Aristotle's direct realism in de Anima

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 321-335

  Esfeld, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

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EID: 0039029153     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (79)

1. For helpful criticism of an earlier version of this paper I am grateful to Burkhard Hafemann, Ludger Jansen, and Holmer Steinfath.
2. Compare Andreas Graeser, "On Aristotle's Framework of Sensibilia," in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 69-97, in particular 86-91.
3. de Interpretatione 1.16a3-8. All the English translations in this paper are adopted from The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
4. de Interpretatione 1.16a3-8. All the English translations in this paper are adopted from The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5. de Anima 2.12.424a17-20.
6. de Anima 3.4.429b31-430a2.
7. de Anima 2.5.416b33-4, 418a5, 2.7.419a17-18, and 2.11.424a1.
8. de Anima 2.5.417b20, 2.10.422b15-16, and 3.7.431a4-5; de Sensu 2.438b22-3. Compare W. David Ross, Aristotle, De Anima. Text, Introduction, Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24-5; Karen Gloy, "Aristoteles' Konzeption der Seele in 'De Anima,'" Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 38 (1984): 381-411, in particular 406-9.
9. de Anima 2.5.417b20, 2.10.422b15-16, and 3.7.431a4-5; de Sensu 2.438b22-3. Compare W. David Ross, Aristotle, De Anima. Text, Introduction, Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24-5; Karen Gloy, "Aristoteles' Konzeption der Seele in 'De Anima,'" Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 38 (1984): 381-411, in particular 406-9.
10. de Anima 2.5.417b20, 2.10.422b15-16, and 3.7.431a4-5; de Sensu 2.438b22-3. Compare W. David Ross, Aristotle, De Anima. Text, Introduction, Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24-5; Karen Gloy, "Aristoteles' Konzeption der Seele in 'De Anima,'" Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 38 (1984): 381-411, in particular 406-9.
11. de Anima 2.5.417b20, 2.10.422b15-16, and 3.7.431a4-5; de Sensu 2.438b22-3. Compare W. David Ross, Aristotle, De Anima. Text, Introduction, Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 24-5; Karen Gloy, "Aristoteles' Konzeption der Seele in 'De Anima,'" Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 38 (1984): 381-411, in particular 406-9.
12. de Anima 2.7.418a3-6, 2.11.424a1-2, and 3.4.429b30-1.
13. de Anima 2.12.424a18, 3.8.432a2-5, compare 3.2.425b23-4.
14. See Klaus Oehler, Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewußtseinsproblems in der Antike (Munich: Beck, 1962), second part.
15. de Anima 3.3.427a19-20 and 3.4.429a13-14.
16. de Anima 3.4.429a13-15 and 429b24-5.
17. de Anima 3.4.429a13-18, 429a27-9, and 3.7.431b2; Metaphysics 12.7.1072a30 and 1072b22.
18. de Anima 3.4.429a13-18, 429a27-9, and 3.7.431b2; Metaphysics 12.7.1072a30 and 1072b22.
19. For a recent clear exposition see Victor Caston, "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 249-98, in particular 261-2. See also Deborah K. W. Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33-5, 55-80, and 99-107.
20. For a recent clear exposition see Victor Caston, "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998): 249-98, in particular 261-2. See also Deborah K. W. Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 33-5, 55-80, and 99-107.
21. As to such a materialist view of Aristotle's theory of perception, see in particular Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 470-84; Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-78; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195-225; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 5, in particular p. 203.
22. As to such a materialist view of Aristotle's theory of perception, see in particular Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 470-84; Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-78; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195-225; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 5, in particular p. 203.
23. As to such a materialist view of Aristotle's theory of perception, see in particular Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 470-84; Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-78; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195-225; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 5, in particular p. 203.
24. As to such a materialist view of Aristotle's theory of perception, see in particular Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 470-84; Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-78; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195-225; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 5, in particular p. 203.
25. As to such a materialist view of Aristotle's theory of perception, see in particular Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review 70 (1961): 470-84; Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-78; Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195-225; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chapter 5, in particular p. 203.
26. See Everson, Aristotle on Perception.
27. See Everson, Aristotle on Perception, 175-7 and 193-203.
28. Wolfgang Welsch, Aisthesis. Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987), in particular 93, 186-7, 195.
29. Compare Gerald J. Massey's methodological guidelines for dealing with such philosophical issues that he sets out in his "The Indeterminacy of Translation: A Study in Philosophical Exegesis," Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 317-45.
30. See de Anima 2.5.417a21-b26.
31. de Anima 2.6.418a14-15, 2.10.422a20-1, 2.12.424a5-6, 3.2.425b20-2, 426b8-17, 3.3.427a20-1, 428a3-4, 3.7.431a20, and 431a24-5. In Analytica Posteriora 2.19.99b35, perception is described as δύναμις F0;ριτιF0;ή. As to the translation of F0;ρίνειν as "discerning," see Theodor Ebert, "Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 37 (1983): 181-98.
