Real freedom versus reciprocity: Competing views on the justice of unconditional basic income

Political Studies

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 140-163

  Van Der Veen, Robert J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0038901902     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00134     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. I wish to thank Jeroen Knijff and Stuart White for helpful discussions, and the members of the Nuffield College seminar on Political Theory for their comments on a draft of this paper.
2. Of course even in the full-employment era of the sixties there was awareness of this possibility, under the influence of 'automation', and basic income guarantees were considered as a sound response. For example: R. Theobald, ed., The Guaranteed Income: Next Step in Economic Evolution? (New York, Doubleday, 1966).
3. See S. Brittan and S. Webb, Beyond the Welfare State: an Examination of Basic Incomes in a Market Economy (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1990), p. 46.
4. J. Elster, 'Comment on van der Veen and Van Parijs', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 709-22, at p. 719. See the reply in R. J. van der Veen and Ph. Van Parijs, 'Universal grants versus socialism: reply to six critics', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 723-57, revised as ch. 9 in Ph. Van Parijs, Marxism Recycled (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
5. J. Elster, 'Comment on van der Veen and Van Parijs', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 709-22, at p. 719. See the reply in R. J. van der Veen and Ph. Van Parijs, 'Universal grants versus socialism: reply to six critics', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 723-57, revised as ch. 9 in Ph. Van Parijs, Marxism Recycled (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
6. J. Elster, 'Comment on van der Veen and Van Parijs', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 709-22, at p. 719. See the reply in R. J. van der Veen and Ph. Van Parijs, 'Universal grants versus socialism: reply to six critics', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 723-57, revised as ch. 9 in Ph. Van Parijs, Marxism Recycled (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993).
7. This difference leads Brittan and Webb to claim that the 'clue to legitimizing some Basic Income Guarantee is to see it not as a handout, but as a property right' (Brittan and Webb, Beyond the Welfare State, p. 3). However, when the question is then shifted to evaluating the legitimacy of property rights, the issue whether it is right to be endowed with property that confers the opportunity to contribute nothing of value to others can be raised once more. See section 3 below.
8. For a more detailed account of sustainability, see Ph. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), section 2.3. Given the frequency of references to this work, it will be henceforth abbreviated as RFA.
9. See A. B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal (Oxford, Clarendon 1995), ch. 7 for a clear overview of the uncertainties involved in determining the relationship between taxation, benefits, and work incentives under a basic income system, on the basis of empirical evidence about labour supply pertaining to current rules of the game. For a simulation study incorporating the behavioral effects of introducing a basic income at 50% of the Netherlands net minimum wage, see N. E. M. de Jager, J. J. Graafland and G. M. M. Gelauff. 'A negative income tax in a mini-welfare state: a simulation exercise with MIMIC', Journal of Policy Modeling, 18 (1996), 233-31.
10. See A. B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal (Oxford, Clarendon 1995), ch. 7 for a clear overview of the uncertainties involved in determining the relationship between taxation, benefits, and work incentives under a basic income system, on the basis of empirical evidence about labour supply pertaining to current rules of the game. For a simulation study incorporating the behavioral effects of introducing a basic income at 50% of the Netherlands net minimum wage, see N. E. M. de Jager, J. J. Graafland and G. M. M. Gelauff. 'A negative income tax in a mini-welfare state: a simulation exercise with MIMIC', Journal of Policy Modeling, 18 (1996), 233-31.
11. For example, the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau's influential economic scenario 'Balanced Growth' considers an individualized negative income tax scheme, of which the basic income component (the tax credit at zero work) rises up to (a rather austere) social minimum level over a period of 25 years. Centraal Planbureau, Nederland in Drievoud (The Hague, SdU, 1992), sec. 3.3. More optimism, however, can be found in the debate on basic income conducted in Ireland, where a politically influential paper shows that a full basic income could be introduced in the Irish economy within three years, at a flat rate tax of around 50%. See C. M. A. Clark and J. Healy, Pathways to a Basic Income (Dublin, The Justice Commission, Conference of Religions of Ireland, Milltown Park, Dublin, 1997).
