Corruption in a paternalistic democracy: Lessons from Italy for Latin America

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 113, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 447-470

  Colazingari, Silvia ^a   Rose Ackerman, Susan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039065060     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2658076     Document Type: Article

References (127)

1. Franco Cazzola, Delia corruzione. Fisiologia e papologia di un sistema politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31-32; Gherado Colombo, "Le indagini della magistratura italiana nei reati contro la pubblica amministrazione. Il danno conseguente alla corruzione." Questione Giustizia 13 (Spring-Summer 1994): 467-478; Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption," Political Studies 45 (Special Issue 1997): 516-538. In 1988, one source estimated that the turnover of bribery and extortion totaled 27 billion lira. See Fortune-Italy, no. 7 (October 1989): 41.
2. Franco Cazzola, Delia corruzione. Fisiologia e papologia di un sistema politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31-32; Gherado Colombo, "Le indagini della magistratura italiana nei reati contro la pubblica amministrazione. Il danno conseguente alla corruzione." Questione Giustizia 13 (Spring-Summer 1994): 467-478; Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption," Political Studies 45 (Special Issue 1997): 516-538. In 1988, one source estimated that the turnover of bribery and extortion totaled 27 billion lira. See Fortune-Italy, no. 7 (October 1989): 41.
3. Franco Cazzola, Delia corruzione. Fisiologia e papologia di un sistema politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31-32; Gherado Colombo, "Le indagini della magistratura italiana nei reati contro la pubblica amministrazione. Il danno conseguente alla corruzione." Questione Giustizia 13 (Spring-Summer 1994): 467-478; Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption," Political Studies 45 (Special Issue 1997): 516-538. In 1988, one source estimated that the turnover of bribery and extortion totaled 27 billion lira. See Fortune-Italy, no. 7 (October 1989): 41.
4. Franco Cazzola, Delia corruzione. Fisiologia e papologia di un sistema politico (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31-32; Gherado Colombo, "Le indagini della magistratura italiana nei reati contro la pubblica amministrazione. Il danno conseguente alla corruzione." Questione Giustizia 13 (Spring-Summer 1994): 467-478; Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, "The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption," Political Studies 45 (Special Issue 1997): 516-538. In 1988, one source estimated that the turnover of bribery and extortion totaled 27 billion lira. See Fortune-Italy, no. 7 (October 1989): 41.
5. Colombo, "Indagini della magistratura italiana."
6. The Economist, Special Survey, 26 May 1990.
7. Romano Prodi, "Sindrome botte di ferro," Mondo Economico, 29 May 1993, 28-29.
8. Ziya Önis, "The Logic of the Developmental State," Comparative Politics 24 (October 1991): 109-126.
9. Paolo Sylos Labini, "Il ruolo delle imprese pubbliche nel recente svilluppo dell'economia italiana," Economia Pubblica, No. 1-2, (January-February 1984): 5-12.
10. Romano Prodi and Daniele Di Giovanni, "Forty-Five Years of Industrial Policy in Italy: Protagonists, Objectives, and Instruments" in Mario Baldassarri, ed., Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945-90 (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 31-58.
11. Janos Kornai, "Degrees of Paternalism" in Janos Kornai, Economics of Shortage. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980), 561-71. On corruption in Soviet-style systems, see John M. Montias and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption in a Soviet-Type Economy: Theoretical Considerations" in Steven Rosefielde, ed., Economic Welfare and Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 53-83.
12. Janos Kornai, "Degrees of Paternalism" in Janos Kornai, Economics of Shortage. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980), 561-71. On corruption in Soviet-style systems, see John M. Montias and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption in a Soviet-Type Economy: Theoretical Considerations" in Steven Rosefielde, ed., Economic Welfare and Economics of Soviet Socialism: Essays in Honor of Abram Bergson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 53-83.
