Schelling's critique of Hegel's science of logic

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 99-128

  Houlgate, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

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References (142)

1. Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1993), 1.
2. See Alan White, Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983), 7.
3. See, for example, Edward Allen Beach, The Potencies of God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1994), 142.
4. The most thorough English-language study of Schelling's Hegelkritik, besides Bowie's book, is Alan White's Absolute Knowledge (cited above, note 2). An important recent German study of Schelling's relation to Hegel is to be found in Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Die Grenzen der Vernunft. Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main: Anton Hain, 1991), 245-68 .
5. See F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke (hereafter "SW"), ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Part I, 10 vols.; Part II, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 10:126-64. For the English translation of these lectures, see F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy (hereafter "OHMP"), trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 134-63
6. See F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke (hereafter "SW"), ed. K. F. A. Schelling, Part I, 10 vols.; Part II, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-61), 10:126-64. For the English translation of these lectures, see F. W. J. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy (hereafter "OHMP"), trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 134-63
7. See SW, II/3:1-174. All translations from the lectures on the introduction to the philosophy of revelation are my own. It might, of course, be possible to formulate alternative Schellingian criticisms of Hegel based on earlier texts of Schelling which do not address Hegel's philosophy explicitly. In this essay, however, I restrict myself to Schelling's own direct critique of Hegel and its background in the distinction he draws between negative and positive philosophy.
8. SW, II/3:83: "nur das reine Was desselben enthält, nichts aber von dem Daβ, von der Existenz." See also SW, II/3:59.
9. SW, II/3:83: "nur das reine Was desselben enthält, nichts aber von dem Daβ, von der Existenz." See also SW, II/3:59.
10. SW, II/3:60 and 101-2.
11. SW, II/3:172.
12. On Schelling's view that the existence of particular things in nature can only be confirmed a posteriori by sensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:61-2, 171, and 173. On his view that the existence of God (and of other minds) can only be confirmed a posteriori by pure, nonsensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:113, 169, 171, and 173, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 148 and 172. Note that alongside the more familiar sensuous empiricism, Schelling thus propounds a theory of metaphysical empiricism, according to which we can directly intuit that which is not given to the senses; see SW, II/3:114.
13. On Schelling's view that the existence of particular things in nature can only be confirmed a posteriori by sensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:61-2, 171, and 173. On his view that the existence of God (and of other minds) can only be confirmed a posteriori by pure, nonsensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:113, 169, 171, and 173, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 148 and 172. Note that alongside the more familiar sensuous empiricism, Schelling thus propounds a theory of metaphysical empiricism, according to which we can directly intuit that which is not given to the senses; see SW, II/3:114.
14. On Schelling's view that the existence of particular things in nature can only be confirmed a posteriori by sensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:61-2, 171, and 173. On his view that the existence of God (and of other minds) can only be confirmed a posteriori by pure, nonsensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:113, 169, 171, and 173, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 148 and 172. Note that alongside the more familiar sensuous empiricism, Schelling thus propounds a theory of metaphysical empiricism, according to which we can directly intuit that which is not given to the senses; see SW, II/3:114.
15. On Schelling's view that the existence of particular things in nature can only be confirmed a posteriori by sensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:61-2, 171, and 173. On his view that the existence of God (and of other minds) can only be confirmed a posteriori by pure, nonsensuous experience or Vorstellung, see SW, II/3:113, 169, 171, and 173, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 148 and 172. Note that alongside the more familiar sensuous empiricism, Schelling thus propounds a theory of metaphysical empiricism, according to which we can directly intuit that which is not given to the senses; see SW, II/3:114.
16. The appropriate translation of Vorstellung would thus be "presentation" rather than "representation." I have elected to leave the term untranslated in this essay, however, as the etymology of the German word itself provides the clearest indication of its meaning for Schelling.
17. SW, II/3:161: "Das Denken hat eben nur mit der Möglichkeit, der Potenz zu tun."
18. SW, II/3:165, 148.
19. For a lucid account of Schelling's negative philosophy, see Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 95-146. See also John Burbidge, "Contraries and Contradictories: Reasoning in Schelling's Late Philosophy," The Owl of Minerva 16, no. 1 (fall 1984): 55-68.
