Elusive synergy: Business-government relations and development

Comparative Politics

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 101-122

  Schneider, Ben Ross ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039066495     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422108     Document Type: Review

References (91)

1. See Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard Doner and Gary Hawes, "The Political Economy of Growth in Southeast and Northeast Asia," in Manochehr Dorraj, ed., The Changing Political Economy of the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
2. See Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard Doner and Gary Hawes, "The Political Economy of Growth in Southeast and Northeast Asia," in Manochehr Dorraj, ed., The Changing Political Economy of the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
3. See Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard Doner and Gary Hawes, "The Political Economy of Growth in Southeast and Northeast Asia," in Manochehr Dorraj, ed., The Changing Political Economy of the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
4. See Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard Doner and Gary Hawes, "The Political Economy of Growth in Southeast and Northeast Asia," in Manochehr Dorraj, ed., The Changing Political Economy of the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Richard Doner, Driving a Bargain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
5. Rosemary Thorp, Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ricardo Tirado, ed., Los Empresarios ante la Globalización (Mexico: UNAM, 1994); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru (Boulder: Westview, 1994). An earlier literature on business-state relations in Latin America concentrated on multinational corporations to the relative neglect of domestic business.
6. Rosemary Thorp, Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ricardo Tirado, ed., Los Empresarios ante la Globalización (Mexico: UNAM, 1994); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru (Boulder: Westview, 1994). An earlier literature on business-state relations in Latin America concentrated on multinational corporations to the relative neglect of domestic business.
7. Rosemary Thorp, Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ricardo Tirado, ed., Los Empresarios ante la Globalización (Mexico: UNAM, 1994); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru (Boulder: Westview, 1994). An earlier literature on business-state relations in Latin America concentrated on multinational corporations to the relative neglect of domestic business.
8. Rosemary Thorp, Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ricardo Tirado, ed., Los Empresarios ante la Globalización (Mexico: UNAM, 1994); Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru (Boulder: Westview, 1994). An earlier literature on business-state relations in Latin America concentrated on multinational corporations to the relative neglect of domestic business.
9. See Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva, eds., Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
10. See Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva, eds., Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
11. See Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva, eds., Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
12. See Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva, eds., Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
13. See Ernest Bartell and Leigh Payne, eds., Business and Democracy in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva, eds., Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).
14. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
15. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
16. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
17. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
18. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
19. See Peter Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses," Sociological Forum, 4 (December 1989), 561-87; Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development," World Development, 24 (June 1996); Alice H. Amsden, "Diffusion of Development," American Economic Review, 81 (May 1991), 282-86; Alice H. Amsden and Takashi Hikino, "Project Execution Capability, Organizational Know-How, and Conglomerate Corporate Growth in Late Industrialization," Industrial and Corporate Change, 3 (1994), 111-48.; Takashi Hikino and Alice H. Amsden, "Staying Behind, Stumbling Back, Sneaking Up, Soaring Ahead," in William Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
20. Assessing Evans' analysis of Korean development is beyond the scope of this review and my competence. See Woo; Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The Ties That Bind?," Political Power and Social Theory, 10 (Winter 1996), 307-20; Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).
21. Assessing Evans' analysis of Korean development is beyond the scope of this review and my competence. See Woo; Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The Ties That Bind?," Political Power and Social Theory, 10 (Winter 1996), 307-20; Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).
22. Assessing Evans' analysis of Korean development is beyond the scope of this review and my competence. See Woo; Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The Ties That Bind?," Political Power and Social Theory, 10 (Winter 1996), 307-20; Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).
23. Assessing Evans' analysis of Korean development is beyond the scope of this review and my competence. See Woo; Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The Ties That Bind?," Political Power and Social Theory, 10 (Winter 1996), 307-20; Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997).
24. Evans, "Predatory," p. 574.
25. World Bank, World Development Report: The State in a Changing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
26. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 146.
27. Ibid., p. 16.
28. Ibid., p. 16; Amsden, "Diffusion," p. 285; and Amsden, "South Korea," p. 363.
29. Ibid., p. 16; Amsden, "Diffusion," p. 285; and Amsden, "South Korea," p. 363.
30. Ibid., p. 16; Amsden, "Diffusion," p. 285; and Amsden, "South Korea," p. 363.
31. Jesse Biddle and Vedat Milor, "Economic Governance in Turkey," in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
32. See Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," International Organization, 38 (Winter 1984), 1-40; and Woo.