13. Alan Friedman, Ce la fara il capitalismo italiano? (Milano: Longanesi, 1989); Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, "The Restructuring of Large-sized Industrial Groups" in Baldassarri, ed., Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945-90, 141-160. Marcello De Cecco, a leading economist, described the period as "criminal Keynesianism" in "Italia, partiti el il Keynesismo delinquenziale," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 16 April 1993, 1-3. In 1981, Socialist Minister for State Holdings Gianni De Michelis issued a report that criticized the state's policy of incorporating loss-making companies into the system of public holdings. De Michelis et al., Rapporto sulle partecipazioni statali (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1981).
14. Alan Friedman, Ce la fara il capitalismo italiano? (Milano: Longanesi, 1989); Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, "The Restructuring of Large-sized Industrial Groups" in Baldassarri, ed., Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945-90, 141-160. Marcello De Cecco, a leading economist, described the period as "criminal Keynesianism" in "Italia, partiti el il Keynesismo delinquenziale," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 16 April 1993, 1-3. In 1981, Socialist Minister for State Holdings Gianni De Michelis issued a report that criticized the state's policy of incorporating loss-making companies into the system of public holdings. De Michelis et al., Rapporto sulle partecipazioni statali (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1981).
15. Alan Friedman, Ce la fara il capitalismo italiano? (Milano: Longanesi, 1989); Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, "The Restructuring of Large-sized Industrial Groups" in Baldassarri, ed., Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945-90, 141-160. Marcello De Cecco, a leading economist, described the period as "criminal Keynesianism" in "Italia, partiti el il Keynesismo delinquenziale," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 16 April 1993, 1-3. In 1981, Socialist Minister for State Holdings Gianni De Michelis issued a report that criticized the state's policy of incorporating loss-making companies into the system of public holdings. De Michelis et al., Rapporto sulle partecipazioni statali (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1981).
16. Alan Friedman, Ce la fara il capitalismo italiano? (Milano: Longanesi, 1989); Gian Maria Gros-Pietro, "The Restructuring of Large-sized Industrial Groups" in Baldassarri, ed., Industrial Policy in Italy, 1945-90, 141-160. Marcello De Cecco, a leading economist, described the period as "criminal Keynesianism" in "Italia, partiti el il Keynesismo delinquenziale," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 16 April 1993, 1-3. In 1981, Socialist Minister for State Holdings Gianni De Michelis issued a report that criticized the state's policy of incorporating loss-making companies into the system of public holdings. De Michelis et al., Rapporto sulle partecipazioni statali (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1981).
17. Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Centre Domination in Italy," West European Politics 12 (October 1989): 114-128; Paolo Farneti, "I partiti politici e il sistema di potere" in V. Castronovo, ed., L'Italia contemporanea 1945-1975 (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 61-104; Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater, "Party Politics and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?" in M. J. Laver and Ian Budge, eds., Party Policy and Government Coalitions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 314-341.
18. Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Centre Domination in Italy," West European Politics 12 (October 1989): 114-128; Paolo Farneti, "I partiti politici e il sistema di potere" in V. Castronovo, ed., L'Italia contemporanea 1945-1975 (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 61-104; Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater, "Party Politics and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?" in M. J. Laver and Ian Budge, eds., Party Policy and Government Coalitions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 314-341.
19. Mark Donovan, "Party Strategy and Centre Domination in Italy," West European Politics 12 (October 1989): 114-128; Paolo Farneti, "I partiti politici e il sistema di potere" in V. Castronovo, ed., L'Italia contemporanea 1945-1975 (Torino: Einaudi, 1976), 61-104; Alfio Mastropaolo and Martin Slater, "Party Politics and Coalition Bargaining in Italy, 1948-87: Is There Order Behind the Chaos?" in M. J. Laver and Ian Budge, eds., Party Policy and Government Coalitions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 314-341.
20. Denis Mack Smith, "Italy's Dirty Linen," New York Review of Books, 30 November 1995, 13.
21. Donovan, "Party Strategy," 116, 122.
22. Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics," 316.
23. Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Donovan, "Party Strategy"; Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."
24. Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Donovan, "Party Strategy"; Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."
25. Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Donovan, "Party Strategy"; Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."