12. For example, the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau's influential economic scenario 'Balanced Growth' considers an individualized negative income tax scheme, of which the basic income component (the tax credit at zero work) rises up to (a rather austere) social minimum level over a period of 25 years. Centraal Planbureau, Nederland in Drievoud (The Hague, SdU, 1992), sec. 3.3. More optimism, however, can be found in the debate on basic income conducted in Ireland, where a politically influential paper shows that a full basic income could be introduced in the Irish economy within three years, at a flat rate tax of around 50%. See C. M. A. Clark and J. Healy, Pathways to a Basic Income (Dublin, The Justice Commission, Conference of Religions of Ireland, Milltown Park, Dublin, 1997).
13. The final result of this transition process has been characterized as a state of 'weak abundance'. If the rise of basic income is thought to extend indefinitely, until it finally absorbs the whole of per capita income, then this defines a limit state of 'strong abundance'. The consequences of such an extended transition were set out in R. J. van der Veen and Ph. Van Parijs, 'A capitalist road to communism', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 635-55, revised as ch. 8 in Van Parijs, Marxism Recycled. The relevant concepts of abundance are presented formally in RFA, pp. 86-7.
14. The final result of this transition process has been characterized as a state of 'weak abundance'. If the rise of basic income is thought to extend indefinitely, until it finally absorbs the whole of per capita income, then this defines a limit state of 'strong abundance'. The consequences of such an extended transition were set out in R. J. van der Veen and Ph. Van Parijs, 'A capitalist road to communism', Theory and Society, 15 (1986), 635-55, revised as ch. 8 in Van Parijs, Marxism Recycled. The relevant concepts of abundance are presented formally in RFA, pp. 86-7.
15. Although this formulation helps to clarify what is being claimed, it is subject to ambiguity of a different kind. For even if the share of basic income is capable of rising, the change to a basic income regime may be thought to bring about a lesser rate of per capita income growth, in comparison with the one associated with a continuation of the welfare state regime. Indeed it is thought that a substantial basic income, which requires high marginal rates of tax, might have a negative effect on the formation of human capital, and thus contribute to a slow-down of productivity increases. See L. Bovenberg and F. van der Ploeg. 'Pros and cons of basic income', paper for the BIEN International Congress, Vienna, 12-14 September 1996. Plenary Session on 'Basic Income and Subsidized Employment'.
16. J. E. Meade, Agathotopia: The Economics of Partnership (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1989), Part III. A revised version of this essay is included in J. E. Meade, Liberty, Equality and Efficiency (London, Macmillan, 1993).
17. J. E. Meade, Agathotopia: The Economics of Partnership (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1989), Part III. A revised version of this essay is included in J. E. Meade, Liberty, Equality and Efficiency (London, Macmillan, 1993).
18. Ph. Van Parijs, ed., Arguing for Basic Income (London, Verso, 1992).
19. Ph. Van Parijs, 'Competing Justifications of Basic Income', in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income, pp. 3-43, at p. 8.
20. R. E. Goodin, 'Towards a Minimally Presumptuous Social Welfare Policy', in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income, pp. 195-214. A revised version is included in R. E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 14.
21. R. E. Goodin, 'Towards a Minimally Presumptuous Social Welfare Policy', in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income, pp. 195-214. A revised version is included in R. E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 14.
22. An eloquent expression is B. Jordan, 'Basic Income and the Common Good', in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income, pp. 155-77. Jordan's view is supported in good part by the sociological approach of Claus Offe. See
23. C. Offe, 'A Non-Productivist Design for Social Policies', in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income, pp. 61-78.
24. See among others, the contributions of H. Steiner and J. Baker in Van Parijs, Arguing for Basic Income.
25. RFA, p. 25.
26. RFA, section 1.7.
27. See R. J. van der Veen, Between Exploitation and Communism (Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1991), sec. 3.2. The inclusion rule on opportunity sets is also invoked in RFA, pp. 49-50.
28. RFA, p. 25.
29. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon, 1972), p. 83.
30. RFA, p. 27.
31. The nature and implications of 'undominated diversity' are explained in RFA, ch. 3.
32. As Barry has argued, however, this may not always be true if relative prices are altered in consequence of such a change. See B. Barry, 'Survey article: real freedom and basic income', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4 (1996), 242-76, section 3
33. Leximin real freedom is likewise incapable of deciding on any basic income regime which taxes gifts and bequests optimally while taxing wage income at a lesser rate than the yield-maximizing one, and hence grants a basic income in the range between B and B′.
