Forecasting China's political and economic future

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 14-27

  De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno ^a   Feng, Yi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038877439     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1997.11655719     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. Richard Holbrooke, "China and the U.S.: Into the 1980s," Current Policy (Washington: U.S. Department of State) 187 (1988): 2.
2. William H. Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. James Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 163-81.
3. S. Feder, "FACTIONS and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics in H. Bradford Westerfield," in Inside the CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
4. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, Red Flag Over Hong Kong (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1996).
5. The NPC functions as a legislature, although it lacks the fundamental functions of its counterparts in democracies.
6. All three have published on issues related to China and have demonstrated expertise on China's politics. Feng's research areas include the political economy of China and other Asian Pacific countries. Hsiang is working on China's foreign policy, and Zhang's research is on China's political and economic reforms.
7. Samuel S.G. Wu and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea: A Model of China's Security Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (September 1994): 379-403.
8. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-Khomeini Iran," PS 17 (1984): 226-36; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and A.F.K. Organski, "A Mark in Time Saves Nein: An Illustration of a Forecasting Model Using Formal Models," International Political Science Review 13 (1992): 81-100; and Jacek Kugler, Lewis Snider, and William Longwell, "From Desert Shield to Desert Storm: Success, Strife, or Quagmire?" Conflict Management and Peace Science 13, no. 2 (spring 1994): 113-48.
9. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-Khomeini Iran," PS 17 (1984): 226-36; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and A.F.K. Organski, "A Mark in Time Saves Nein: An Illustration of a Forecasting Model Using Formal Models," International Political Science Review 13 (1992): 81-100; and Jacek Kugler, Lewis Snider, and William Longwell, "From Desert Shield to Desert Storm: Success, Strife, or Quagmire?" Conflict Management and Peace Science 13, no. 2 (spring 1994): 113-48.
10. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-Khomeini Iran," PS 17 (1984): 226-36; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and A.F.K. Organski, "A Mark in Time Saves Nein: An Illustration of a Forecasting Model Using Formal Models," International Political Science Review 13 (1992): 81-100; and Jacek Kugler, Lewis Snider, and William Longwell, "From Desert Shield to Desert Storm: Success, Strife, or Quagmire?" Conflict Management and Peace Science 13, no. 2 (spring 1994): 113-48.
11. Wu and Bueno de Mesquita, "Assessing the Dispute."
12. In the consolidated data set, three other actors were added, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer - Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, and overseas investors. Yang is a political soldier compared to Liu, whose strength is professionalism. Between the two, Yang is more conservative politically. Wan, the former NPC chairman, is a reformer and an ally of fallen party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.
13. Su Shaozhi, "Complexity of Chinese Politics," Zheng Ming 211 (1995): 45.
14. Shi Sha, "Changes in the NPC," China Times Magazine 170 (1995): 40-41.
15. Dorothy Solinger, "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics," World Policy Journal 6 (1989): 621-32.
16. Yi Feng and Li Jieli, "Political Capacity and World System: A Comparative Perspective of the Qing Dynasty and the PRC,"Journal of Contemporary China, forthcoming (1996).
17. Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 15-25 and 32-49.
18. John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," World Politics 42, no. 2 (January 1990): 151-83; Yi Feng, "Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science 27 ( 1997), forthcoming; and David Sanders, Patterns of Political Instability (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981).
19. John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," World Politics 42, no. 2 (January 1990): 151-83; Yi Feng, "Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science 27 ( 1997), forthcoming; and David Sanders, Patterns of Political Instability (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981).
20. John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," World Politics 42, no. 2 (January 1990): 151-83; Yi Feng, "Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic Growth," British Journal of Political Science 27 ( 1997), forthcoming; and David Sanders, Patterns of Political Instability (New York: St. Martins Press, 1981).
21. Joseph Fewsmith noticed that "Jiang seems convinced of the importance of ideology and the need to develop a theoretical framework to secure his power and to rally the nation behind the government effort" ("Jockeying for Position in the Post-Deng Era," Current History 94, no. 593 [June 1995]: 252-63).
22. Fewsmith, ibid., provides a wealth of information regarding how Jiang, with the blessing and help of Deng, strengthened his position as the core of the CCP leadership.
23. Willy Wo-Lap Lam discusses in detail the role to be played by Zhu in the context of China's succession politics (China After Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing Since Tiananmen [New York: Wiley, 1995], pp. 324-53). He also notes that "the tug-of-war between Li and Zhu shifted to the latter's favor" (p. 331).
24. For a comprehensive book-length analysis of the NPC, see Kevin J. O'Brien, Reform Without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
25. Fewsmith also lists Yang Shangkun, the 87-year-old retired general, and Wan Li, the 78-year-old erstwhile NPC chairman, as potential contenders in China's succession ("Jockeying for Position").
26. Fewsmith, ibid., pp. 252 and 256. The latest and the most definite Chinese official statement was made by Li Peng during his visit to France in April 1996. Li confirmed that Deng had completely assigned his power to the new leadership with Jiang at the center ( World Journal [Flushing, NY] [April 14, 1996]).
27. Fewsmith, ibid., pp. 252 and 256. The latest and the most definite Chinese official statement was made by Li Peng during his visit to France in April 1996. Li confirmed that Deng had completely assigned his power to the new leadership with Jiang at the center ( World Journal [Flushing, NY] [April 14, 1996]).
28. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position," p. 254; June Teufel Dreyer, "People's Army: Serving Whose Interests?" Current History 93, no. 584 (September 1994): 265-69; and Qi Xin, "The Advent of the X-Day," The Nineties 300 (1995): 42-43.
29. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position," p. 254; June Teufel Dreyer, "People's Army: Serving Whose Interests?" Current History 93, no. 584 (September 1994): 265-69; and Qi Xin, "The Advent of the X-Day," The Nineties 300 (1995): 42-43.
30. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position," p. 254; June Teufel Dreyer, "People's Army: Serving Whose Interests?" Current History 93, no. 584 (September 1994): 265-69; and Qi Xin, "The Advent of the X-Day," The Nineties 300 (1995): 42-43.
31. For a detailed presentation of Jiang's expanding power base, see Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, pp. 335-40.
32. Ibid., p. 345.
33. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position," p. 255.
34. People's Daily (March 12, 1995). Tian is not included in the data because he is considered close to Qiao, his boss at the NPC. See Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, p. 309.
35. People's Daily (March 12, 1995). Tian is not included in the data because he is considered close to Qiao, his boss at the NPC. See Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, p. 309.
36. Some political commentators even regard Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, and Tian Jiyun as progressive forces in China, representing the people's desire for change, while others consider them more or less opportunistic. See Wen Hui et al., "Seminar on Post-Deng China," Zheng Ming 212 (1995): 88-91; and Shi Sha, "Changes in the NPC," China Times Magazine 170 (1995): 40-41.
37. Some political commentators even regard Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan, and Tian Jiyun as progressive forces in China, representing the people's desire for change, while others consider them more or less opportunistic. See Wen Hui et al., "Seminar on Post-Deng China," Zheng Ming 212 (1995): 88-91; and Shi Sha, "Changes in the NPC," China Times Magazine 170 (1995): 40-41.
38. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position."
39. O'Brien, Reform Without Liberalization. For an example of recent political comments, see Wang Fang, "The Power Struggle on the Law of the Bank," China Times Magazine 170 (1995): 42-43.
40. O'Brien, Reform Without Liberalization. For an example of recent political comments, see Wang Fang, "The Power Struggle on the Law of the Bank," China Times Magazine 170 (1995): 42-43.
41. Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, p. 341.
42. It is acknowledged that various factions exist in the military. They can be characterized by ideology, professionalism, the old guards, and the young stars. When it comes to Deng's reform policy, these factions normally unite behind Deng. See Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, pp. 199 and 226. It should be noted that although some soldiers resisted Deng's command to send the army into Tiananmen Square on June 3, 1989, the number of those soldiers was more symbolic than critical. In this study, we include the two most influential groups in the Chinese military, as represented by Liu Huaqing, who represents the professional military, and Yang Shangkun, who represents the political military.
43. Guan Jie, "Liu Huaqing on the Use of the Military on June 4, 1989," Zheng Ming 212 (1995): 27-28.
44. Lu Jia, "Difficulty in Bankruptcy and Privatization in China," China Times Magazine 165 (1995): 33-34.
45. See John Bryan Starr, "China in 1995: Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity," Asian Survey 36, no. 1 (January 1996): 13-24.
46. Lu, "Difficulty in Bankruptcy and Privatization."
47. Yan Hua, "Agriculture in Mainland China," The Nineties 303 (1995): 48-50.
48. Now the personnel of the local offices of the People's Bank of China are appointed by its headquarters, rather than by local officials.
49. The abstentions and negative votes were concentrated in delegates from Sichuan Province, Guangdong Province, Shangdong Province, Beijing, Henan Province, the Guangxi Autonomous Region, and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. See Luo Bing, "The Controversial Speech by Tian Jiyun," Zheng Ming 210 (1995): 7. It has been noted that dissent within the legislature is a manifestation of the growing divergence of central and regional political interests (Starr, "China in 1995").
50. This view can be represented by Fewsmith, who argues that the Clinton administration "has undermined reformers within the Chinese leadership by demonstrating hostility toward the Chinese government, and has strengthened the hands of hard-liners who have argued that American threats were empty" ("America and China: Back from the Brink," Current History 93, no. 584 [September 1994]: 250-57 and 255).
51. This view was summarized by Jonathan Pollack ("China and U.S. Relations in Bilateral and Regional Settings" [conference proceedings, "Looking at One Another: China and the United States," Pomona College, March 29, 1996]). The U.S. policy toward China, Pollack said, "will not succeed in the long run, if the United States is compelled to assume these burdens unilaterally, that is, without allies providing . . . appropriate political support. . . . Without such a coordinated view between the United States and its allies and friends, I do not believe the [U.S.] policy is sustainable or credible domestically or internationally."
52. For the four bargaining rounds or iterations of the expected-utility model, the forecasted positions are 50, 50, 60, and 60.
53. For the four rounds of iterations, the forecasted positions are 50, 50, 50, and 50.
54. Fewsmith, "America and China."
55. The assumptions are that a U.S. policy of non-engagement toward China (model 2) is not practical and that the free-rider problem will prevent a unified policy toward China among the United States, its Western allies, and Asian countries (model 3).
56. As Bruce J. Dickson points out, various rectification movements have been used in the past to bolster the party leadership. The current problems in China, however, would require that the party "substitute regulation of institutional procedure for rectification of political ideology" ("Conflict and Non-Compliance in Chinese Politics: Party Rectification, 1983-87," Pacific Affairs 63, no. 2 [summer 1990]: 170-90).
57. O'Brien, Reform Without Liberalization, p. 175.
58. Ibid., p. 164.
59. People's Daily (March 17, 1995).
60. Ibid.
61. People's Daily (March 18, 1996).
62. Part of Qiao's political resources, which remain uncounted, is the backing of Peng Zhen, who is retired but still retains political influence. Peng is now the second most important living veteran, next only to Deng, and is in good health (Qi Xin, "The Politics of the Elders," The Nineties 304 [1995]: 64-67).
63. Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position," p. 258.