26. According to Franco Bassanini, a former member of the Socialist party, the sharing of bribery receipts by the political parties began in the early 1970s with a payment from Eni-Petronim. He claimed that the agreement conditioned their behavior in parliament. Giovanni Valentini, interview with Franco Bassanini, La Repubblica, 13 February 1993.
27. Franco Cazzola, Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano (Milano: Giuffre, 1974); Di Palma, Surviving; Angelo Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle" in Key Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 110-136.
28. Franco Cazzola, Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano (Milano: Giuffre, 1974); Di Palma, Surviving; Angelo Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle" in Key Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 110-136.
29. Franco Cazzola, Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano (Milano: Giuffre, 1974); Di Palma, Surviving; Angelo Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle" in Key Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, eds., When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 110-136.
30. Sergio Turone, Politica ladra: Storia della corruzione in Italia, 1861-1992 (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992), 342, reports that the DC, the Socialists, and the Communists each received 25 percent, with the Social Democrats and the Republicans dividing the rest.
31. Panebianco, "Italian Radicals," 118.
32. Joseph LaPalombara, Democracy Italian Style (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 213.
33. Giulio Sapelli, Cleptocrazia (Roma: Feltrinelli, 1994).
34. He appealed his conviction and in December 1995 his sentence was reduced to six years by an appeals court. See "Court Cuts Sentence for Italian Financier Cusani," Reuter North American Wire, 1 December 1995, NEXIS. In November 1996, his sentence in a related case was upheld, and he began a four year jail sentence. He is the first major figure to go to jail. See "Italian Financier Goes to Prison in Graft Scandal," Reuter Financial Service, 13 November 1996, NEXIS.
35. He appealed his conviction and in December 1995 his sentence was reduced to six years by an appeals court. See "Court Cuts Sentence for Italian Financier Cusani," Reuter North American Wire, 1 December 1995, NEXIS. In November 1996, his sentence in a related case was upheld, and he began a four year jail sentence. He is the first major figure to go to jail. See "Italian Financier Goes to Prison in Graft Scandal," Reuter Financial Service, 13 November 1996, NEXIS.
36. "Ex-Premiers Convicted in Italy," Washington Post, 28 October 1995.
37. Alves Marchi and Roberto Marchionatti, Montedison 1966-89, L'evoluzione di una grande impresa al confine tra pubblico e privato. Collana CIRIEC di Storie d'Impresa (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1992), 168, 187-190.
38. John Glover, "Italy: A Death in Tangentopoli - Ferruzzi Chief," Reuter Textline: International Investor, 31 May 1994, NEXIS . De Benedetti was himself imprisoned as a result of the Clean Hands investigations. He claimed that when his company ceased paying bribes to the post office in 1991, it received no new orders. See La Repubblica, 18 May 1993.
39. John Glover, "Italy: A Death in Tangentopoli - Ferruzzi Chief," Reuter Textline: International Investor, 31 May 1994, NEXIS . De Benedetti was himself imprisoned as a result of the Clean Hands investigations. He claimed that when his company ceased paying bribes to the post office in 1991, it received no new orders. See La Repubblica, 18 May 1993.
40. See the interviews in La Repubblica, 13 February 1993, with Florio Fiorini, Eni finance director in 1982 and on 29 December 1993 and 9 January 1994 with Franco Bernabe, governmental commissioner of Eni SpA. According to one press estimate, politicians extracted between 400 and 600 billion lira per year from the chemical industry during the 1980s. See Giuseppe Turani, "L'Enimont un alabicco di Pandora," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 29 January 1993.
41. See the interviews in La Repubblica, 13 February 1993, with Florio Fiorini, Eni finance director in 1982 and on 29 December 1993 and 9 January 1994 with Franco Bernabe, governmental commissioner of Eni SpA. According to one press estimate, politicians extracted between 400 and 600 billion lira per year from the chemical industry during the 1980s. See Giuseppe Turani, "L'Enimont un alabicco di Pandora," La Repubblica, Affari e Finanza, 29 January 1993.
42. Glover, "Italy." After the Socialists took over the chairmanship of Eni, the DC retained the power to appoint the directors of several operating companies. After three controversial chairmen held the post between 1979 and 1982, Eni appointed a respected professor who served until 1989. Interview with Franco Bernabe, La Repubblica, 29 December 1993.
