US human rights policy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1981

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 402-430

  Hartmann, Hauke ^a  

^a BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038970566     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2001.0017     Document Type: Article

References (130)

1. John Shattuck & J. Brian Atwood, Defending Democracy: Why Democrats Trump Autocrats, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 167, 169 (1998).
2. Interview with Patricia Derian, former Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Alexandria, VA (28 Apr. 1998).
3. See Oversight of the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993 and U.S. Human Rights Policy: Hearings before the House Subcomm. on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, Comm. on Foreign Affairs 52 (1994).
4. Id. at 61-62.
5. The debate on Reagan's human rights policy is summarized in Elizabeth Cohn, Human Rights, in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICYMAKING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 441-45 (David W. Dent ed., 1995). Viewpoints and interpretations vary widely, and just a few shall be mentioned to clarify the spectrum of opinions. See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066 (1986) (for the argument that an originally disinterested Reagan administration was caught by the logic of its own human rights rhetoric); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991), (for the view that Reagan's democratization policy was a consequent and deepened follow-up to Carter's flawed human rights policy); and Charles Maechling Jr., Human Rights Dehumanized, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 118 (1983) (who charged, early on, the Reagan administration with a cynical instrumentalization of the human rights issue for its foreign policy agenda).
6. The debate on Reagan's human rights policy is summarized in Elizabeth Cohn, Human Rights, in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICYMAKING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 441-45 (David W. Dent ed., 1995). Viewpoints and interpretations vary widely, and just a few shall be mentioned to clarify the spectrum of opinions. See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066 (1986) (for the argument that an originally disinterested Reagan administration was caught by the logic of its own human rights rhetoric); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991), (for the view that Reagan's democratization policy was a consequent and deepened follow-up to Carter's flawed human rights policy); and Charles Maechling Jr., Human Rights Dehumanized, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 118 (1983) (who charged, early on, the Reagan administration with a cynical instrumentalization of the human rights issue for its foreign policy agenda).
7. The debate on Reagan's human rights policy is summarized in Elizabeth Cohn, Human Rights, in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICYMAKING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 441-45 (David W. Dent ed., 1995). Viewpoints and interpretations vary widely, and just a few shall be mentioned to clarify the spectrum of opinions. See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066 (1986) (for the argument that an originally disinterested Reagan administration was caught by the logic of its own human rights rhetoric); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991), (for the view that Reagan's democratization policy was a consequent and deepened follow-up to Carter's flawed human rights policy); and Charles Maechling Jr., Human Rights Dehumanized, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 118 (1983) (who charged, early on, the Reagan administration with a cynical instrumentalization of the human rights issue for its foreign policy agenda).
8. The debate on Reagan's human rights policy is summarized in Elizabeth Cohn, Human Rights, in U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICYMAKING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 441-45 (David W. Dent ed., 1995). Viewpoints and interpretations vary widely, and just a few shall be mentioned to clarify the spectrum of opinions. See, e.g., Tamar Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066 (1986) (for the argument that an originally disinterested Reagan administration was caught by the logic of its own human rights rhetoric); JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY (1991), (for the view that Reagan's democratization policy was a consequent and deepened follow-up to Carter's flawed human rights policy); and Charles Maechling Jr., Human Rights Dehumanized, 52 FOREIGN POL'Y 118 (1983) (who charged, early on, the Reagan administration with a cynical instrumentalization of the human rights issue for its foreign policy agenda).
9. The human rights initiatives of Congress during the 1970s are well covered by literature and shall not be dealt with in detail in the course of this article. See, e.g., DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (1988); LARS SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS]; SANDY VOGELGESANG, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE: THE DILEMMA OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (1980).
10. The human rights initiatives of Congress during the 1970s are well covered by literature and shall not be dealt with in detail in the course of this article. See, e.g., DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (1988); LARS SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS]; SANDY VOGELGESANG, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE: THE DILEMMA OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (1980).
11. The human rights initiatives of Congress during the 1970s are well covered by literature and shall not be dealt with in detail in the course of this article. See, e.g., DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (1988); LARS SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA (1981) [hereinafter SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS]; SANDY VOGELGESANG, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE: THE DILEMMA OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (1980).
12. "Unfortunately, the prevailing attitude has led the United States into embracing governments which practice torture and unabashedly violate almost every human rights guarantee pronounced by the world community. . . . [C]onsideration for human rights in foreign policy is both morally imperative and practically necessary." Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership: Report from the House Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements, H.R. Rep. No., at 9 (1974), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
13. Bipartisan support for human rights issues was eroding only slowly. In July 1977, the prevailing view of the White House on the legislative branch was still that "[t]here is recognition across the political spectrum of the concern of the American public for human rights. Thus, irrespective of political affiliation there are few in Congress who feel they can ignore human rights violations . . . ." Confidential draft of the Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights (PRM/NSC-28) of 7 July 1977, at 81-82, in: Folder "Human Rights, PRM, 7/77 [CF, O/A 716]," Box 19 Human Rights through [Indian Land Claims] Maine: Notes Doug Huron, Collection White House Office Counsel to the President, Carter Library.
14. Michael Ross Fowler therefore calls the conservative approach to human rights "bipolar." See MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER, THINKING ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POL'Y 45 (1987).
