35. This objection is made by J. Raz, 'Facing Diversity: the Case of Epistemic Abstinence', in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Clarendon, 1994), pp. 73-5 and Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 179-81.
36. Raz, 'Facing Diversity', p.79.
37. These comments are from a report by an anonymous referee for this journal.
38. C. Larmore, 'Political liberalism', Political Theory, 18 (1990), p. 342. Nagel admits near the end of the article that some conceptions of the good may pass the test (see 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 237).
39. C. Larmore, 'Political liberalism', Political Theory, 18 (1990), p. 342. Nagel admits near the end of the article that some conceptions of the good may pass the test (see 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 237).
40. See Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 163n.
41. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 161.
42. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 161.
43. S. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', Utilitas, 8 (1996), p. 286.
44. It should be noted that Barry terms it the argument from scepticism (Justice as Impartiality, p. 169). I use the present terminology to distinguish it from claims such as that all normative statements are unable to be objectively established.
45. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169.
46. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 178.
47. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169.
48. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169. The same argument, in less detail, is made in B. Barry, 'John Rawls and the search for stability', Ethics, 105 (1995), p. 903 and Brian Barry, 'In defense of political liberalism', Ratio Juris, 7 (1994), pp. 329-30.
49. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169. The same argument, in less detail, is made in B. Barry, 'John Rawls and the search for stability', Ethics, 105 (1995), p. 903 and Brian Barry, 'In defense of political liberalism', Ratio Juris, 7 (1994), pp. 329-30.
50. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169. The same argument, in less detail, is made in B. Barry, 'John Rawls and the search for stability', Ethics, 105 (1995), p. 903 and Brian Barry, 'In defense of political liberalism', Ratio Juris, 7 (1994), pp. 329-30.
51. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 170.
52. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 171.
53. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 171.
54. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', pp. 277-8.
55. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', pp. 277-8.
56. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', p. 277.
57. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', pp. 279-80.
58. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', p. 279. See also Raz, 'Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy', in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Clarendon, 1994), pp. 103-4.
59. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', p. 279. See also Raz, 'Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy', in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Clarendon, 1994), pp. 103-4.
60. Caney, 'Impartiality and liberal neutrality', p. 277.
61. A. Woolrych, 'Political Theory and Political Practice', in C. A. Patrides and R. B. Waddington (eds), The Age of Milton: Backgrounds to Seventeenth Century (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1980), esp. p. 39. See also G. Burgess, 'Common law and political theory in early Stuart England', Political Science, 40 (1988) and Margaret Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution (New York, Octagon, 1964).
62. A. Woolrych, 'Political Theory and Political Practice', in C. A. Patrides and R. B. Waddington (eds), The Age of Milton: Backgrounds to Seventeenth Century (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1980), esp. p. 39. See also G. Burgess, 'Common law and political theory in early Stuart England', Political Science, 40 (1988) and Margaret Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution (New York, Octagon, 1964).
63. A. Woolrych, 'Political Theory and Political Practice', in C. A. Patrides and R. B. Waddington (eds), The Age of Milton: Backgrounds to Seventeenth Century (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1980), esp. p. 39. See also G. Burgess, 'Common law and political theory in early Stuart England', Political Science, 40 (1988) and Margaret Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution (New York, Octagon, 1964).
64. L. G. Schwoerer, 'The right to resist: Whig resistance theory, 1688 to 1694', in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds), Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). An interesting point to note is that those on one side of the conflict, the Whigs, often appealed to contractarian arguments in defence of their position. See Schwoerer, 'The right to resist', pp. 238ff.
65. L. G. Schwoerer, 'The right to resist: Whig resistance theory, 1688 to 1694', in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds), Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993). An interesting point to note is that those on one side of the conflict, the Whigs, often appealed to contractarian arguments in defence of their position. See Schwoerer, 'The right to resist', pp. 238ff.
66. Barry, 'John Rawls and the search for stability', p. 915.
67. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 56.
68. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 56-7. Rawls actually lists six, but the sixth, that in any society some selection of values must be made from among all that might be realized, is less a cause of disagreement and more an inevitable consequence in any society. It is therefore left out. This point and some abbreviation of the burdens are from Leif Wenar, 'Political liberalism: an internal critique', Ethics, 106 (1995), p. 41.
69. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 56-7. Rawls actually lists six, but the sixth, that in any society some selection of values must be made from among all that might be realized, is less a cause of disagreement and more an inevitable consequence in any society. It is therefore left out. This point and some abbreviation of the burdens are from Leif Wenar, 'Political liberalism: an internal critique', Ethics, 106 (1995), p. 41.
70. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 55, 58.
71. Nagel, 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', p. 234.
72. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 60.
73. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 60-1.
74. This is the claim made by S. Mulhall and A. Swift in Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), pp. 184-5. Barry (in 'John Rawls and the search for stability', pp. 901-2) claims that the burdens imply his own uncertainty thesis, but of course does not see that as a weakness.
75. This is the claim made by S. Mulhall and A. Swift in Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), pp. 184-5. Barry (in 'John Rawls and the search for stability', pp. 901-2) claims that the burdens imply his own uncertainty thesis, but of course does not see that as a weakness.
76. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 63.
77. Mulhall and Swift's claim that the burdens of judgement do imply scepticism rests on a definition of sceptical views as those that 'require the individual committed to the truth of her particular doctrine to accept not only that she will not be able to persuade everybody else of its truth but also that their failure to see it may be reasonable'. (Liberals and Communitarians, p. 185). The burdens of judgement do imply this, but this is not an accurate definition of scepticism (or uncertainty). It simply repeats what Rawls claims the result of the burdens is - reasonable disagreement.
78. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 62-3, 150-4.
79. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 63.
80. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 63.
81. D. Copp, 'Pluralism and stability in liberal theory', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), pp. 198-200; M. Sandel, 'Review of political liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107 (1994), 1782-89.
82. D. Copp, 'Pluralism and stability in liberal theory', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), pp. 198-200; M. Sandel, 'Review of political liberalism', Harvard Law Review, 107 (1994), 1782-89.
83. This argument was suggested to me by an anonymous referee for this journal.
84. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986).
85. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 291.
86. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 291.
87. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 292-3.
88. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 295.
89. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 298-9.
90. See for example J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), section 50, especially pp. 327-8; Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, ch. 3, especially p. 53.
91. See for example J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972), section 50, especially pp. 327-8; Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, ch. 3, especially p. 53.
92. See for example Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', p. 115; W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990), pp. 216-30; and Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality'.
93. See for example Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', p. 115; W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990), pp. 216-30; and Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality'.
94. See for example Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality', p. 115; W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990), pp. 216-30; and Caney, 'Consequentialist defences of liberal neutrality'.