Bank supervision and the limits of political influence over bureaucracy

Public Administration Review

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 303-313

  Kunioka, Todd T ^a   Woller, Gary M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039032697     PISSN: 00333352     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3110113     Document Type: Article

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