32. de Anima 2.6.418a14-15, 2.10.422a20-1, 2.12.424a5-6, 3.2.425b20-2, 426b8-17, 3.3.427a20-1, 428a3-4, 3.7.431a20, and 431a24-5. In Analytica Posteriora 2.19.99b35, perception is described as δύναμις F0;ριτιF0;ή. As to the translation of F0;ρίνειν as "discerning," see Theodor Ebert, "Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 37 (1983): 181-98.
33. de Anima 2.6.418a14-15, 2.10.422a20-1, 2.12.424a5-6, 3.2.425b20-2, 426b8-17, 3.3.427a20-1, 428a3-4, 3.7.431a20, and 431a24-5. In Analytica Posteriora 2.19.99b35, perception is described as δύναμις F0;ριτιF0;ή. As to the translation of F0;ρίνειν as "discerning," see Theodor Ebert, "Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 37 (1983): 181-98.
34. See de Anima 3.3.427a20-1 and 428a3-5.
35. Compare Wolfgang Bernard, Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles (Baden-Baden: Koerner, 1988), in particular chapters 2.7 and 3.2. As to the soul in general as activity in Aristotle, see Johannes Hübner, "Die aristotelische Konzeption der Seele als Aktivität in de Anima II. 1," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 81(1999): 1-32.
36. Compare Wolfgang Bernard, Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles (Baden-Baden: Koerner, 1988), in particular chapters 2.7 and 3.2. As to the soul in general as activity in Aristotle, see Johannes Hübner, "Die aristotelische Konzeption der Seele als Aktivität in de Anima II. 1," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 81(1999): 1-32.
37. de Anima 3.2.425b26-426a1.
38. See de Anima 3.2.425b26-7 and 426a15-17.
39. See for example Horst Seidl, Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim: Hain, 1971), 97-8; Anthony C. Lloyd, "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio 21 (1979): 135-48, in particular 135-8; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G. Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50, in particular 29; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-9; Allan Silverman, "Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 271-92, in particular 284-6.
40. See for example Horst Seidl, Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim: Hain, 1971), 97-8; Anthony C. Lloyd, "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio 21 (1979): 135-48, in particular 135-8; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G. Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50, in particular 29; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-9; Allan Silverman, "Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 271-92, in particular 284-6.
41. See for example Horst Seidl, Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim: Hain, 1971), 97-8; Anthony C. Lloyd, "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio 21 (1979): 135-48, in particular 135-8; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G. Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50, in particular 29; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-9; Allan Silverman, "Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 271-92, in particular 284-6.
42. See for example Horst Seidl, Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim: Hain, 1971), 97-8; Anthony C. Lloyd, "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio 21 (1979): 135-48, in particular 135-8; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G. Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50, in particular 29; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-9; Allan Silverman, "Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 271-92, in particular 284-6.
43. See for example Horst Seidl, Der Begriff des Intellekts (νους) bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim: Hain, 1971), 97-8; Anthony C. Lloyd, "Was Aristotle's Theory of Perception Lockean?" Ratio 21 (1979): 135-48, in particular 135-8; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G. Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50, in particular 29; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 102-9; Allan Silverman, "Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Ancient Philosophy 9 (1989): 271-92, in particular 284-6.
44. de Anima 2.12.424a28-32, 3.2.426a30-b3, 3.4.429a31-b3, and 3.13.435b7-9.
45. For a contrary position see for instance Friedo Ricken, "Probleme der Aristotelischen Wahrnehmungslehre," Philosophische Rundschau 38 (1991): 209-24, in particular 210-15.
46. de Anima 3.2.426a10-11.
47. See Wolfgang Welsch, Aisthesis, in particular chapter 3.
48. de Anima 3.4.429b30-1, 430a3-5, 3.5.430a19-20, 3.7.431a1-2, and 431b17; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b21-2.
49. de Anima 3.4.429b30-1, 430a3-5, 3.5.430a19-20, 3.7.431a1-2, and 431b17; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b21-2.
50. Compare Steven M. Nadler, Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Manchester Manchester University Press, 1989), 11-12.
51. Except for touch; see de Anima 3.13.435a14-19.
52. de Anima 2.7.418b3-419b2.
53. Myles F. Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15-26; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristote voit du rouge et entend un 'do': Combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur 'De Anima,' II, 7-8," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger 118 (1993): 263-80; T. K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 6.
54. Myles F. Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15-26; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristote voit du rouge et entend un 'do': Combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur 'De Anima,' II, 7-8," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger 118 (1993): 263-80; T. K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 6.
55. Myles F. Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft," in Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15-26; Myles F. Burnyeat, "Aristote voit du rouge et entend un 'do': Combien se passe-t-il de choses? Remarques sur 'De Anima,' II, 7-8," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger 118 (1993): 263-80; T. K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapter 6.