20. For a lucid account of Schelling's negative philosophy, see Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 95-146. See also John Burbidge, "Contraries and Contradictories: Reasoning in Schelling's Late Philosophy," The Owl of Minerva 16, no. 1 (fall 1984): 55-68.
21. SW, II/3:104, 149, and 155.
22. In this essay I will follow Schelling in using these terms interchangeably, whether I am discussing Schelling himself or Hegel. Distinctions will be drawn between necessary and contingent existence, and between the mere thought of existence and the Vorstellung of existence, but no significant distinctions will be drawn between existence, being and actuality. In the Science of Logic Hegel distinguishes these terms very carefully, but the logical distinctions he draws between them are not relevant to the topic of this essay. The terms "existence" and "actuality" should thus be understood here, not in their distinctive Hegelian sense, but rather as equivalent to "being itself" or "sheer being." (Schelling argues that Hegel's concept of sheer -or pure - being falls woefully short of what Schelling himself understands by "being itself." As will become apparent later, however, I believe, contra Schelling, that Hegel's concept of pure being comes much closer to what Schelling has in mind than Schelling allows.) For Hegel's own, highly nuanced account of pure being, existence and actuality, see G. W. F. Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik" (hereafter "WL"), ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel, 2 vols., Theorie Werkausgabe, Vols. 5 and 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), I:82; II:125-47 and 200-17. English translations taken from Science of Logic (hereafter "SL"), trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), 82, 481-98, and 541-53.
23. In this essay I will follow Schelling in using these terms interchangeably, whether I am discussing Schelling himself or Hegel. Distinctions will be drawn between necessary and contingent existence, and between the mere thought of existence and the Vorstellung of existence, but no significant distinctions will be drawn between existence, being and actuality. In the Science of Logic Hegel distinguishes these terms very carefully, but the logical distinctions he draws between them are not relevant to the topic of this essay. The terms "existence" and "actuality" should thus be understood here, not in their distinctive Hegelian sense, but rather as equivalent to "being itself" or "sheer being." (Schelling argues that Hegel's concept of sheer - or pure - being falls woefully short of what Schelling himself understands by "being itself." As will become apparent later, however, I believe, contra Schelling, that Hegel's concept of pure being comes much closer to what Schelling has in mind than Schelling allows.) For Hegel's own, highly nuanced account of pure being, existence and actuality, see G. W. F. Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik" (hereafter "WL"), ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel, 2 vols., Theorie Werkausgabe, Vols. 5 and 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), I:82; II:125-47 and 200-17. English translations taken from Science of Logic (hereafter "SL"), trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), 82, 481-98, and 541-53.
24. In this essay I will follow Schelling in using these terms interchangeably, whether I am discussing Schelling himself or Hegel. Distinctions will be drawn between necessary and contingent existence, and between the mere thought of existence and the Vorstellung of existence, but no significant distinctions will be drawn between existence, being and actuality. In the Science of Logic Hegel distinguishes these terms very carefully, but the logical distinctions he draws between them are not relevant to the topic of this essay. The terms "existence" and "actuality" should thus be understood here, not in their distinctive Hegelian sense, but rather as equivalent to "being itself" or "sheer being." (Schelling argues that Hegel's concept of sheer - or pure - being falls woefully short of what Schelling himself understands by "being itself." As will become apparent later, however, I believe, contra Schelling, that Hegel's concept of pure being comes much closer to what Schelling has in mind than Schelling allows.) For Hegel's own, highly nuanced account of pure being, existence and actuality, see G. W. F. Hegel, "Wissenschaft der Logik" (hereafter "WL"), ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel, 2 vols., Theorie Werkausgabe, Vols. 5 and 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), I:82; II:125-47 and 200-17. English translations taken from Science of Logic (hereafter "SL"), trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), 82, 481-98, and 541-53.
25. SW, II/3:149: "gar nichts von einem Nichtsein."
26. SW, II/3:158-9.
27. SW, II/3:167.
28. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (hereafter "CPR," with references to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions) ed. Raymond Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), A122/B111; English translations taken from Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 116.
29. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (hereafter "CPR," with references to pagination in the first [A] and second [B] German editions) ed. Raymond Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), A122/B111; English translations taken from Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), 116.
