Bid-ask spreads with indirect competition among specialists

Journal of Financial Markets

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 89-119

  Gehrig, Thomas ^a   Jackson, Matthew ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bid ask spreads; D43; G12; Indirect competition; Market structure; Multi security markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038909346     PISSN: 13864181     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1386-4181(97)00005-0     Document Type: Article

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