34. RFA, p. 99.
35. To be precise, what one must accept is resource equality plus Van Parijs's claim that this conception require the redistribution of external resources at the level of the egalitarian baseline's basic income, in the post-auction situation envisaged by Dworkin. See R. Dworkin, 'What is equality? Part II: equality of resources', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1981), 283-345, section 4. Dworkin has never explicitly confirmed the validity of this particular claim. I see no fault in the claim, however, and so I here assume that it holds.
36. Van Parijs makes these claims in the course of discussing several variants of the Rawlsian approach to basic income, one of which corresponds to regime LT (RFA, pp. 94-6), while the other corresponds to regime LS (RFA, pp. 96-8). It should be noted that Van Parijs mixes up his claim that these Rawlsian variants unfairly discriminate against people with certain conceptions of the good with the further objection that the acceptance of these regimes violates the liberal principle of neutrality. That is to say, he supposes that such regimes 'could be vindicated only on perfectionistic premises' (RFA, p. 98). I do not agree with this further objection. For as I have just shown, both the labour-taxing and the labour-subsidizing Rawlsian regimes are permitted by Van Parijs's own principle of leximin real freedom, which is certainly not a perfectionistic rule of distribution. The unfair discrimination which Van Parijs refers to therefore has nothing to do with infringements of liberal neutrality. It is purely a result of his (legitimate) decision to accept only one of the many possible real-freedom maximizing external resource distributions as fair, namely that of regime LR.
37. Van Parijs makes these claims in the course of discussing several variants of the Rawlsian approach to basic income, one of which corresponds to regime LT (RFA, pp. 94-6), while the other corresponds to regime LS (RFA, pp. 96-8). It should be noted that Van Parijs mixes up his claim that these Rawlsian variants unfairly discriminate against people with certain conceptions of the good with the further objection that the acceptance of these regimes violates the liberal principle of neutrality. That is to say, he supposes that such regimes 'could be vindicated only on perfectionistic premises' (RFA, p. 98). I do not agree with this further objection. For as I have just shown, both the labour-taxing and the labour-subsidizing Rawlsian regimes are permitted by Van Parijs's own principle of leximin real freedom, which is certainly not a perfectionistic rule of distribution. The unfair discrimination which Van Parijs refers to therefore has nothing to do with infringements of liberal neutrality. It is purely a result of his (legitimate) decision to accept only one of the many possible real-freedom maximizing external resource distributions as fair, namely that of regime LR.
38. Van Parijs makes these claims in the course of discussing several variants of the Rawlsian approach to basic income, one of which corresponds to regime LT (RFA, pp. 94-6), while the other corresponds to regime LS (RFA, pp. 96-8). It should be noted that Van Parijs mixes up his claim that these Rawlsian variants unfairly discriminate against people with certain conceptions of the good with the further objection that the acceptance of these regimes violates the liberal principle of neutrality. That is to say, he supposes that such regimes 'could be vindicated only on perfectionistic premises' (RFA, p. 98). I do not agree with this further objection. For as I have just shown, both the labour-taxing and the labour-subsidizing Rawlsian regimes are permitted by Van Parijs's own principle of leximin real freedom, which is certainly not a perfectionistic rule of distribution. The unfair discrimination which Van Parijs refers to therefore has nothing to do with infringements of liberal neutrality. It is purely a result of his (legitimate) decision to accept only one of the many possible real-freedom maximizing external resource distributions as fair, namely that of regime LR.
39. RFA, p. 116.
40. See RFA, pp. 117-24. In my view, however, the case is inconclusive as it stands, given that Van Parijs has selected the principle of leximin resources as the fair mode of implementing the principle of leximin real freedom. For while his final conclusion surely implies that the basic income-maximizing regime which is recommended by leximin resources best serves the real freedom of the least-advantaged in any real world-comparison with a regime that dispenses a lower level of basic income, it does not imply that it is also superior, in this respect, to all feasible regimes that redistribute income on a work-conditional basis. In particular, what needs to be shown is that the basic income-maximizing regime outperforms the conditional minimum transfers of the existing welfare state, on the principle of leximin real freedom. I believe that Van Parijs does not devote sufficient attention to this problem. But since the problem is not of immediate relevance to the central topic of this article, I wish to refer the reader to publications elsewhere. See R. J. van der Veen, 'Basic income and real freedom: comment on Barry', Journal of Political Philosophy, 5 (1997), 274-86, and 'Leximin opportunities, basic income and the social minimum', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September, Workshop 'Paine and Beyond: Principled Justifications of Basic Income'.