30. SW, II/3:160: "eben darum . . . müssen wir von dem ausgehen, was ich das bloβ Existierende genannt habe, von dem unmittelbar, einfach notwendig Seienden, das notwendig ist, weil es aller Potenz, aller Möglichkeit zuvorkommt," 166: "Eben darum ist es das notwendig Existierende, weil es alle vorgängige Möglichkeit ausschlieβt, weil es allem Können zuvorkommt."
31. SW, II/3:165: "das a priori Unbegreifliche."
32. SW, II/3:168: "von selbst."
33. SW, II/3:7. See also Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 162.
34. SW, II/3:7. See also Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 162.
35. SW, II/3:166. This is not to say that nature or the human world is necessary, but only that existence as such is necessary. Insofar as nature and the human world are contingent (because they are freely created) and so do not have to exist, "there could exist nothing at all" (SW, II/3:59). There could not, however, be no existence whatsoever; there could not be absolutely nothing. On the contingency of nature, see notes 36 and 45 below.
36. SW, II/3:166. This is not to say that nature or the human world is necessary, but only that existence as such is necessary. Insofar as nature and the human world are contingent (because they are freely created) and so do not have to exist, "there could exist nothing at all" (SW, II/3:59). There could not, however, be no existence whatsoever; there could not be absolutely nothing. On the contingency of nature, see notes 36 and 45 below.
37. SW, II/3:167.
38. SW, II/3:167.
39. See SW, I/10:17; OHMP, 51-2; SW, II/3:156.
40. See SW, I/10:17; OHMP, 51-2; SW, II/3:156.
41. See SW, I/10:17; OHMP, 51-2; SW, II/3:156.
42. SW, II/3-70: "Die Vernunft, wenn gleich ihr letztes Ziel und Absehen nur das Seiende ist, das Ist, kann es doch nicht anders bestimmen, sie hat keinen Begriff für dasselbe, als den des nicht nicht Seienden."
43. SW, II/3:70, 160, and 171.
44. SW, II/3:153, 164, and 171. For a brief but helpful account of Schelling's positive philosophy, see Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 147-62.
45. SW, II/3:153, 164, and 171. For a brief but helpful account of Schelling's positive philosophy, see Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 147-62.
46. SW, II/3:128: "Denn a priori ist das wovon sie ausgeht."
47. SW, II/3:173.
48. SW, II/3:162-3: "ein absolutes Auβer-sich."
49. SW, II/3:163.
50. Note that Schelling's belief that necessary existence can be shown to be the existence of God is quite compatible with his denial that we can prove the existence of God a priori by means of the ontological argument (or indeed any other argument). Schelling insists that we can know a priori that existence as such is necessary, because sheer existence is all that existence can be; it can never not be, nor can it merely be potential being. But he denies that we can prove a priori that the existence of God (as the perfect being) is necessary, because he rejects the idea that existence is necessarily entailed by perfection; see SW, I/10:15; OHMP, 50. Schelling accepts, however, that we can show a posteriori that sheer, necessary existence is in fact itself the existence of God; see SW, II/3:131, 157-9, and 169, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 107. This commits Schelling to the following position: what can be shown to be necessary is not God's existence as God - as the perfect creator of all things - but God's existence as sheer, necessary existence alone. For Schelling, God's Godhood or Divinity as such cannot be shown to be necessary, and cannot be necessary, because God freely raises himself into his Godhood as he creates the world; see SW, II/4:353. God must exist as sheer existence, as sheer Daβ, therefore; but qua this Daβ he freely makes himself into God as such, into God the creator - a fact that we discover a posteriori by coming to recognize nature and human history as the work of a free creator. See also note 44 below.
51. Note that Schelling's belief that necessary existence can be shown to be the existence of God is quite compatible with his denial that we can prove the existence of God a priori by means of the ontological argument (or indeed any other argument). Schelling insists that we can know a priori that existence as such is necessary, because sheer existence is all that existence can be; it can never not be, nor can it merely be potential being. But he denies that we can prove a priori that the existence of God (as the perfect being) is necessary, because he rejects the idea that existence is necessarily entailed by perfection; see SW, I/10:15; OHMP, 50. Schelling accepts, however, that we can show a posteriori that sheer, necessary existence is in fact itself the existence of God; see SW, II/3:131, 157-9, and 169, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 107. This commits Schelling to the following position: what can be shown to be necessary is not God's existence as God - as the perfect creator of all things - but God's existence as sheer, necessary existence alone. For Schelling, God's Godhood or Divinity as such cannot be shown to be necessary, and cannot be necessary, because God freely raises himself into his Godhood as he creates the world; see SW, II/4:353. God must exist as sheer existence, as sheer Daβ, therefore; but qua this Daβ he freely makes himself into God as such, into God the creator - a fact that we discover a posteriori by coming to recognize nature and human history as the work of a free creator. See also note 44 below.
