The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: An experimental analysis

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 291-304

  Chaudhuri, Ananish ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Bargaining; C92; D82; L14; Principal agent theory; Ratcheting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038913359     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00095-x     Document Type: Article

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