Rational choice theory and third world politics: The 1990 party merger in Korea

Comparative Politics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 83-100

  Kim, HeeMin ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038879148     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/422194     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. James Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., Politics and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Frans A. A. M. van Winden, "The Economic Theory of Political Decision Making: A Survey and Perspective," in Julien van den Broeck, ed., Public Choice (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
2. James Booth, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell, eds., Politics and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Frans A. A. M. van Winden, "The Economic Theory of Political Decision Making: A Survey and Perspective," in Julien van den Broeck, ed., Public Choice (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
3. Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-2.
4. For a concise summary of criticisms of rational choice approaches to the third world, see Daniel Little, "Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies," Journal of Asian Studies, 50 (1991), 35-52.
5. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Tun-jen Cheng and Mihae Lim Tallian, "Bargaining over Electoral Reform during the Democratic Transition," in HeeMin Kim and Woosang Kim, eds., Rationality and Politics in the Korean Peninsula (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1995) pp. 17-52.
6. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Tun-jen Cheng and Mihae Lim Tallian, "Bargaining over Electoral Reform during the Democratic Transition," in HeeMin Kim and Woosang Kim, eds., Rationality and Politics in the Korean Peninsula (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1995) pp. 17-52.
7. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Tun-jen Cheng and Mihae Lim Tallian, "Bargaining over Electoral Reform during the Democratic Transition," in HeeMin Kim and Woosang Kim, eds., Rationality and Politics in the Korean Peninsula (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1995) pp. 17-52.
8. Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
9. Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
10. Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
11. For example, Robert Bates, ed., Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Barbara Geddes, "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies," American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 371-92.
12. For example, Robert Bates, ed., Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Barbara Geddes, "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies," American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 371-92.
13. For Korea's new electoral system, see David Brady and Jongryn Mo, "Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice: A Case Study of the 1988 Korean Elections," Comparative Political Studies, 24 (1992), 402-29; Cheng and Tallian.
14. See Dong-yun Han, "The Three-Party Merger and the Secret Agreement among Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil" [in Korean], Shin Dong-a [New East Asia] (March 1990).
15. Jae-hong Kim and Choong-shik Kim, "Four Parties' Strategies of Breaking Four-Party System" [in Korean], Shin Dong-a (February 1990).
16. See Young-ki Kwon, "Kim Young-sam and Park Chul-eon, Friends or Enemies?" [in Korean], Wolgan Chosun [Chosun Monthly[ (April 1990).
17. James Cotton, "Understanding the State in South Korea: Bureaucratic-Authoritarian or State Autonomy Theory?," Comparative Political Studies, 24 (1992), 526.
18. Jin Park, "Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance," Asian Survey, 30 (1990), 1158.
19. Dong-a Ilbo, Jan. 23, 1990.
20. Sisa Journal, Feb. 4, 1990.
21. Dong-yun Han.
22. Sisa Journal.
23. Kim and Kim.
24. Dong-yun Han, pp. 168-69. Regionalism has been a dominant social cleavage in Korea since Park Chung-hee came to power in a military coup in 1961. Under Park's rule, most important investments in industry and infrastructure were concentrated around Seoul and in the Kyungsang provinces, whence Park and many of his followers came. Kyungsang provinces were also favorably treated in elite recruitment and dominated the central government. A gap in political power and economic well-being emerged between Kyungsang provinces and the rest of the country outside of Seoul. Worst treated by the Park government were the two Cholla provinces, which produced many prominent opposition figures, including Kim Dae-jung. Park's neglect of Cholla provinces led to the impoverishment of the region at the time the country was experiencing the "economic miracle," which in turn raised a sense of bitterness and relative deprivation in Cholla. This pattern of regional discrimination and cleavage continued after the assassination of Park in 1979; Park's successors, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, also came from Kyungsang provinces. The cohesion in elite cooperation and voter support in Kyungsang provinces began to decline with the emergence of the RDP, led by Kim Young-sam, who came from South Kyungsang province. Most voters in North Kyungsang, the home of Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo, still supported the governing DJP while those in the South Kyungsang began to turn to the opposition RDP. Voters in the central region of Choongchung provinces were generally progovernment during Park's rule since Park's second hand, Kim Jong-pil, came from this region and it was relatively well treated. However, Chun Doo-hwan ostracized Kim, who then established the NDRP. Voters in Choongchung provinces began to develop their own regional identity around the NDRP. In recent decades regionalism has been the most reliable predictor of voter choice in elections.