43. Glover, "Italy."
44. Ibid.
45. "When the Fiddling Had to Stop," The Economist, 2 July 1994, 62.
46. Glover, "Italy."
47. Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 567-575; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (August 1993): 599-617.
48. Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 567-575; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (August 1993): 599-617.
49. Between 1982 and 1988, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) went from losing 2,825 billion lira to making a profit of 660 billion. Eni went from losing 1,734 billion lira in 1982 to a profit of 1,310 billion in 1988. The consolidated balance sheets of IRI and Eni are available in Marco Borsa and Allessandro Aleotti, "Fu vera gloria? Espansione 234 (November 1989): 25, 28. For a contrary view, see Ernesto U. Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law in Divising Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Italian Experience," European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 3 (Spring 1995): 30.
50. Between 1982 and 1988, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) went from losing 2,825 billion lira to making a profit of 660 billion. Eni went from losing 1,734 billion lira in 1982 to a profit of 1,310 billion in 1988. The consolidated balance sheets of IRI and Eni are available in Marco Borsa and Allessandro Aleotti, "Fu vera gloria? Espansione 234 (November 1989): 25, 28. For a contrary view, see Ernesto U. Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law in Divising Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Italian Experience," European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 3 (Spring 1995): 30.
51. Luigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake. "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America," Review of International Political Economy 3 (Winter 1996): 662-697.
52. Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Corruzione politica e amministrazione pubblica (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).
53. Mastropaolo and Slater, "Party Politics."
54. The survey results are reported in A. Calabro and A. Zeni, "Italiani brava tangente," Il Mondo, 2 March 1987, 38-45. A survey of members of Confindustria, the industrialists' association, reported that 85 percent of those surveyed thought that before the Clean Hands investigations bribery was at least "frequent" in public works contracts. At the time of the survey, 47 percent thought corruption had drastically decreased. Summarized in "Still Crooked," The Economist, 5 February 1994 .
55. The survey results are reported in A. Calabro and A. Zeni, "Italiani brava tangente," Il Mondo, 2 March 1987, 38-45. A survey of members of Confindustria, the industrialists' association, reported that 85 percent of those surveyed thought that before the Clean Hands investigations bribery was at least "frequent" in public works contracts. At the time of the survey, 47 percent thought corruption had drastically decreased. Summarized in "Still Crooked," The Economist, 5 February 1994 .
56. Law No. 195 - State Contribution to the Financing of Political Parties (May 2,1974) - Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (GU), No. 135 (25 May 1974). The law was amended by Law No. 11 (16 January 1978) - GU, No. 23 (24 January 1978); Law No. 422 of 1980 - GU, No. 220 (12 August 1980); Law No. 659 of 1981 - GU, No. 323 (24 November 1981); Law No. 22 of 1982 - GU, No. 30 (1 February 1982), and Law No. 413 of 1985 - GU No. 194 (19 August 1985). See Giovanni Salvo, "Italy," in United States Congress, Law Library of Congress, 1991, 110-15, In 1994, the public financing portions of the laws were abrogated in a popular referendum supported by 90 percent of those who voted. In 1997, public financing was reinstated on the basis of a citizen checkoff on individual tax forms. See Law No. 2 (2 January 1997) - GU, No. 5 (8 January 1997). Citizens can earmark 0.4 percent of their income tax payments for a fund to support political parties. The government determines the distribution of the funds on the basis of votes in the most recent election for the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to the tax writeoff, individuals and firms that give between 500,000 and 50 million lira of their own funds can take a tax credit totaling 22 percent of these contributions. The law also includes a requirement that political parties publish their balance sheets each year in two newspapers, one of which must be distributed nationally.
57. Vittorio Testa, "Politici e faccendieri in un'autobotte fantasma," La Repubblica, 1 January 1993.
58. Armando Cossutta, Il finanziamento pubblico dei partiti (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1974).
59. Salvo, "Italy," 112-113.
60. Ibid., 113-115.
61. Donatello Della Porta, "Actors in Corruption: Business Politicians in Italy," International Social Science Journal 149 (September 1996): 349-364.