52. Note that Schelling's belief that necessary existence can be shown to be the existence of God is quite compatible with his denial that we can prove the existence of God a priori by means of the ontological argument (or indeed any other argument). Schelling insists that we can know a priori that existence as such is necessary, because sheer existence is all that existence can be; it can never not be, nor can it merely be potential being. But he denies that we can prove a priori that the existence of God (as the perfect being) is necessary, because he rejects the idea that existence is necessarily entailed by perfection; see SW, I/10:15; OHMP, 50. Schelling accepts, however, that we can show a posteriori that sheer, necessary existence is in fact itself the existence of God; see SW, II/3:131, 157-9, and 169, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 107. This commits Schelling to the following position: what can be shown to be necessary is not God's existence as God - as the perfect creator of all things - but God's existence as sheer, necessary existence alone. For Schelling, God's Godhood or Divinity as such cannot be shown to be necessary, and cannot be necessary, because God freely raises himself into his Godhood as he creates the world; see SW, II/4:353. God must exist as sheer existence, as sheer Daβ, therefore; but qua this Daβ he freely makes himself into God as such, into God the creator - a fact that we discover a posteriori by coming to recognize nature and human history as the work of a free creator. See also note 44 below.
53. Note that Schelling's belief that necessary existence can be shown to be the existence of God is quite compatible with his denial that we can prove the existence of God a priori by means of the ontological argument (or indeed any other argument). Schelling insists that we can know a priori that existence as such is necessary, because sheer existence is all that existence can be; it can never not be, nor can it merely be potential being. But he denies that we can prove a priori that the existence of God (as the perfect being) is necessary, because he rejects the idea that existence is necessarily entailed by perfection; see SW, I/10:15; OHMP, 50. Schelling accepts, however, that we can show a posteriori that sheer, necessary existence is in fact itself the existence of God; see SW, II/3:131, 157-9, and 169, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 107. This commits Schelling to the following position: what can be shown to be necessary is not God's existence as God - as the perfect creator of all things - but God's existence as sheer, necessary existence alone. For Schelling, God's Godhood or Divinity as such cannot be shown to be necessary, and cannot be necessary, because God freely raises himself into his Godhood as he creates the world; see SW, II/4:353. God must exist as sheer existence, as sheer Daβ, therefore; but qua this Daβ he freely makes himself into God as such, into God the creator - a fact that we discover a posteriori by coming to recognize nature and human history as the work of a free creator. See also note 44 below.
54. Note that Schelling's belief that necessary existence can be shown to be the existence of God is quite compatible with his denial that we can prove the existence of God a priori by means of the ontological argument (or indeed any other argument). Schelling insists that we can know a priori that existence as such is necessary, because sheer existence is all that existence can be; it can never not be, nor can it merely be potential being. But he denies that we can prove a priori that the existence of God (as the perfect being) is necessary, because he rejects the idea that existence is necessarily entailed by perfection; see SW, I/10:15; OHMP, 50. Schelling accepts, however, that we can show a posteriori that sheer, necessary existence is in fact itself the existence of God; see SW, II/3:131, 157-9, and 169, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 107. This commits Schelling to the following position: what can be shown to be necessary is not God's existence as God - as the perfect creator of all things - but God's existence as sheer, necessary existence alone. For Schelling, God's Godhood or Divinity as such cannot be shown to be necessary, and cannot be necessary, because God freely raises himself into his Godhood as he creates the world; see SW, II/4:353. God must exist as sheer existence, as sheer Daβ, therefore; but qua this Daβ he freely makes himself into God as such, into God the creator - a fact that we discover a posteriori by coming to recognize nature and human history as the work of a free creator. See also note 44 below.