15. See LARS SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 21-22 (1987) (on the progressive minority).
16. Similar categories of political orientation are used by Martha L. Cottam, The Carter Administration's Policy toward Nicaragua: Images, Goals, Tactics, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 123, 125 (1992) (convincingly tying foreign policy behavior to threat perceptions).
17. Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address (20 Jan. 1977), reprinted in 1 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER, 1-4, 2, 3 (1977).
18. See Cyrus R. Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, reprinted in THE DIPLOMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 207, 207-08 (David D. Newsom ed., 1986).
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 211. This was, argues Schoultz, an unequivocal message to the foreign policy bureaucracy: "After this address, no one misunderstood where diplomats should concentrate their efforts. . . ." SCHOULTZ, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 115.
21. Vance, supra note 13, at 208.
22. Id. at 209.
23. Derian Interview, supra note 2. Analogously, a memorandum in May 1977 to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out that the opposition groups in Latin America generally reacted favorably to the new administration's human rights policy, but that "[s]ome see, or pretend to see, the most recent public human rights statements by United States Government officials as a backing away, at least to some extent, from our previously voiced high priority for human rights." Confidential memorandum from Executive Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff to Brzezinski, "Human Rights Policy Impact: Latin America," 11 May 1977, at 3, in: Folder 8, 1/20/77-1/20/81, Box HU-1, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library.
24. The heavy bureaucratic infighting that occurred mainly between some regional bureaus and the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) is well described in Edwin S. Maynard, The Bureaucracy and Implementation of US Human Rights Policy, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 175, 187 (1989). More partisan accounts are given by the former Deputy Assistant Secretary under Derian, Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 257-61 (1982) (Cohen blames the regional bureaus of having pursued a policy of "clientism") and Caleb Rossiter who gives primary responsibility to the allegedly confrontational and uncompromising behavior of the "outsiders" of the Human Rights Bureau for the harsh controversies, holding that "the appointment of a senior foreign-service officer as the head of HA might have spared it the ensuing trauma." Caleb Rossiter, Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction, INT'L POL'Y REP. 5 (Sept. 1984).
25. The heavy bureaucratic infighting that occurred mainly between some regional bureaus and the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) is well described in Edwin S. Maynard, The Bureaucracy and Implementation of US Human Rights Policy, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 175, 187 (1989). More partisan accounts are given by the former Deputy Assistant Secretary under Derian, Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 257-61 (1982) (Cohen blames the regional bureaus of having pursued a policy of "clientism") and Caleb Rossiter who gives primary responsibility to the allegedly confrontational and uncompromising behavior of the "outsiders" of the Human Rights Bureau for the harsh controversies, holding that "the appointment of a senior foreign-service officer as the head of HA might have spared it the ensuing trauma." Caleb Rossiter, Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction, INT'L POL'Y REP. 5 (Sept. 1984).
26. The heavy bureaucratic infighting that occurred mainly between some regional bureaus and the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) is well described in Edwin S. Maynard, The Bureaucracy and Implementation of US Human Rights Policy, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 175, 187 (1989). More partisan accounts are given by the former Deputy Assistant Secretary under Derian, Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 257-61 (1982) (Cohen blames the regional bureaus of having pursued a policy of "clientism") and Caleb Rossiter who gives primary responsibility to the allegedly confrontational and uncompromising behavior of the "outsiders" of the Human Rights Bureau for the harsh controversies, holding that "the appointment of a senior foreign-service officer as the head of HA might have spared it the ensuing trauma." Caleb Rossiter, Human Rights: The Carter Record, The Reagan Reaction, INT'L POL'Y REP. 5 (Sept. 1984).
27. Draft of the Notre Dame-speech, Pt. Four, at 1, in: Folder "[5/22/77-Notre Dame Speech] [2]," Box 6 "5/17/77-California Trip (UAW) [3] through 5/23/77-Signing Ceremony-Drought & Tax Cut Legislation," Collection Speech writer's Office-Chron File, Carter Library.
28. Memorandum from Smith to Fallows, at 2, in: Folder "[5/22/77-Notre Dame Speech] [2]," Box 6 "5/17/77-California Trip (UAW) [3] through 5/23/77-Signing Ceremony-Drought & Tax Cut Legislation, Collection Speech writer's Office-Chron File, Carter Library.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Undated fourth draft of the Notre Dame-speech, in: Folder "[5/22/77-Notre Dame Speech] [3]," Box 6 "5/17/77-California Trip (UAW) [3] through 5/23/77-Signing Ceremony-Drought & Tax Cut Legislation," Collection Speech Writer's Office-Chron File, Carter Library.
31. Script of the Notre Dame-speech, at 21, in: Folder "[5/22/77-Notre Dame Speech] [5]," Box 6 "5/17/77-California Trip (UAW) [3] through 5/23/77-Signing Ceremony-Drought & Tax Cut Legislation," Collection Speech Writer's Office-Chron File, Carter Library; compare with Carter's actual speech at the University of Notre Dame, in 1 PUB. PAPERS: JIMMY CARTER 1977, 954 (1977). This passage was supposed to follow the much-quoted appeal for US leadership "to regain the moral stature that we once had." Id. at 958.
32. Ambassador Andrew Young, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly (14 Dec. 1978), reprinted in AM. FOR. REL. 1978: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 510-15 (Elaine P. Adam ed., 1979).