41. See RFA, pp. 117-24. In my view, however, the case is inconclusive as it stands, given that Van Parijs has selected the principle of leximin resources as the fair mode of implementing the principle of leximin real freedom. For while his final conclusion surely implies that the basic income-maximizing regime which is recommended by leximin resources best serves the real freedom of the least-advantaged in any real world-comparison with a regime that dispenses a lower level of basic income, it does not imply that it is also superior, in this respect, to all feasible regimes that redistribute income on a work-conditional basis. In particular, what needs to be shown is that the basic income-maximizing regime outperforms the conditional minimum transfers of the existing welfare state, on the principle of leximin real freedom. I believe that Van Parijs does not devote sufficient attention to this problem. But since the problem is not of immediate relevance to the central topic of this article, I wish to refer the reader to publications elsewhere. See R. J. van der Veen, 'Basic income and real freedom: comment on Barry', Journal of Political Philosophy, 5 (1997), 274-86, and 'Leximin opportunities, basic income and the social minimum', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September, Workshop 'Paine and Beyond: Principled Justifications of Basic Income'.
42. 'Leximin opportunities, basic income and the social minimum', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September,
43. 'Leximin opportunities, basic income and the social minimum', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September, Workshop 'Paine and Beyond: Principled Justifications of Basic Income'.
44. Rawls, Theory of Justice, section 47.
45. S. White. 'Liberal equality, exploitation, and the case for an unconditional basic income',Political Studies, XLV (1997), 312-26, at pp. 317-8.
46. White, 'Liberal equality', p. 318.
47. White, 'Liberal equality', p. 321-2.
48. Ph. Van Parijs, 'Reciprocity and the justification of an unconditional basic income: reply to Stuart White', Political Studies, XLV (1997), 327-30, at pp. 328-9.
49. S. White, 'Reply to Van Parijs', unpublished paper, p. 2.
50. This condition on equal sharing is the vantage point of a forceful critique of both Dworkin's resource egalitarian conception, and Van Parijs's use of it in defending basic income. It is developed in G. van Donselaar, The Benefits of Another's Pains: Parasitism, Scarcity, Basic Income (Ph.D. thesis in philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1997), ch. 4.
51. Indeed, the issue remains open in the above-mentioned exchange between Van Parijs and White. For Van Parijs admits that the equal and unconditional distribution of the wealth tax remains contested between him and White (Van Parijs, 'Reciprocity', pp. 329-30). But after noting this, he does nothing to argue for his view any further than to make his point about the proper scope of proportionate reciprocity, cited in the penultimate paragraph of the text above. As we have seen, that point is inconclusive, because it presupposes the fairness of distributing the tax fund in the form of basic income.
52. White, 'Liberal equality', p. 319.
53. White, 'Liberal equality', p. 319, and fn 19.
54. 'Beveridge, the national minimum, and its future in a European context', ch. 15 in A. B. Atkinson, Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). A participation income is individualized, not means-tested, and subjected to performing some type of work or training within a range of approved activities.
55. 'Beveridge, the national minimum, and its future in a European context', ch. 15 in A. B. Atkinson, Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). A participation income is individualized, not means-tested, and subjected to performing some type of work or training within a range of approved activities.
56. White, 'Liberal equality', p. 319.
57. S. White, 'Reciprocity arguments for basic income', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September, Workshop: 'Alternative Justifications of Basic Income'.
58. S. White, 'Reciprocity arguments for basic income', paper presented at 6th BIEN International Congress 1996, Vienna, 12-14 September, Workshop: 'Alternative Justifications of Basic Income'.
59. Van Parijs, 'Reciprocity', p. 330. Such liberals can consistently speak in favour of granting people a lower level of basic income than the maximum sustainable one, without providing any supplementary transfers to the productively unable. This corresponds to expanding the domain of 'privileges' allocated by reciprocity, by cutting down on 'basic entitlements'.