62. The Economist, 2 July 1994. Denis Mack Smith in "Italy's Dirty Linen" reviews the endemic nature of political corruption and attributes Italy's spiraling public debt in part to the corruption in public life.
63. The Economist, 2 July 1994. Denis Mack Smith in "Italy's Dirty Linen" reviews the endemic nature of political corruption and attributes Italy's spiraling public debt in part to the corruption in public life.
64. Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law," 128-129.
65. Party discipline was difficult to maintain before 1988, because voting in the parliament was by secret ballot. See Donovan, "Party Strategy," 123-124.
66. Vito Marino Caferra, Il sistema della corruzione. Le regioni, I soggetle, I luoghi. (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992).
67. Cazzola, "Della corruzione," 143; G. Palombarini, "Stato di diritto caratteri del'emergenza e cultura della trasformazione," Questione Giustizia 2 (Summer 1983): 623-672.
68. Cazzola, "Della corruzione," 143; G. Palombarini, "Stato di diritto caratteri del'emergenza e cultura della trasformazione," Questione Giustizia 2 (Summer 1983): 623-672.
69. Alberto Vannucci, "La razionalità occulta della corruzione politica" in Antonio A. Martino and Fedele Ruggeri, eds., Scelta rationale e azione politica (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1995), 129; Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law," 32-33.
70. Alberto Vannucci, "La razionalità occulta della corruzione politica" in Antonio A. Martino and Fedele Ruggeri, eds., Scelta rationale e azione politica (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1995), 129; Savona, "Beyond Criminal Law," 32-33.
71. Pier Luigi Zanchetta, "Tangentopli tra prospettive politiche e soluzioni giudiziarie," Questione Giustizia 13 (1994): 486.
72. Proposte in materia di prevenzione della corruzione e dell-illecito," Finanziamento di Partiti Diritto Penale Dell-economia 7 (October-December 1994): 911-918.
73. "Constitutional Reform in Italy Garners Critics," Financial Times, 1-2 November 1997.
74. Caferra, Il sistema della corruzione; Vittorio Testa, "Politici e faccendieri in un'autobotte fantasma," La Repubblica, 22 January 1993.
75. Caferra, Il sistema della corruzione; Vittorio Testa, "Politici e faccendieri in un'autobotte fantasma," La Repubblica, 22 January 1993.
76. Caferra, "Il sistema," 141.
77. Alberto Vannucci, "Come Combattere la corruzione in Italia?" Quaderni di Sociologia, forthcoming, 1998.
78. Caferra, "Il sistema," 143-145.
79. Ibid., 152.
80. In 1995, the Italian government successfully privatized a portion of Eni, Enichem's parent company. To accomplish this, Eni was restructured and Enichem closed more than forty-five plants and sold off weak divisions. See "Six-legged Dog Out of the Kennel: The Eni Sale is a Test of Italy's Credibility and its Privatisation Plans," Financial Times, 1 November 1995; "Italian Eni Sale Under Way - At Last," Financial Times, 10 November 1995.
81. In 1995, the Italian government successfully privatized a portion of Eni, Enichem's parent company. To accomplish this, Eni was restructured and Enichem closed more than forty-five plants and sold off weak divisions. See "Six-legged Dog Out of the Kennel: The Eni Sale is a Test of Italy's Credibility and its Privatisation Plans," Financial Times, 1 November 1995; "Italian Eni Sale Under Way - At Last," Financial Times, 10 November 1995.
82. Asli Demirgūç-Kunt and Ross Levine, The Financial System and Public Enterprise Reform: Concepts and Cases, Policy Research Working Paper no. 1319 (Washington DC: The World Bank, July 1994).