33. Jimmy Carter, Speech at the University of Notre Dame (22 May 1977), supra note 12, at 961.
34. Memorandum from Doolittle to Fallows, passed on to the President (20 May 1977) with handwritten remarks by Carter, in: Folder "[5/22/77-Notre Dame Speech] [4]," Box 6 "5/17/77-California Trip (UAW) [3] through 5/23/77-Signing Ceremony-Drought & Tax Cut Legislation," Collection Speech Writer's Office-Chron File, Carter Library. From this memorandum the famous "inordinate fear"-formulation also originated: What is new about the Carter foreign policy is that it is not based on fear. Its basis is, instead, a calm confidence in the superiority of our own system. . . . When you are confident of democracy's future, you are free of that inordinate fear of communism which once lead us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear.
35. Even Eleanor Roosevelt, generally regarded as predisposed to progressive ideas, spoke out against direct governmental action for the protection of economic and social rights in December 1948 in her position as head of the US delegation at the United Nations. In 1952, the delegation finally was successful in its efforts to obtain a detachment of civil and political rights from economic and social rights, which was to lead to the passage of two separate international covenants on human rights. See M. Glen Johnson, The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 HUM RTS. Q. 19 (1987).
36. This argument is summarized by ERNST B. HAAS, GLOBAL EVANGELISM RIDES AGAIN: HOW TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT REALLY TRYING (1978), who deplored a "double standard" of the United Nations on human rights violations: "The logic of the Cold War and of the struggle for de-colonization dominated the consideration of human rights issues." Id. at 29.
37. On the longevity of concerns against a ratification of international human rights treaties see Natalie Henever Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM RTS. Q. 309 (1988).
38. See Confidential Assignment for the Presidential Review Memorandum PRM/NSC-28 (20 May 1977), in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (National Security Archive ed., 1994, Document No. 1562).
39. Confidential draft of the Presidential Review Memorandum PRM/NSC-28: Human Rights (PRM/NSC-28) of 7 July 1977, in: Folder "Human Rights, PRM, 7/77 [CF, O/A 716]," Box 19 "Human Rights through [Indian Land Claims] Maine: Notes Doug Huron," Collection White House Office Counsel to the President, Carter Library.
40. See Presidential Directive/NSC 30, "Human Rights," in: Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (National Security Archive ed., Document No. 1521). An instructive undated draft of this Directive is to be found in the appendix of the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Vice-President Walter Mondale of Feb. 7, 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079).
41. See Presidential Directive/NSC 30, "Human Rights," in: Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (National Security Archive ed., Document No. 1521). An instructive undated draft of this Directive is to be found in the appendix of the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Vice-President Walter Mondale of Feb. 7, 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079).
42. Presidential Directive/NSC 30, supra note 33, at 1. The words in italics only appear in the aforementioned draft. Basically, this directive only reconfirmed the approach already put into practice. A report by the director of the policy planning staff in the State Department, Anthony Lake, had critically summarized one month earlier: "[W]e say that all three aspects of human rights . . . are equally important. But our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations of the person, than on countries where there is little political liberty. Moreover . . ., we do not give a government's own efforts to promote economic development or equity equal weight with its record on political liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance"; confidential report from Lake to Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment," draft version 16 Jan. 1978, at 13, in Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 174, Document No. 1852).
43. Presidential Directive/NSC 30, supra note 33, at 1. The words in italics only appear in the aforementioned draft. Basically, this directive only reconfirmed the approach already put into practice. A report by the director of the policy planning staff in the State Department, Anthony Lake, had critically summarized one month earlier: "[W]e say that all three aspects of human rights . . . are equally important. But our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations of the person, than on countries where there is little political liberty. Moreover . . ., we do not give a government's own efforts to promote economic development or equity equal weight with its record on political liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance"; confidential report from Lake to Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment," draft version 16 Jan. 1978, at 13, in Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 174, Document No. 1852).
44. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The Carter Human Rights Policy: A Provisional Appraisal, 10-11, 45-46 (11 Jan. 1981), in: Folder "[NSC Accomplishments-Human Rights: 1/81]," Box 34, Collection Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection-Subject File, Carter Library.
45. Congress granted the administration only little latitude for developmental aid or the opening of US markets, especially when prospective projects implied cooperation with the Soviet Union. The North/South-Dialogue certainly was a laudable undertaking, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wrote in reaction to Carter's Notre Dame-speech, but it should not blur the foreign policy focus of the White House on the primary issue - the Soviet challenge. See Patrick Moynihan, Totalitarianism - the Central Challenge, in MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S STANCE 32 (Ernest W. Lefever ed., 1977).
46. Already on 18 February 1977, the NSC staff member for Global Affairs Jessica Tuchman proposed - in preparation for the UN speech of the President - to Brzezinski that Carter should define the "most basic human rights," which in her opinion was primarily the "sanctity of the person," the protection against "detainment and arrest without charge, torture, killing, etc." Confidential memorandum, Human Rights Proposal, at 3, in: Folder "Human Rights, 2-4/77," Box IO-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library.
47. Quoted in David M. Maxfield, Human Rights: Getting Through a Policy Maze, 36 CONG. Q. 2046-51, 2049 (1978).
48. In July 1977, the Presidential Review Memorandum on Human Rights still held that "[o]ur natural allies on human rights questions . . . will be the center and moderate liberal wings of both parties," but continued to deplore that "the human rights advocates on the Hill who should be our greatest supporters have been frustrated because our actions fail to meet their optimistic expectations." PRM/NSC-28, supra note 32, at 82.