55. SW, II/3:164.
56. SW, I/10:127; OHMP, 134.
57. SW, I/10:127; OHMP, 134.
58. SW, I/10:126, 141; OHMP, 134, 145.
59. SW, I/10:126, 141; OHMP, 134, 145.
60. SW, I/10:143-4; OHMP, 147.
61. SW, I/10:143-4; OHMP, 147.
62. SW, I/10:126-7, 141; OHMP, 134, 146.
63. SW, I/10:126-7, 141; OHMP, 134, 146.
64. SW, II/3:80.
65. SW; II/3:163.
66. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such - das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
67. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such -das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
68. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such - das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
69. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such - das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
70. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such - das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
71. SW, I/10:159-60; OHMP, 159-60 . For Schelling, existence as such - das Seiende selbst or the pure Daβ - is groundlessly necessary, but nature is not necessary in any sense, either rationally or groundlessly. Groundlessly necessary existence, in Schelling's view, is the primordial existence of God; that is to say, it is God insofar as he is sheer, irreducible existence, sheer that-ness, but not yet God as such. See SW, II/1:586-7; see also "On the Source of the Eternal Truths," trans. Edward Allen Beach, The Owl of Minerva 22, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 64-5. This pure Daβ freely creates nature and in the very same act freely raises itself to explicit Godhood. God as sheer Daβ thus raises itself (himself) to explicit Godhood precisely by becoming the free creator of nature. See SW, II/4:353, and Beach, The Potencies of God(s), 156: "Only in the execution of the world's creation does this Daβ reveal its true character. This is why Schelling insists that God in himself did not, properly speaking, exist prior to the creation, but simply had the status of the infinite Prius, or Überseiende." Hegel's reduction of God to the Concept blinds him, in Schelling's view, to this free activity whereby God both creates nature and becomes fully God at one and the same time. See also note 36 above.
72. SW, I/10:129; OHMP, 136.
73. SW, I/10:129; OHMP, 136.
74. SW, I/10:137; OHMP, 143.
75. SW, I/10:137; OHMP, 143.
76. SW, I/10:133; OHMP, 140.
77. SW, I/10:133; OHMP, 140.
78. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 138.
79. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 138.
80. SW, I/10:131-2; OHMP, 138.
81. SW, I/10:131-2; OHMP, 138.
82. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141.
83. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141.
84. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141.
85. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141.
86. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 138-9.
87. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 138-9.
88. Jacques Derrida, Glas (Paris: Éditions Denoël/Gonthier, 1981), 281: "grâce au jeu du déjà et du pas-encore." For an English translation see Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 201.
89. Jacques Derrida, Glas (Paris: Éditions Denoël/Gonthier, 1981), 281: "grâce au jeu du déjà et du pas-encore." For an English translation see Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 201.
90. See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 289: "The Hegelian dialectic is all powerful to reduce this individuality of the tode ti to the concept." See also, Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 78: "The labor of thought wins out over the otherness of things and men."
91. See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 289: "The Hegelian dialectic is all powerful to reduce this individuality of the tode ti to the concept." See also, Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," in The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 78: "The labor of thought wins out over the otherness of things and men."
92. See, for example, Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 75: "The speculative result is in so far illusory, as the existing subject proposes qua thinker to abstract from the fact that he is occupied in existing, in order to be sub specie aeterni." Kierkegaard is concerned to highlight the existence of the subject, rather than existence as such. Nevertheless, his interpretation of Hegel is similar to - and, indeed, in part indebted to - that of Schelling.
93. SW, II/3:164.
94. For Hegel's discussion of the absolute necessity of being as such, and of the contingency of finite things, see WL, II:200-17; SL, 541-53. See also Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Theorie über den Zufall," in Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 157-86, and Stephen Houlgate, "Necessity and Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic," The Owl of Minerva 27, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 37-49.
95. For Hegel's discussion of the absolute necessity of being as such, and of the contingency of finite things, see WL, II:200-17; SL, 541-53. See also Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Theorie über den Zufall," in Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 157-86, and Stephen Houlgate, "Necessity and Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic," The Owl of Minerva 27, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 37-49.
96. For Hegel's discussion of the absolute necessity of being as such, and of the contingency of finite things, see WL, II:200-17; SL, 541-53. See also Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Theorie über den Zufall," in Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 157-86, and Stephen Houlgate, "Necessity and Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic," The Owl of Minerva 27, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 37-49.