56. John E. Sisko, "Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Phronesis 41 (1996): 138-57; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception, in particular chapters 2 and 6.
57. John E. Sisko, "Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" Phronesis 41 (1996): 138-57; Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception, in particular chapters 2 and 6.
58. Compare Wolfgang Welsch, Aisthesis, in particular 93, 186-7, and 195.
59. Compare the argument of Christopher Shields, "Intentionality and Isomorphism in Aristotle," in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. J. Cleary and W. C. Wians, vol. 11 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 307-30, in particular 322-7, in favor of what he calls "weak isomorphism" and against what he calls "strong isomorphism," which implies numerical identity.
60. Compare de Anima 2.12.424a21-4 and see against interpretations to the contrary Julie K. Ward, "Perception and Logos in 'De anima' ii 12," Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 217-33; David Bradshaw, "Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory," Apeiron 30 (1997): 143-62.
61. Compare de Anima 2.12.424a21-4 and see against interpretations to the contrary Julie K. Ward, "Perception and Logos in 'De anima' ii 12," Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 217-33; David Bradshaw, "Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory," Apeiron 30 (1997): 143-62.
62. Compare de Anima 2.12.424a21-4 and see against interpretations to the contrary Julie K. Ward, "Perception and Logos in 'De anima' ii 12," Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 217-33; David Bradshaw, "Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory," Apeiron 30 (1997): 143-62.
63. de Anima 2.12.424a17-20.
64. For a contemporary position along these lines, see John Haldane, "A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind," Ratio 11 (1998): 253-77, in particular 267-9.
65. de Anima 3.7.431b21-432a3.
66. Perception: de Anima 2.6.418a11-16, 3.3.427b11-12, 428a11, 428b18- 22, 428b27-9, and 3.6.430b29; de Sensu 4.442b8-10; Metaphysics 3.5.1010b1- 3. Thought: de Anima 3.3.428a17-18, 3.5.430a26-7, and 3.6.430b26-9; Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-1052a4.
67. Perception: de Anima 2.6.418a11-16, 3.3.427b11-12, 428a11, 428b18- 22, 428b27-9, and 3.6.430b29; de Sensu 4.442b8-10; Metaphysics 3.5.1010b1- 3. Thought: de Anima 3.3.428a17-18, 3.5.430a26-7, and 3.6.430b26-9; Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-1052a4.
68. Perception: de Anima 2.6.418a11-16, 3.3.427b11-12, 428a11, 428b18- 22, 428b27-9, and 3.6.430b29; de Sensu 4.442b8-10; Metaphysics 3.5.1010b1- 3. Thought: de Anima 3.3.428a17-18, 3.5.430a26-7, and 3.6.430b26-9; Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-1052a4.
69. Perception: de Anima 2.6.418a11-16, 3.3.427b11-12, 428a11, 428b18- 22, 428b27-9, and 3.6.430b29; de Sensu 4.442b8-10; Metaphysics 3.5.1010b1- 3. Thought: de Anima 3.3.428a17-18, 3.5.430a26-7, and 3.6.430b26-9; Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-1052a4.
70. Perception: de Anima 2.6.418a11-16, 3.3.427b11-12, 428a11, 428b18- 22, 428b27-9, and 3.6.430b29; de Sensu 4.442b8-10; Metaphysics 3.5.1010b1- 3. Thought: de Anima 3.3.428a17-18, 3.5.430a26-7, and 3.6.430b26-9; Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-1052a4.
71. As to such an externalism in today's philosophy, see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), in particular chapters 6 and 9, and John McDowell, "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space," in Subject, Thought, and Context, ed. Philip Pettit and John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 137-68.
72. As to such an externalism in today's philosophy, see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, ed. John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), in particular chapters 6 and 9, and John McDowell, "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space," in Subject, Thought, and Context, ed. Philip Pettit and John McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 137-68.
73. de Anima 3.6.430a26-b3 and 3.8.432a11-12. Compare Categories 2.1a16-19, 4.2a4-10; de Interpretatione 10.19b11-12.
74. de Anima 3.6.430a26-b3 and 3.8.432a11-12. Compare Categories 2.1a16-19, 4.2a4-10; de Interpretatione 10.19b11-12.
75. de Anima 3.6.430a26-b3 and 3.8.432a11-12. Compare Categories 2.1a16-19, 4.2a4-10; de Interpretatione 10.19b11-12.
76. de Anima 2.6.418a14-16, 3.1.425a30-b4, 3.3.428b21-30, and 3.6.430b29-30.
77. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
78. Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality, ed. Wilfrid Sellars (London: Routledge, 1963), 127-96.
79. See McDowell, Mind and World, lecture 4.