49. Confidential memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, "Human Rights," 3 Dec. 1977, at 3, in Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074).
50. Stanley Hoffmann, The Hell of Good Intentions, 29 FOREIGN POL'Y, 3, 20 (Winter 1977/ 78).
51. See the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Research Publications International, Declassified Documents (1994), Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287. "[W]e run genuine risks with such a foundation," Mondale warned the President. "It would have a quasi-governmental character. The government would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction on those difficult human rights which cannot be resolved immediately." Carter's note on the margin - "We may publicly support a group organized privately - & privately we can help to organize or bolster one." - indicates that the President also regarded open support by the administration for such an initiative as a political risk. Brzezinski continued to push for a human rights institute, but it received "less than enthusiastic endorsement" by the administration, as Madeleine Albright commented after Congress had rejected the project. See her undated and unclassified memorandum "Congressional Human Rights Vote" to Brzezinski, in Folder: Human Rights, 2-4/77, Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Carter Library.
52. See the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Research Publications International, Declassified Documents (1994), Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287. "[W]e run genuine risks with such a foundation," Mondale warned the President. "It would have a quasi-governmental character. The government would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction on those difficult human rights which cannot be resolved immediately." Carter's note on the margin - "We may publicly support a group organized privately - & privately we can help to organize or bolster one." - indicates that the President also regarded open support by the administration for such an initiative as a political risk. Brzezinski continued to push for a human rights institute, but it received "less than enthusiastic endorsement" by the administration, as Madeleine Albright commented after Congress had rejected the project. See her undated and unclassified memorandum "Congressional Human Rights Vote" to Brzezinski, in Folder: Human Rights, 2-4/77, Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Carter Library.
53. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
54. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
55. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
56. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
57. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
58. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
59. The executive branch debate on the Human Rights Foundation is not only a first-rate example of governmental timidity, but also stands out in glaring contrast to the vigorous efforts of the Reagan administration to establish - in a narrower and more conservative fashion - the National Endowment for Democracy. This debate, so far basically ignored in the literature, will be dealt with in detail in my forthcoming dissertation. The documentary record of this debate includes the confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 3 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 200, Document No. 2074); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Mondale to Carter, 7 Dec. 1977, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 195, Document No. 2287); confidential memorandum "Human Rights Foundation" from Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Jan. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (rp research publications ed., 1991, Microfiche No. 302, Document No. 3394); confidential memorandum "Human Rights" from Brzezinski to Carter, 7 Feb. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1996, Microfiche No. 83, Document No. 1079); unclassified memorandum "OMB's Position on the Establishment of a Human Rights Institute" from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 Apr. 1978, in: Folder 6, "4/1/78-6/30/78," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library; and the unclassified memorandum "Fascell's Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute" from NSC staff member Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, 3 May 1978, in: Folder "Human Rights, 5/ 77-11/78," Box 10-32, Collection National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material-Subject File, Carter Library. See also Institute for Human Rights and Freedom: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1978).
60. Confidential memorandum Human Rights: Country Reports, the UN Treaties and a New Strategy, from NSC staff member Jessica Tuchman via Madeleine Albright to Brzezinski, 2 Oct. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 189, Document No. 2250). For a legislative initiative to this effect, which was planned in March 1979, but then not undertaken see Lincoln Bloomfield, supra note 35, at 43.
61. Confidential memorandum Human Rights: Country Reports, the UN Treaties and a New Strategy, from NSC staff member Jessica Tuchman via Madeleine Albright to Brzezinski, 2 Oct. 1978, in: Declassified Documents (research publications international ed., 1994, Microfiche No. 189, Document No. 2250). For a legislative initiative to this effect, which was planned in March 1979, but then not undertaken see Lincoln Bloomfield, supra note 35, at 43.
62. For a critical comparison of rhetoric and substance of the Carter administration's human rights policy see Larman C. Wilson, Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy: The Rhetoric and the Practice, in INTERACTION: FOREIGN POL'Y AND PUBLIC POLICY 178 (Don C. Piper & Ronald J. Terchek eds., 1983); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985).
63. For a critical comparison of rhetoric and substance of the Carter administration's human rights policy see Larman C. Wilson, Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy: The Rhetoric and the Practice, in INTERACTION: FOREIGN POL'Y AND PUBLIC POLICY 178 (Don C. Piper & Ronald J. Terchek eds., 1983); David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 205 (1985).
64. The literature on this topic in general pays much attention to the Bureau's upgrading in rank, personnel, and responsibilities by Congressional initiative. However, almost no mention is made of the frontal attack on the Human Rights Bureau by the Department's Bureau of Management during 1979. As the Human Rights Bureau was accused of violating the anti-deficit guidelines of the Department by exceeding the expenses for its refugee programs, the Bureau of Management successfully tried to take away the responsibilities for refugee affairs from HA, leaving only asylum matters under the auspices of Derian's team. This resulted in a decrease of personnel and interdepartmental standing. In its memorandum "Proposed Reorganization of Refugee Functions" to the Bureau of Management of 9 April 1979, HA warned that Congress, the public and the Department itself would view "such a reduction [as] a weakening of Department of State commitment to human rights," but the Bureau of Management even emphasized its wish to reduce functions and personnel of the young bureau further after the end of Carter's first term to underline its limited scope "as a pure policy bureau." For a description of this bureaucratic fight, see Margaret F. Gourlay, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Department of State Organizational History, Washington D.C.: Department of State Library (loose binder) (Office of the Historian, State Department ed., March 1984), Part 1, Section HA, at 5-6. Rossiter, supra note 19, n.27, at 27 instead suggests that this reorganization actually relieved the Human Rights Bureau of a burden, while Maynard, "Bureaucracy and Implementation," supra note 19, at 180, even describes this as Derian's own initiative.