97. For Hegel's discussion of the absolute necessity of being as such, and of the contingency of finite things, see WL, II:200-17; SL, 541-53. See also Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Theorie über den Zufall," in Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 157-86, and Stephen Houlgate, "Necessity and Contingency in Hegel's Science of Logic," The Owl of Minerva 27, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 37-49.
98. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §418; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 10]; Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace, together with the Zusätze in Boumann's text (1845), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 159. I have amended the translation.
99. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §418; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 10]; Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace, together with the Zusätze in Boumann's text (1845), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 159. I have amended the translation.
100. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes, §465; Philosophy of Mind, 224.
101. See G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Zweiter Teil: Die Naturphilosophie. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §254; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 9]; Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) with the Zusätze in Michelet's text (1847), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 28.
102. See G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Zweiter Teil: Die Naturphilosophie. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §254; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 9]; Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) with the Zusätze in Michelet's text (1847), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 28.
103. For Hegel's account of thought and its activity, see Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Dritter Teil: Die Philosophie des Geistes, §§465-7; Philosophy of Mind, 224-7.
104. Strictly speaking, Kant only identifies understanding (Verstand), not thought as a whole, with the faculty of judgment (Vermögen zu urteilen); see CPR, A108-9/B93-4; pp. 105-6. Theoretical reason (Vernunft) depends on the activity of judgment, however, insofar as it seeks "to discover the universal condition of its judgment[s];" see CPR, A345/B364; p. 306. Bowie confirms at various points in his book that Schelling understands thought to be primarily discursive and predicative; see, for example, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 26: "knowledge has a subject-object, prepositional structure"; and 63: "Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling conceives of being as the 'transitive relationship of a subject to its predicates.'" See also Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995), 140-1.
105. Strictly speaking, Kant only identifies understanding (Verstand), not thought as a whole, with the faculty of judgment (Vermögen zu urteilen); see CPR, A108-9/B93-4; pp. 105-6. Theoretical reason (Vernunft) depends on the activity of judgment, however, insofar as it seeks "to discover the universal condition of its judgment[s];" see CPR, A345/B364; p. 306. Bowie confirms at various points in his book that Schelling understands thought to be primarily discursive and predicative; see, for example, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 26: "knowledge has a subject-object, prepositional structure"; and 63: "Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling conceives of being as the 'transitive relationship of a subject to its predicates.'" See also Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995), 140-1.
106. Strictly speaking, Kant only identifies understanding (Verstand), not thought as a whole, with the faculty of judgment (Vermögen zu urteilen); see CPR, A108-9/B93-4; pp. 105-6. Theoretical reason (Vernunft) depends on the activity of judgment, however, insofar as it seeks "to discover the universal condition of its judgment[s];" see CPR, A345/B364; p. 306. Bowie confirms at various points in his book that Schelling understands thought to be primarily discursive and predicative; see, for example, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 26: "knowledge has a subject-object, prepositional structure"; and 63: "Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling conceives of being as the 'transitive relationship of a subject to its predicates.'" See also Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995), 140-1.
107. Strictly speaking, Kant only identifies understanding (Verstand), not thought as a whole, with the faculty of judgment (Vermögen zu urteilen); see CPR, A108-9/B93-4; pp. 105-6. Theoretical reason (Vernunft) depends on the activity of judgment, however, insofar as it seeks "to discover the universal condition of its judgment[s];" see CPR, A345/B364; p. 306. Bowie confirms at various points in his book that Schelling understands thought to be primarily discursive and predicative; see, for example, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 26: "knowledge has a subject-object, prepositional structure"; and 63: "Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling conceives of being as the 'transitive relationship of a subject to its predicates.'" See also Peter Dews, The Limits of Disenchantment: Essays on Contemporary European Philosophy (London: Verso, 1995), 140-1.
108. CPR, A572/B626; p. 504.
109. CPR, A572/B626; p. 504.
110. See CPR, A567-75/B620-30; pp. 500-7, and SW, II/3:156-7, 168-9. On the subtle differences between Kant and Schelling concerning the ontological argument, despite the similarity of their approaches, see SW, I/10:12-17; OHMP, 48-52.
111. See CPR, A567-75/B620-30; pp. 500-7, and SW, II/3:156-7, 168-9. On the subtle differences between Kant and Schelling concerning the ontological argument, despite the similarity of their approaches, see SW, I/10:12-17; OHMP, 48-52.
