An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 403-436

  Osano, Hiroshi ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038875388     PISSN: 08891583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jjie.1997.0375     Document Type: Article

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