65. The literature on this topic in general pays much attention to the Bureau's upgrading in rank, personnel, and responsibilities by Congressional initiative. However, almost no mention is made of the frontal attack on the Human Rights Bureau by the Department's Bureau of Management during 1979. As the Human Rights Bureau was accused of violating the anti-deficit guidelines of the Department by exceeding the expenses for its refugee programs, the Bureau of Management successfully tried to take away the responsibilities for refugee affairs from HA, leaving only asylum matters under the auspices of Derian's team. This resulted in a decrease of personnel and interdepartmental standing. In its memorandum "Proposed Reorganization of Refugee Functions" to the Bureau of Management of 9 April 1979, HA warned that Congress, the public and the Department itself would view "such a reduction [as] a weakening of Department of State commitment to human rights," but the Bureau of Management even emphasized its wish to reduce functions and personnel of the young bureau further after the end of Carter's first term to underline its limited scope "as a pure policy bureau." For a description of this bureaucratic fight, see Margaret F. Gourlay, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Department of State Organizational History, Washington D.C.: Department of State Library (loose binder) (Office of the Historian, State Department ed., March 1984), Part 1, Section HA, at 5-6. Rossiter, supra note 19, n.27, at 27 instead suggests that this reorganization actually relieved the Human Rights Bureau of a burden, while Maynard, "Bureaucracy and Implementation," supra note 19, at 180, even describes this as Derian's own initiative.
66. The literature on this topic in general pays much attention to the Bureau's upgrading in rank, personnel, and responsibilities by Congressional initiative. However, almost no mention is made of the frontal attack on the Human Rights Bureau by the Department's Bureau of Management during 1979. As the Human Rights Bureau was accused of violating the anti-deficit guidelines of the Department by exceeding the expenses for its refugee programs, the Bureau of Management successfully tried to take away the responsibilities for refugee affairs from HA, leaving only asylum matters under the auspices of Derian's team. This resulted in a decrease of personnel and interdepartmental standing. In its memorandum "Proposed Reorganization of Refugee Functions" to the Bureau of Management of 9 April 1979, HA warned that Congress, the public and the Department itself would view "such a reduction [as] a weakening of Department of State commitment to human rights," but the Bureau of Management even emphasized its wish to reduce functions and personnel of the young bureau further after the end of Carter's first term to underline its limited scope "as a pure policy bureau." For a description of this bureaucratic fight, see Margaret F. Gourlay, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Department of State Organizational History, Washington D.C.: Department of State Library (loose binder) (Office of the Historian, State Department ed., March 1984), Part 1, Section HA, at 5-6. Rossiter, supra note 19, n.27, at 27 instead suggests that this reorganization actually relieved the Human Rights Bureau of a burden, while Maynard, "Bureaucracy and Implementation," supra note 19, at 180, even describes this as Derian's own initiative.
67. See JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 46 (1986). See also VOGELGESANG, supra note 6, at 60, who likewise describes Derian as a "determined political appointee with direct access to the president."
68. See JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 46 (1986). See also VOGELGESANG, supra note 6, at 60, who likewise describes Derian as a "determined political appointee with direct access to the president."
69. Derian first applied for a meeting via the President's legal adviser Bob Lipshutz in November 1977, which was supported by Vance, but not granted. See the unclassified memorandum from Lipshutz to Carter, 11 Nov. 1977, in: Folder 2, "11/1/77-12/31/77," Box HU-2, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library. Another request, supported by Brzezinski in November 1978, was finally successful and led to a brief exchange on 6 December 1978, see the unclassified schedule proposal from Brzezinski to Carter, 8 November 1978. Under the rubric "Previous Participation," the proposal explicitly states: "You have not met with Secretary Derian to discuss her responsibilities," in: Folder 8, "1/20/77-1/20/81," Box HU-1, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library.
70. Derian Interview, supra note 2.
71. Id. Rossiter, supra note 19, n.11, at 26, offers a slightly different account on the question of informing the President. "One high official" had told him that it was Carter who had "asked Derian to communicate directly with him." Derian reportedly declined, saying that she "would not circumvent normal channels of communication."
72. Maynard, supra note 19, at 187.
73. ESF until 1979 was named more appropriately Security Supporting Assistance and includes funds for large infrastructural projects or to cover balance-of-payments deficits in states deemed strategically relevant. For a detailed description of the operating procedures of this board, see the untitled report of the economic officer of the Human Rights Bureau Barbara Bowie. This report was given to the transition team of the incoming Reagan administration and passed on to the Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. It is attached to the memorandum "Historical Reports" from G. Michael Bache (HA) & David Pierce (Economic Bureau), 3 Feb. 1981, in: Case-No. 8204052, Part I, Microfiche 1: "Carter, Jimmy: Human Rights 1977-1981," FOIA-Office, Department of State, Washington D.C.