25. See HeeMin Kim, "Kim's Dilemma and the Politics of Rivalry: An Analysis of the 1987 Presidential Election in Korea," Pacific Focus, 7 (1992), 141-59.
26. See Cheng and Tallian.
27. Dong-a Ilbo; Sisa Journal; also, Gyung-hwan Ahn, "Comments on Korean Domestic Politics" [in Korean], Wolgan Chosun (December 1990); Dong-yun Han.
28. Dong-a Ilbo; Sisa Journal; also, Gyung-hwan Ahn, "Comments on Korean Domestic Politics" [in Korean], Wolgan Chosun (December 1990); Dong-yun Han.
29. See Dong-yun Han.
30. See Ahn for an assessment of the DJP strategy during the coalition bargaining. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party split in June 1993, more than three years after Korean political leaders contemplated the merger of their parties.
31. Kim and Kim.
32. See Dong-yun Han.
33. See Young-sup Jang, "Roh and Kim, Honeymoon or Conflict?" [in Korean], Wolgan Chosun (December 1990).
34. Cheng and Tallian.
35. Gang-shik Lee, "The Beginning and the End of the Presidential Candidate Nominating Convention of the New Democratic Party" [in Korean], Shin Dong-a (November 1970). Kim Dae-jung made an impressive showing against the incumbent president, Park Chung-hee, in the presidential election of April 1971. He received 43.6 percent of the votes, against Park's 51.2. Park's majority, allowing for regional factors, was a mere 0.2 percent of the total votes cast, despite the money and administrative power he mobilized. It is widely believed that Kim Dae-jung's strong showing against Park contributed to Park's decision to abandon direct presidential elections, a tradition inherited by Chun Doo-hwan. On the 1971 presidential election (and the history of authoritarian rule in Korea)
36. , see Hak-Kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 30-45.
37. Jin Park.
38. Sung-Joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 328.
39. Young Whan Kihl, "South Korea's Search for a New Order: An Overview," in Ilpyong Kim and Young Whan Kihl, eds., Political Change in South Korea (New York: Korean PWPA, 1988), pp. 3-21.
40. Chang-gi Kim, "Kim Duk-yong Who Became a Top Aide for a Former Enemy" [in Korean], Wolgan Chosun (August 1992); interview with Jang Hyun, former Kim Dae-jung campaign advisor, April 20, 1991.
41. Young-sup Jang; Kwon.
42. Dong-yun Han, p. 163.
43. Kim and Kim.
44. The location of the parties in Table 2 reflects in a crude manner the information about the political relationship among the leaders of the four parties. Because Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were politically least compatible, the RDP and the PPD have been put in extreme columns. Kim Jong-pil's close tie with Kim Young-sam places the NDRP next to the RDP. Roh Tae-woo's amenability to the other three puts the DJP between the PPD and the NDRP.
45. See William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
46. See Dong-yun Han; Young-sup Jang.
47. Dong-a Ilbo.
48. See Jin Park.
49. See Young-sup Jang.
50. Myung-kyu Han, "Is Opposition Alliance Possible?" [in Korean], Shin Dong-a (March 1990).
51. For further details about the paternalistic nature of Korean political parties, see Ahn. Also see Cotton for assemblymen's lack of policy orientation.
52. See Sohn.
53. Myung-kyu Han.
54. Young-sup Jang.
55. Dong-a Ilbo.
56. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Political Science Quarterly, 99 (1984), 212. Politicians as rational actors should also evaluate the potential cost of their actions. One cost of the merger was citizen reaction to (or punishment for) the merger in the next national assembly and presidential elections. The expected cost of the merger was low due to two years of economic slowdown and political instability prior to the merger, as well as the stable political system the merger seemed to deliver (a two party system with a dominant governing part). See HeeMin Kim, "A Theory of Government-Driven Democratization: The Case of Korea," World Affairs, 156 (1994), 130-40.
57. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," Political Science Quarterly, 99 (1984), 212. Politicians as rational actors should also evaluate the potential cost of their actions. One cost of the merger was citizen reaction to (or punishment for) the merger in the next national assembly and presidential elections. The expected cost of the merger was low due to two years of economic slowdown and political instability prior to the merger, as well as the stable political system the merger seemed to deliver (a two party system with a dominant governing part). See HeeMin Kim, "A Theory of Government-Driven Democratization: The Case of Korea," World Affairs, 156 (1994), 130-40.
58. For example, Geertz.
59. For example, Polanyi; Cheng and Tallian.
60. Robert H. Frank, "Rethinking Rational Choice," in Roger Friedland and A. F. Robertson, eds., Beyond the Market Place: Rethinking Economy and Society (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990).