112. See CPR, A567-75/B620-30; pp. 500-7, and SW, II/3:156-7, 168-9. On the subtle differences between Kant and Schelling concerning the ontological argument, despite the similarity of their approaches, see SW, I/10:12-17; OHMP, 48-52.
113. See CPR, A567-75/B620-30; pp. 500-7, and SW, II/3:156-7, 168-9. On the subtle differences between Kant and Schelling concerning the ontological argument, despite the similarity of their approaches, see SW, I/10:12-17; OHMP, 48-52.
114. SW, II/3:163.
115. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §28; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 8]; The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 66.
116. G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen, §28; ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), [Werke in zwanzig Bänden 8]; The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 66.
117. WL, I:82-3; SL, 82.
118. WL, I:82-3; SL, 82.
119. Alan White, "Hegel or Schelling?" Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 30 (Autumn/Winter 1994): 16.
120. White, Absolute Knowledge, 86.
121. Robert Pippin, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 188.
122. SW, I/10:134; OHMP, 140.
123. SW, I/10:134; OHMP, 140.
124. SW, II/3:149.
125. SW, II/3:167: "das bloβ Existierende . . . , in dem noch nichts von einem Wesen, einem Was, zu begreifen ist." See also SW, II/3:162-3.
126. SW, II/3:167: "das bloβ Existierende . . . , in dem noch nichts von einem Wesen, einem Was, zu begreifen ist." See also SW, II/3:162-3.
127. WL, I:83, 113; SL, 83, 106.
128. WL, I:83, 113; SL, 83, 106.
129. White, Absolute Knowledge, 57.
130. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 139.
131. SW, I/10:132; OHMP, 139.
132. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141, and WL, I:112; SL, 106.
133. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141, and WL, I:112; SL, 106.
134. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141, and WL, I:112; SL, 106.
135. SW, I/10:135; OHMP, 141, and WL, I:112; SL, 106.
136. Apart from Alan White and myself, other English-speaking commentators on Hegel who accept that Hegel's dialectic develops immanently out of itself, without being, as it were, pulled forward by any presupposed goal, include Richard Dien Winfield and William Maker. See, for example, Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988) and William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1994). See also Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991), 41-76. It should be noted, however, that despite our broad agreement concerning Hegel's method, White, Winfield, Maker, and I do not agree about the relation between thought and being in Hegel. As I understand it, I am the only one of the four who maintains that Hegel's Logic provides an ontological account of the basic structure of being as such, rather than a mere category theory or theory of determinacy.
137. Apart from Alan White and myself, other English-speaking commentators on Hegel who accept that Hegel's dialectic develops immanently out of itself, without being, as it were, pulled forward by any presupposed goal, include Richard Dien Winfield and William Maker. See, for example, Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988) and William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1994). See also Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991), 41-76. It should be noted, however, that despite our broad agreement concerning Hegel's method, White, Winfield, Maker, and I do not agree about the relation between thought and being in Hegel. As I understand it, I am the only one of the four who maintains that Hegel's Logic provides an ontological account of the basic structure of being as such, rather than a mere category theory or theory of determinacy.
138. Apart from Alan White and myself, other English-speaking commentators on Hegel who accept that Hegel's dialectic develops immanently out of itself, without being, as it were, pulled forward by any presupposed goal, include Richard Dien Winfield and William Maker. See, for example, Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and Justice (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1988) and William Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1994). See also Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1991), 41-76. It should be noted, however, that despite our broad agreement concerning Hegel's method, White, Winfield, Maker, and I do not agree about the relation between thought and being in Hegel. As I understand it, I am the only one of the four who maintains that Hegel's Logic provides an ontological account of the basic structure of being as such, rather than a mere category theory or theory of determinacy.
139. See White, Absolute Knowledge, 57; and Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 82.
140. See White, Absolute Knowledge, 57; and Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 82.
141. For a critique of Derrida's reading of Hegel, see Stephen Houlgate, "Hegel, Derrida, and Restricted Economy: The Case of Mechanical Memory," Journal of the History of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (January 1996): 79-93.
142. This paper was originally given at a conference entitled Schelling contra Hegel which was held at the University of Warwick on May 9, 1997. I should like to thank all those who commented on the paper at the conference, and to acknowledge a particular debt of gratitude to Edward Beach for the very helpful remarks he made both during the day's proceedings and in writing after the conference.