74. Rossiter, supra note 19, at 6-20, describes the Christopher Group as a confrontation-ridden "kangaroo court," at 20, while the "Historical Reports" prepared by Bowie, supra note 52, suggest a more consensus-oriented working atmosphere. Also, Rossiter interprets the fact that the main responsibility for the supervision of food aid stayed with the Department of Agriculture and that development projects were primarily worked out by the AID as weakening HA's position, whereas Bowie's "Historical Reports" emphasize that HA was integrated into the long-term planning of AID'S projects and annual budgets and was regularly consulted on food aid decisions. The "basic human needs"-character of most of this kind of aid make any fundamental and long-term controversies between the agencies involved unlikely.
75. Rossiter, supra note 19, at 6-20, describes the Christopher Group as a confrontation-ridden "kangaroo court," at 20, while the "Historical Reports" prepared by Bowie, supra note 52, suggest a more consensus-oriented working atmosphere. Also, Rossiter interprets the fact that the main responsibility for the supervision of food aid stayed with the Department of Agriculture and that development projects were primarily worked out by the AID as weakening HA's position, whereas Bowie's "Historical Reports" emphasize that HA was integrated into the long-term planning of AID'S projects and annual budgets and was regularly consulted on food aid decisions. The "basic human needs"-character of most of this kind of aid make any fundamental and long-term controversies between the agencies involved unlikely.
76. "[T]he President's human rights policy was at least discussed in the Board, if only because the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA) was a participant and could in egregious cases make its argument with State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM). If the case was bumped up to higher levels, PM or the regional bureaus . . . invariably won out and the sale would be approved." Bloomfield, supra note 35, at 14-15.
77. Id. at 45.
78. Transcript of an Interview with David Aaron 9, 15 Dec. 1980, in: Folder, "Aaron, David," Box 1, Collection White House Staff Exit Interviews, Carter Library.
79. The term "modified Cold Warriors" is taken from Cottam, supra note 11, at 124.
80. Secret memorandum NSC Report for 1977: A Critical Self-Appraisal from Brzezinski to Carter, 12 Jan. 1978, at 29/30, in: Folder, "Weekly Reports [to the President] 42-52," Box 41, Collection Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection-Subject File, Carter Library.
81. Interview with Robert Pastor, former NSC staff member for Latin American Affairs, in Atlanta, GA (17 Apr. 1998).
82. Nicaragua was the conservatives' favorite example for accusing the Carter administration of active collaboration to replace "moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion." See Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, in 68 COMMENTARY 34-35 (1979) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships]. However, as soon as a victory of the leftist guerillas was perceived as possible and as a strategic threat, the Carter administration in fact downgraded its concern for human rights, as the NSC staff member for Latin American Affairs, Robert Pastor, explained: "[Once] the United States approached Nicaragua as a political-security crisis, . . . the Human Rights Bureau was excluded from the central deliberations, although it continued to play a role in defining the State Department position. . . . By September 1978, the frontier of US human rights policy had been reached." ROBERT PASTOR, THE UNITED STATES AND NICARAGUA 70 & 74 (1987).
83. Nicaragua was the conservatives' favorite example for accusing the Carter administration of active collaboration to replace "moderate autocrats friendly to American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion." See Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, in 68 COMMENTARY 34-35 (1979) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships]. However, as soon as a victory of the leftist guerillas was perceived as possible and as a strategic threat, the Carter administration in fact downgraded its concern for human rights, as the NSC staff member for Latin American Affairs, Robert Pastor, explained: "[Once] the United States approached Nicaragua as a political-security crisis, . . . the Human Rights Bureau was excluded from the central deliberations, although it continued to play a role in defining the State Department position. . . . By September 1978, the frontier of US human rights policy had been reached." ROBERT PASTOR, THE UNITED STATES AND NICARAGUA 70 & 74 (1987).
84. For a description of Carter's policy towards El Salvador, see RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR (1984). For a more recent synopsis, see DARIO MORENO, U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ENDLESS DEBATE 71-81 (1990). An account which makes use of the abundance of documentary material declassified during the early 1990s is lacking. Excellent collections of executive branch documents on El Salvador from Carter to Bush are provided by the National Security Archive. See EL SALVADOR: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1977-1984 (National Security Archive ed., 1989); EL SALVADOR: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1980-1994 (National Security Archive ed., 1996). My forthcoming dissertation will deal extensively with the US human rights policy towards El Salvador.
85. For a description of Carter's policy towards El Salvador, see RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR (1984). For a more recent synopsis, see DARIO MORENO, U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ENDLESS DEBATE 71-81 (1990). An account which makes use of the abundance of documentary material declassified during the early 1990s is lacking. Excellent collections of executive branch documents on El Salvador from Carter to Bush are provided by the National Security Archive. See EL SALVADOR: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1977-1984 (National Security Archive ed., 1989); EL SALVADOR: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1980-1994 (National Security Archive ed., 1996). My forthcoming dissertation will deal extensively with the US human rights policy towards El Salvador.