33. Evans, "The State as Problem," p. 174.
34. In a broader cross-national project on Weberian bureaucracy, Evans and Rauch find a positive correlation between Weberian bureaucracy and economic performance. Peter Evans and James Rauch, "Bureaucracy and Growth," ms., 1997; also World Development Report 1997.
35. Silva conducted forty-three interviews with business leaders and policymakers and scoured company reports and career trajectories to establish linkages among individuals in pivotal positions in government, associations, and firms.
36. Economist, 27 (April 1991), 44,
37. cited in Gerald Davis, Kristina Diekmann, and Catherine Tinsley, "The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s," American Sociological Review, 59 (August 1994), 548.
38. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 8.
39. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 48-53.
40. For example, in Austria and Switzerland peak associations resolved disputes internally, and "as a result, political conflicts within the business community did not immobilize the public agenda and government machinery." Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 197. On Taiwan and Mexico, see Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 281; Cristina Puga, "Las organizaciones empresariales en la negociación del Tratado de Libre Comercio," in Tirado, ed.
41. For example, in Austria and Switzerland peak associations resolved disputes internally, and "as a result, political conflicts within the business community did not immobilize the public agenda and government machinery." Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 197. On Taiwan and Mexico, see Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 281; Cristina Puga, "Las organizaciones empresariales en la negociación del Tratado de Libre Comercio," in Tirado, ed.
42. For example, in Austria and Switzerland peak associations resolved disputes internally, and "as a result, political conflicts within the business community did not immobilize the public agenda and government machinery." Peter Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 197. On Taiwan and Mexico, see Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 281; Cristina Puga, "Las organizaciones empresariales en la negociación del Tratado de Libre Comercio," in Tirado, ed.
43. For a more explicit argument on the benefits of encompassing organization, see Kurt Weyland "'Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?," Latin American Research Review, 32 (1997), 37-68.
44. See Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico," in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., Voting for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Rosemary Thorp and Francisco Durand, "A Historical View of Business-State Relations," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.; and Biddle and Milor.
45. See Robert Kaufman, Carlos Bazdresch, and Blanca Heredia, "Mexico," in Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb, eds., Voting for Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Rosemary Thorp and Francisco Durand, "A Historical View of Business-State Relations," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.; and Biddle and Milor.
46. Wade; Fields, Enterprise; and Karl Fields, "Creating Cooperation and Determining the Distance," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.
47. Wade; Fields, Enterprise; and Karl Fields, "Creating Cooperation and Determining the Distance," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.
48. Political economies dominated by highly diversified business organizations seem to greatly restrict the utility of the sectoral approaches in Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Frieden; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
49. Political economies dominated by highly diversified business organizations seem to greatly restrict the utility of the sectoral approaches in Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Frieden; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
50. Political economies dominated by highly diversified business organizations seem to greatly restrict the utility of the sectoral approaches in Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Frieden; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
51. Political economies dominated by highly diversified business organizations seem to greatly restrict the utility of the sectoral approaches in Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Frieden; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
52. Nathaniel Leff, "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 26 (July 1978), 672-73. On the "firm-as-portfolio" model in the United States, see Davis et al., p. 553.
53. Nathaniel Leff, "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 26 (July 1978), 672-73. On the "firm-as-portfolio" model in the United States, see Davis et al., p. 553.
54. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 130, also 149-53. In a very different context, an econometric study of French industry concludes that differentially diversified groups were less likely than unlinked firms to exploit market power. David Encaoua and Alexis Jacquemin, "Organizational Efficiency and Monopoly Power," European Economic Review, 19 (1982), 25-26, 42-48.
55. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 130, also 149-53. In a very different context, an econometric study of French industry concludes that differentially diversified groups were less likely than unlinked firms to exploit market power. David Encaoua and Alexis Jacquemin, "Organizational Efficiency and Monopoly Power," European Economic Review, 19 (1982), 25-26, 42-48.
56. See Ha-Joon Chang, "Interpreting the Korean Experience" (Cambridge Research Paper, 1990), p. 27; Cho Soon, The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p. 72.
57. See Ha-Joon Chang, "Interpreting the Korean Experience" (Cambridge Research Paper, 1990), p. 27; Cho Soon, The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), p. 72.
58. Chang, p. 27, argues that "the fact that the chaebols as conglomerates are potentially able to move into any line of business...makes it difficult for a particular chaebol to keep a particular industry as its fiefdom. Unless it remains reasonably efficient, other chaebols can easily persuade the state that they can do a better job and get the state support in the next round of capacity expansion."
59. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 9.
60. Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962); and The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
61. Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962); and The Visible Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
62. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, p. 125.
63. Leff, pp. 666-67. For full reviews, see Fields, Enterprise, ch. 1; Mark Granovetter, "Business Groups," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
64. Leff, pp. 666-67. For full reviews, see Fields, Enterprise, ch. 1; Mark Granovetter, "Business Groups," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
65. Leff, pp. 666-67. For full reviews, see Fields, Enterprise, ch. 1; Mark Granovetter, "Business Groups," in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
66. They use a modified notion of "economies of scope" to describe increasing returns to management assets across multiple sectors. See Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 21-31.
67. Amsden and Hikino, p. 141.
68. Leff. p. 674. For one of the fullest theories for variations among developing countries, based on variable patterns of economic openness, see Mauro Guillén, "Business Groups in Economic Development," unpublished paper, 1997.
69. Leff. p. 674. For one of the fullest theories for variations among developing countries, based on variable patterns of economic openness, see Mauro Guillén, "Business Groups in Economic Development," unpublished paper, 1997.
70. See Woo; Richard Steers, Yoo Keun Shin, and Gerardo Ungson, The Chaebol (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 19; Hidemasa Morikawa, "Japan," in Chandler et al., Big Business and the Wealth of Nations; Annibal Villela and Werner Baer, O Setor Privado Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1980), pp. 294-95.
71. See Woo; Richard Steers, Yoo Keun Shin, and Gerardo Ungson, The Chaebol (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 19; Hidemasa Morikawa, "Japan," in Chandler et al., Big Business and the Wealth of Nations; Annibal Villela and Werner Baer, O Setor Privado Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1980), pp. 294-95.
72. See Woo; Richard Steers, Yoo Keun Shin, and Gerardo Ungson, The Chaebol (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 19; Hidemasa Morikawa, "Japan," in Chandler et al., Big Business and the Wealth of Nations; Annibal Villela and Werner Baer, O Setor Privado Nacional (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1980), pp. 294-95.
73. Amsden, "South Korea," p. 364.
74. Ibid., p. 337; also Kim.
75. Fields, Enterprise, p. 23.
76. Leff, "Industrial"; Harry Strachan, "Nicaragua's Grupos Económicos," in Sidney Greenfield et al., eds., Entrepreneurs in Cultural Context (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), pp. 244-45.
77. Leff, "Industrial"; Harry Strachan, "Nicaragua's Grupos Económicos," in Sidney Greenfield et al., eds., Entrepreneurs in Cultural Context (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), pp. 244-45.
78. Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 21.
79. Analyses of social capital constitute another major societal approach; they generally reverse the causal arrows and view state performance largely as a function of social networks and capital. See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 6; World Development, 24 (June 1996).
80. Analyses of social capital constitute another major societal approach; they generally reverse the causal arrows and view state performance largely as a function of social networks and capital. See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 6; World Development, 24 (June 1996).
81. See Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World," International Organization, 50 (1996); Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Ross Schneider, "Alternative Theories of Business and Business-State Relations," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.
82. See Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World," International Organization, 50 (1996); Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Ross Schneider, "Alternative Theories of Business and Business-State Relations," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.
83. See Jeffrey Winters, Power in Motion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World," International Organization, 50 (1996); Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Ross Schneider, "Alternative Theories of Business and Business-State Relations," in Maxfield and Schneider, eds.
84. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, pp. 17-18. Amsden, "South Korea," p. 363, notes that "legislation passed in Korea in the 1960s stipulated that any illegal overseas transfer of $1 million or more was punishable with a minimum sentence often years' imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death!" See also Woo.
85. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant, pp. 17-18. Amsden, "South Korea," p. 363, notes that "legislation passed in Korea in the 1960s stipulated that any illegal overseas transfer of $1 million or more was punishable with a minimum sentence often years' imprisonment and a maximum sentence of death!" See also Woo.
86. Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
87. Frieden, p. 11.
88. Shafer, Winners. Frieden, p. 34, qualifies his general argument by noting that states have greater autonomy when class conflict overrides sectoral demands.
89. Shafer, Winners. Frieden, p. 34, qualifies his general argument by noting that states have greater autonomy when class conflict overrides sectoral demands.
90. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Frieden, pp. 22-24. Silva offers a potent antidote to sectoral analysis. He draws on Frieden's framework and delves deep into the asset structure of Chilean firms but takes the crucial next step of aggregating and weighting the assets of firms against other firms within the same conglomerate. He concludes that conglomerates typically have multiple sectoral interests as well as the ability to shift assets rapidly among holdings. Deducing the preferences of owners of conglomerates is therefore highly problematic.
91. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); Frieden, pp. 22-24. Silva offers a potent antidote to sectoral analysis. He draws on Frieden's framework and delves deep into the asset structure of Chilean firms but takes the crucial next step of aggregating and weighting the assets of firms against other firms within the same conglomerate. He concludes that conglomerates typically have multiple sectoral interests as well as the ability to shift assets rapidly among holdings. Deducing the preferences of owners of conglomerates is therefore highly problematic.