83. According to The Economist, "family-controlled conglomerates continue to dominate Latin America's private sector. They account for more than two-thirds of the 33 largest private business groups in Brazil. . . . The biggest business groups in Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, too are diverse family-owned empires . . . [T]wo Chilean family groups . . . continue to outstrip [newly privatized] companies in size as well as diversity," See Michael Reid, "Survey: Business in Latin America," The Economist, 6-12 December 1997, 7. On Venezuela, see Moisés Naim, Las empresas venezolanas: Su gerencia (Caracas: IESA, 1989), 504.
84. According to The Economist, "family-controlled conglomerates continue to dominate Latin America's private sector. They account for more than two-thirds of the 33 largest private business groups in Brazil. . . . The biggest business groups in Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, too are diverse family-owned empires . . . [T]wo Chilean family groups . . . continue to outstrip [newly privatized] companies in size as well as diversity," See Michael Reid, "Survey: Business in Latin America," The Economist, 6-12 December 1997, 7. On Venezuela, see Moisés Naim, Las empresas venezolanas: Su gerencia (Caracas: IESA, 1989), 504.
85. According to The Economist, "family-controlled conglomerates continue to dominate Latin America's private sector. They account for more than two-thirds of the 33 largest private business groups in Brazil. . . . The biggest business groups in Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, too are diverse family-owned empires . . . [T]wo Chilean family groups . . . continue to outstrip [newly privatized] companies in size as well as diversity," See Michael Reid, "Survey: Business in Latin America," The Economist, 6-12 December 1997, 7. On Venezuela, see Moisés Naim, Las empresas venezolanas: Su gerencia (Caracas: IESA, 1989), 504.
86. David Fleischer, "Attempts at Corruption Control in Brazil: Congressional Investigations and Strengthening Internal Control" (paper prepared for the 1995 meeting on the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, 28-30 September 1995); Luigi Manzetti, Privatizing South American Style (draft manuscript, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 1996); Manzetti and Blake, "Market Reforms."
87. David Fleischer, "Attempts at Corruption Control in Brazil: Congressional Investigations and Strengthening Internal Control" (paper prepared for the 1995 meeting on the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, 28-30 September 1995); Luigi Manzetti, Privatizing South American Style (draft manuscript, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 1996); Manzetti and Blake, "Market Reforms."
88. David Fleischer, "Attempts at Corruption Control in Brazil: Congressional Investigations and Strengthening Internal Control" (paper prepared for the 1995 meeting on the Latin American Studies Association, Washington DC, 28-30 September 1995); Luigi Manzetti, Privatizing South American Style (draft manuscript, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 1996); Manzetti and Blake, "Market Reforms."
89. Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991).
90. Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy?" (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172, 1992).
91. Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy?" (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172, 1992).
92. Will Ollard, "Tricky Upstream Selloff," Petroleum Economist, 16-17 November 1990.
93. Manzetti, "Privatizing."
94. Ibid.
95. Robert M. Smith, "Exxon's Italian Payments Tied to Specific Benefits," New York Times, 17 July 1975; Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Drugs in Europe," New York Times, 21 March 1976.
96. Robert M. Smith, "Exxon's Italian Payments Tied to Specific Benefits," New York Times, 17 July 1975; Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Drugs in Europe," New York Times, 21 March 1976.
97. Smith, "Italy's Dirty Linen."
98. Tanassi was treated leniently, because the Court of Accounts found that the bribes had not increased the sale price of the Lockheed Hercules airplanes. This finding ignores the opportunity cost of selecting a plane that had been earlier found not to meet defense industry requirements. See Caferra, "Il sistema," 161.
99. Fleischer, "Attempts," 8, 10-12.
100. Barbara Geddes and Artur Ribeiro Neto, "Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil," Third World Quarterly 13 (No. 4, 1992): 641-661.
101. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights, Education and Action, Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1996); Rogelio Pérez Perdomo," Corrupción y ambiente de los negocios en Venezuela" in Rogelio Pérez Perdomo and Ruth Capriles Méndez, eds., Corrupción y control: Una perspectiva comparada (Caracas: IESA, 1991), 18.
102. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights, Education and Action, Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, August 1996); Rogelio Pérez Perdomo," Corrupción y ambiente de los negocios en Venezuela" in Rogelio Pérez Perdomo and Ruth Capriles Méndez, eds., Corrupción y control: Una perspectiva comparada (Caracas: IESA, 1991), 18.