86. For a description of Carter's policy towards El Salvador, see RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR (1984). For a more recent synopsis, see DARIO MORENO, U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ENDLESS DEBATE 71-81 (1990). An account which makes use of the abundance of documentary material declassified during the early 1990s is lacking. Excellent collections of executive branch documents on El Salvador from Carter to Bush are provided by the National Security Archive. See EL SALVADOR: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1977-1984 (National Security Archive ed., 1989); EL SALVADOR: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1980-1994 (National Security Archive ed., 1996). My forthcoming dissertation will deal extensively with the US human rights policy towards El Salvador.
87. For a description of Carter's policy towards El Salvador, see RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR (1984). For a more recent synopsis, see DARIO MORENO, U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ENDLESS DEBATE 71-81 (1990). An account which makes use of the abundance of documentary material declassified during the early 1990s is lacking. Excellent collections of executive branch documents on El Salvador from Carter to Bush are provided by the National Security Archive. See EL SALVADOR: THE MAKING OF U.S. POLICY, 1977-1984 (National Security Archive ed., 1989); EL SALVADOR: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1980-1994 (National Security Archive ed., 1996). My forthcoming dissertation will deal extensively with the US human rights policy towards El Salvador.
88. Unclassified memorandum, Carter Human Rights Policy from Buergenthal to the U.S. Ambassador at the UNESCO Esteban E. Torres, 17 Mar. 1980, at 1, 3, in: Folder 5, "11/ 1/79-5/31/80," Box HU-3, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library.
89. "[Y]ou might just have come across the one matter that could unite the declining numbers of free people in this world and bring more and more of those who live under the slavery of communism into our fold. I pray this is true, but I think you can make it happen if you will approach this in a more realistic way. . . . I would hope and pray that you will . . . reverse the positions you have been taking relative to communist countries," letter from Goldwater to Carter, 18 Apr. 1977 in: Folder 4, "5/1/77-5/31/77," Box HU-1, Collection White House Central Files-Subject File, Carter Library.
90. Moynihan, supra note 36, at 33.
91. Id. at 34.
92. It was argued that even the human rights covenants of the United Nations only distinguished between civil and political rights and economic and social rights, see MURAVCHIK, supra note 47, at 98-99.
93. Id. at 99. Even though President Carter did not follow the bipolar scheme of his conservative critics, there were several members of the administration who emphasized the importance of democratization. The Policy Review Memorandum of July 1977 concluded: "In the final analysis, reliable and lasting protection against violations of the first and second group can only come with the development of institutions that protect civil and political liberties, . . ." in PRM/NSC-28, supra note 32, at 3, but it continued: "In promoting the third group of rights, there is a particular need, however, for caution to avoid giving our policy a parochial cast that appears to export American-style democracy. . . . Our experience in Vietnam and elsewhere have taught us the limits of our power to influence the internal workings of other nations." Id. at 4.
94. Ernest W. Lefever, Limits of the Human Rights Standard, in MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S STANCE 72-74 (Ernest W. Lefever ed., 1977).
95. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships, supra note 60, at 34 (1979); Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security and Latin America, 71 COMMENTARY 29 (1981) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security].
96. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships, supra note 60, at 34 (1979); Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security and Latin America, 71 COMMENTARY 29 (1981) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security].
97. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships, supra note 60, at 44.
98. Id.
99. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security, supra note 69, at 31.
100. Id.
101. On the initial policy of the Reagan administration towards repressive regimes, see Tamar Jacoby, at 1066-70 (1986).
102. "Our greatest contribution to human rights would be to help prevent a democratic or an authoritarian state from being conquered or subverted by totalitarian forces. . . . They not only violate such rights in their own countries, but attempt to export a system predicated upon the denial of all basic human rights." See Jeffery B. Gayner, The Department of State, in MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION 503, at 548-49 (Charles L. Heatherly ed., 1981) (emphasis in the original).
103. On the Reagan administration's early comments on human rights see Wilson, supra note 45, at 194-201.
104. Interview with Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in Washington D.C. (15 June 1998).
105. On Congressional opposition to Lefever's nomination, see Nomination of Ernest W. Lefever: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1981).
106. Letter from New York Representative Guy V. Molinari to Reagan, 1 Oct. 1981, co-signed by forty-five members of the House of Representatives, in: ID# 041762, Subject Category HU (Human Rights), Collection White House Office of Records Management-Subject File, Reagan Library.
107. Letter from directors Robert L. Bernstein, Orville H. Schell and Aryeh Neier, and from Helsinki Watch-member John Carey to Reagan, 5 Oct. 1981, in: ID# 042670, Subject Category HU (Human Rights), Collection White House Office of Records Management-Subject File, Reagan Library. The letter states that on 24 Sept. 1981, Deputy Secretary of State William P. Clark told several representatives of human rights groups - among them John Carey_about plans to do away with the Human Rights Bureau. Clark's announcement probably was not intended as a threat, but as a warning. The Deputy Secretary played a crucial role in reviving the human rights policy, and in a letter to him in June, 1982, Aryeh Neier commended him: "In our view, the Reagan administration got off to a bad start on human rights. Thanks in very large part to your own receptivity to the concerns . . . expressed, we think the administration's record has improved substantially. We hope that you take satisfaction from the role that you have played. . . ." Letter from Neier to Clark, 22 June 1982 in: ID# 087137, Subject Category HU (Human Rights), Collection White House Office of Records Management-Subject File, Reagan Library.
