On the evolution of pareto-optimal behavior in repeated coordination problems

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 273-293

  Lagunoff, Roger ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039001814     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00064     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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