103. The Economist, 2 August 1997, 24-25; see also Gisela von Muhlenbrock, "Discretionality and Corruption: The Chilean Judiciary" (paper presented at the Corruption and Democracy Workshop, North-South Center, University of Miami, 9 May 1995).
104. The Economist, 2 August 1997, 24-25; see also Gisela von Muhlenbrock, "Discretionality and Corruption: The Chilean Judiciary" (paper presented at the Corruption and Democracy Workshop, North-South Center, University of Miami, 9 May 1995).
105. Maria Dakolias, The Judicial Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean: Elements of Reform, World Bank Technical Paper No. 319 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1996), 3.
106. Lawyers Committee, "Halfway," 45-55, 104-106.
107. Manzetti, Privatizing; "Telia-led Group Waits for Cellphone Verdict," Financial Times, 9/10 August 1997; "Privatization Trundles Ahead," The Economist, 15 June 1996.
108. Manzetti, Privatizing; "Telia-led Group Waits for Cellphone Verdict," Financial Times, 9/10 August 1997; "Privatization Trundles Ahead," The Economist, 15 June 1996.
109. Manzetti, Privatizing; "Telia-led Group Waits for Cellphone Verdict," Financial Times, 9/10 August 1997; "Privatization Trundles Ahead," The Economist, 15 June 1996.
110. Caferra, "Il sistema," 93-94; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 484-485.
111. Caferra, "Il sistema," 93-94; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 484-485.
112. Pier Paolo Giglioli, "Political Corruption and the Media: the Tangentopoli Affair," International Social Science Journal 149 (September 1996): 381-194; Turone, "Political ladra," 356-357.
113. Pier Paolo Giglioli, "Political Corruption and the Media: the Tangentopoli Affair," International Social Science Journal 149 (September 1996): 381-194; Turone, "Political ladra," 356-357.
114. The Economist, 16 August 1997, 28.
115. Caferra, "Il sistema," 197.
116. Luciano Barca, "La patologia degli anni Ottanta" in Luciano Barca and Sandro Trento, eds., L'Economia Della Corruzione (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1994), 78-79.
117. In September 1996 the Chamber of Deputies appointed a Council for the Study of the Prevention of Corruption. The Council's final report issued on 23 October 1996 listed as among the causes of corruption the breadth of state intervention and the disarray and complexity of legal norms. See Vannucci, "Come Combattere la corruzione in Italia?"
118. Alberto Statera, "Cassese: Lo stato sprecone piace ai partiti," interview with Sabino Cassese, La Stampa, 2 March 1992.
119. Luigi Giorgino, "Opere pubbliche prima e dopo Tangentopoli," Stato e Mercato 42 (December 1994): 413-414.
120. Ibid., 427.
121. Dora Orlansky, "Democratization, State Reform and Political Inflation," (paper presented at the XVI IPSA Meetings, Buenos Aires, 1994); Horacio Verbitsky, Robo para la corona (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1991).
122. Dora Orlansky, "Democratization, State Reform and Political Inflation," (paper presented at the XVI IPSA Meetings, Buenos Aires, 1994); Horacio Verbitsky, Robo para la corona (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1991).
123. Vannucci, "Come Combattere."
124. Giuseppe De Rita, "Autolegittimazione e nuovi soggetti" in Barca and Trento, eds., L'economia della corruzione; Della Porta and Vannucci "Corruzione politica"; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 482.
125. Giuseppe De Rita, "Autolegittimazione e nuovi soggetti" in Barca and Trento, eds., L'economia della corruzione; Della Porta and Vannucci "Corruzione politica"; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 482.
126. Giuseppe De Rita, "Autolegittimazione e nuovi soggetti" in Barca and Trento, eds., L'economia della corruzione; Della Porta and Vannucci "Corruzione politica"; Zanchetta, "Tangentopoli," 482.
127. Gianmario Cazzaniga, "Sulle cause morali della corruzione" in Barca and Sandro, eds., L'economia della corruzione, 34-35.