108. Letter from Palmer to Bernstein, 28 Oct. 1981, in: ID# 042670, Subject Category HU (Human Rights), Collection White House Office of Records Management-Subject File, Reagan Library.
109. Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1070, argues that a "national consensus for a more aggressive and evenhanded human rights policy" existed.
110. The Memorandum "Reinvigoration of Human Rights Policy" from Clark and Kennedy to Haig, is partially reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, 5 Nov. 1981, at 10. The authorship of this memorandum is shared between Elliott Abrams, then Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and Charles Herron Fairbanks, Jr. of the policy planning staff at the State Department and later Abrams' Deputy. In an interview with the author on 15 June 1998 in Washington D.C., Abrams recalled to have written the memorandum in consultation with Fairbanks, Abrams Interview, supra note 77. On Fairbanks' role in this process, then-acting Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Stephen Palmer said in retrospect: [H]e became convinced that the new administration could . . . use human rights in a constructive way, could stay with the country reports, and emphasize more quiet diplomacy. . . . [H]e persuaded . . . Kennedy. . . . Haig was persuaded by Kennedy, and all of a sudden the atmosphere, at least at the top of the State Department, had been changed. Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy with Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., Association for Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Georgetown University Library, 31 June 1995, at 79.
111. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Elliott Abrams: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (1981). On this occasion, the "reinvigoration" memorandum was debated approvingly, see id. at 8-11.
112. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981, 1-11 (1982).
113. "Rights were considered to enable individuals to pursue happiness freely, but not to supply happiness itself. For a government to insist it could define and supply happiness itself would take away men's right to liberty." Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 10.
116. Ronald Reagan, Speech to the British Parliament (8 June 1982), reprinted in 1 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN 1982, 742-48 (1983).
117. On the establishment and the work of the National Endowment tor Democracy (NED), a formally private organization, which operated under the management of the two party-foundations, the American Institute for Free Labor Development and the US Chamber of Commerce and provided funds granted by Congress for projects supposed to support the democratization-processes, see JOSHUA MUKAVCHIK,, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY 204-20 (1991). A more critical account on the NED is provided by Barbara Conry, Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 27 (1993). A case-study on the work of the NED as a tool of US interventionism is offered by WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (1992).
118. On the establishment and the work of the National Endowment tor Democracy (NED), a formally private organization, which operated under the management of the two party-foundations, the American Institute for Free Labor Development and the US Chamber of Commerce and provided funds granted by Congress for projects supposed to support the democratization-processes, see JOSHUA MUKAVCHIK,, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY 204-20 (1991). A more critical account on the NED is provided by Barbara Conry, Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 27 (1993). A case-study on the work of the NED as a tool of US interventionism is offered by WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (1992).
119. On the establishment and the work of the National Endowment tor Democracy (NED), a formally private organization, which operated under the management of the two party-foundations, the American Institute for Free Labor Development and the US Chamber of Commerce and provided funds granted by Congress for projects supposed to support the democratization-processes, see JOSHUA MUKAVCHIK,, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA'S DESTINY 204-20 (1991). A more critical account on the NED is provided by Barbara Conry, Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 27 (1993). A case-study on the work of the NED as a tool of US interventionism is offered by WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A FAUSTIAN BARGAIN: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (1992).
120. Bloomfield, supra note 35, at 11.
121. Derian Interview, supra note 2.
122. MURAVCHIK, supra note 47, at 57.
123. Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1076.
124. In reaction to the publication of the UN Truth Commission Report on El Salvador, Secretary of State Warren Christopher in late March 1993 convened an El Salvador Panel to review thousands of documents and to interview the foreign policy personnel involved during the Reagan and Bush years to assess whether administration representatives had ignored or downplayed human rights concerns in El Salvador, suppressed information or lied to Congress and the public. The very well-disposed report of this panel, completed in July 1993 and solely dealing with the human rights policy and not with the over-all policy towards El Salvador, contained some criticism, especially on the information policy of the early Reagan administration, but generally reached the conclusion that "the Department and Foreign Service personnel performed creditably -and on occasion with personal bravery - in advancing human rights in El Salvador." See George S. Vest, Richard W. Murphy & I.M. Destler, Report of the Secretary of State's Panel on El Salvador, Executive Summary, in EL SALVADOR: WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1980-1994, Document 1324, at 1 (National Security Archive ed., 1996). The bulk of the documents reviewed by the panel were subsequently declassified and are contained in the National Security Archive's recent El Salvador collection.
125. Abrams Interview, supra note 77.
126. On the El Mozote massacre see Mark Danner, The Truth of El Mozote, NEW YORKER, 6 Dec. 1993, at 50-133; on the administration's reaction to the massacre see Vest, Murphy & Destler, supra note 95, at 55-60.
127. On the El Mozote massacre see Mark Danner, The Truth of El Mozote, NEW YORKER, 6 Dec. 1993, at 50-133; on the administration's reaction to the massacre see Vest, Murphy & Destler, supra note 95, at 55-60.
128. On Congressional concerns relating to Reagan's Central American policies see CYNTHIA ARNSON, CROSSROADS: CONGRESS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND CENTRAL AMERICA (1989).
129. Abrams Interview, supra note 77.
130. For an early study of only formal democratization see EDWARD S. HERMAN & FRANK BRODHEAD, DEMONSTRATION ELECTIONS: U.S. STAGED ELECTIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, VIETNAM, AND EL SALVADOR (1984).