Elite cohesion, regime succession and political instability in syria

Middle East Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 159-179

  Robinson, Glenn E ^a,b  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038909907     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.1998.tb00375.x     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. I categorize the bourgeoisie as part of the state elite and not just a social base of power for the state, because its relationship with the Alawi military officers is closer to a ruling coalition than "social base" implies. The informal crossover between these groups is such that defining where the state ends and society begins is problematic.
2. The Syrian bourgeoisie properly should be seen as being constituted by a number of different segments, for example, the prerevolutionary old families versus the nouveau riche bourgeoisie. For the purposes of this paper, however, I treat the Syrian bourgeoisie as a reasonably unified class actor.
3. The term is Sadiq al-Azm's. "Merchants" here is shorthand for the larger bourgeoisie, including industrialists.
4. For the strongest variation of this argument, see Daniel Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, or his Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). More nuanced expressions of the same argument can be found in Moshe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988) and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Baath Party (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
5. For the strongest variation of this argument, see Daniel Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, or his Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). More nuanced expressions of the same argument can be found in Moshe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988) and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Baath Party (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
6. For the strongest variation of this argument, see Daniel Pipes, Syria Beyond the Peace Process, or his Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). More nuanced expressions of the same argument can be found in Moshe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988) and Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Baath Party (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
7. This point was made by David Waldner, "Power and Politics in Syria in the 1990s," an unpublished manuscript presented to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, June 1994.
8. This argument can be found most notably in the many works on Syria by Raymond Hinnebusch, including an article in Middle East Policy, Vol. III, No. 4, April 1995. See also Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
9. This argument can be found most notably in the many works on Syria by Raymond Hinnebusch, including an article in Middle East Policy, Vol. III, No. 4, April 1995. See also Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
10. Interview with Sadiq al-Azm, Damascus, August 1996. The phrase is also credited to Azm by Seale, ibid.
11. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival," Middle East Policy, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April 1995), p. 79.
12. Interview with the Syrian economist Nabil Sukkar, Damascus, August 1996.
13. In addition to a host of economic problems, including a drop in real GNP of 5 percent in 1986, Syria's foreign exchange reserves dropped to about $357 million by the end of 1986 - an amount less than one month's imports. Nabil Sukkar, "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform" in Contemporary Syria, Eberhard Kienle, ed. (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 28.
14. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
15. Interview with investor Hisham Yafi, Damascus, August 1996.
16. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
17. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
18. The information on Hisham Yafi comes from an extended interview with him at his plant in Damascus, August 1996. He was the only interviewee during my fieldwork who agreed to speak completely on the record.
19. The calculation is as follows: 8 percent of the value of the machine is taken as the tax base, and they pay 45 percent of this amount. While depreciation is calculated into this, it is done over a ten year period. Computers, of course, depreciate in real terms much faster than ten years.
20. The grid is actually significantly better now than it was a few years ago thanks to a series of power generators that have come on line. The daily power shutdowns in Damascus no longer occur. However, while improved, the power grid is still too erratic for high-tech industries to rely on.
21. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
22. Interview with the investor's lawyer, Damascus, August 1996.
23. Middle East Economic Digest, 40:21 (May 24, 1996), p. 8.
24. Ibid., p. 7.
25. Ibid., p. 10.
26. IMF, Staff Report for the 1994 Article IV Consultation, February 15, 1995, p. 10.
27. Not all bourgeoisies favor economic liberalization. For example, a parasitic bourgeoisie which relies primarily on favorable government contracts for its capital accumulation will not generally support economic rationalization.
28. According to David Rundell, economics officer at the U.S. embassy in Damascus, August 1996.
29. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
30. Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under A sad (London and New York: IB Tauris, 1995), p. 258. Perthes is more confident that I am that the regime will be able to successfully manage political liberalization by selectively co-opting societal elements as needed and by keeping the bourgeoisie structurally weak.
31. Ibid. p. 259.
32. Steven Heydemann, "Taxation without Representation: Authoritarianism and Economic Liberalization in Syria" in Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal, editors, Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993).
33. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
34. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
35. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.
36. Ibid.
37. In which case this would become the Pinochet model: the head of the army installs himself as the legitimate president of the republic.
38. Ghassan Salame, State and Society in the Arab East (Beirut: The Center for the Study of Arab Unity, 1987), p. 167 [in Arabic]. Cited in Waldner, p. 23.
39. Ghassan Salame, State and Society in the Arab East (Beirut: The Center for the Study of Arab Unity, 1987), p. 167 [in Arabic]. Cited in Waldner, p. 23.
40. Interview, Damascus, August 1996.