The changing property tax and state-local relations

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 165-187

  Sokolow, Alvin D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0038855203     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029946     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. For another view of growing centralization in state-local relations that emphasizes mandates, see David R. Berman, "State-Local Relations: Authority, Finance, and Regional Cooperation," The Municipal Year Book, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: International City/County Management Association, 1998).
2. The measures include increases in homestead exemptions, limiting yearly increases in tax yields, onetime rebates, reducing or eliminating property taxes on motor vehicles, and the use of the property tax for K-12 education. Scott Mackey, "State Property Tax Relief in 1997," NCSL Legisbrief 46 (November/ December, 1997).
3. Mandy Rafool and Kate Warnock, "Let the Voters Decide," State Legislatures 22 (September 1996): 20-23; and post-election information provided by the staff of the National Conference of State Legislatures.
4. The historical summary in the next two paragraphs is based largely on Glenn W. Fisher, The Worst Tax? A History of the Property Tax in America (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
5. Even in 1902 when Property taxes accounted for about 52 percent of all tax income and about 44 percent of all general revenue for state governments, it was predominantly a local source. About 88 percent of all property taxes in that year was collected by local governments. Steven D. Gold, Property Tax Relief (Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Company, 1979), p. 246.
6. Philip M. Dearborn, "Local Property Taxes: Emerging Trends," Intergovernmental Perspective 19 (Summer 1993): 10-12.
7. Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 206.
8. Ernest S. Griffith and Charles R. Adrian, A History of American City Government: The Formation of Traditions, 1775-1870 (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 199-217.
9. Data for 1994-1995, the latest reporting period for government finances, are available from the U.S. Census of Governments website. For earlier data, U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1994), Volume 2, Table 33.
10. General revenues according to U.S. Census definitions include all local government income other than utility, liquor store, and insurance trust revenue. Own-source revenues are locally raised, whether from tax or non-tax sources. Total general revenues include also intergovernmental receipts, mainly from state and federal governments.
11. Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, 3rd ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988), pp. 162-167.
12. John Shannon, Michael Bell, and Ronald Fisher, "Recent State Experience with Local Tax and Expenditure Controls," National Tax Journal 29 (September 1976): 276-285.
13. Local administration of the property tax, including assessment, collection and other procedures, has always been constrained by state governments and the earlier colonial governments. What may have made rate and other revenue yield limitations on individual local governments more feasible as a device of state control was the shift in the late nineteenth century from classification to a uniform system of valuing various types of property. For a history of this trend see Fisher, The Worst Tax? A History of the Property Tax in America.
14. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Local Taxing Powers (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1962), pp. 34-38.
15. The only states not enacting nor revising property tax limitations during this period were four that had never adopted such measures (Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) and four with previous enactments still on their books (Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wyoming). See U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Tax and Expenditure Limits on Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1995).
16. Hawai'i, Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia dropped tax rate limitations for less severe "full disclosure" requirements. See U.S. Advisory Commissions, Tax and Expenditure Limits, pp. 49-56; Steven D. Gold and Sarah Ritchie, "State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties, 1990-1993: De Facto Federalism," Public Budgeting & Finance 14 (Summer 1994): 26-53.
17. Hawai'i, Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia dropped tax rate limitations for less severe "full disclosure" requirements. See U.S. Advisory Commissions, Tax and Expenditure Limits, pp. 49-56; Steven D. Gold and Sarah Ritchie, "State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties, 1990-1993: De Facto Federalism," Public Budgeting & Finance 14 (Summer 1994): 26-53.
18. Philip G. Joyce and Daniel R. Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector: The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limitations," Public Administration Review 51 (May/June 1991): 240-253.
19. Arthur O' Sullivan, Terri A. Sexton, and Steven M. Sheffrin, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts: The Legacy of Proposition 13 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 32.
20. Alvin D. Sokolow, "The Changing Property Tax in the West: State Centralization of Local Finances," (paper presented to the 1998 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles, CA, March 19-21, 1998).
21. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, pp. 60-65; John H. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation and Their Implication for Balance in State and Local Revenue Systems," The Quest for Balance in Stale-Local Revenue Structures, ed. Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987), pp. 71-105; Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 241; Steven D. Gold, Reforming State-Local Relations: A Practical Guide (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1989), pp. 82-86; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 207-298.
22. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, pp. 60-65; John H. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation and Their Implication for Balance in State and Local Revenue Systems," The Quest for Balance in Stale-Local Revenue Structures, ed. Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987), pp. 71-105; Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 241; Steven D. Gold, Reforming State-Local Relations: A Practical Guide (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1989), pp. 82-86; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 207-298.
23. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, pp. 60-65; John H. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation and Their Implication for Balance in State and Local Revenue Systems," The Quest for Balance in Stale-Local Revenue Structures, ed. Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987), pp. 71-105; Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 241; Steven D. Gold, Reforming State-Local Relations: A Practical Guide (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1989), pp. 82-86; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 207-298.
24. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, pp. 60-65; John H. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation and Their Implication for Balance in State and Local Revenue Systems," The Quest for Balance in Stale-Local Revenue Structures, ed. Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987), pp. 71-105; Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 241; Steven D. Gold, Reforming State-Local Relations: A Practical Guide (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1989), pp. 82-86; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 207-298.
25. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, pp. 60-65; John H. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation and Their Implication for Balance in State and Local Revenue Systems," The Quest for Balance in Stale-Local Revenue Structures, ed. Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987), pp. 71-105; Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 241; Steven D. Gold, Reforming State-Local Relations: A Practical Guide (Denver, CO: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1989), pp. 82-86; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 207-298.
26. U. S. Advisory Commission, Tax and Expenditure Limits, pp. 49-51.
27. Fisher, The Worst Tax?, p. 297; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 163.
28. Fisher, The Worst Tax?, p. 297; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 163.
29. Joyce and Mullins, "The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector," 242.
30. Dennis Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later: The Ambiguous Legacy of Tax Reform in Massachusetts," State and Local Government Review 25 (Spring 1993): 117-129.
31. Richard F. Dye and Therese J. McGuire, "Tax Caps in Illinois: Experience and Issues," Institute of Government and Public Affairs Policy Forum 10 (1996).
32. Kenneth L. Weaver, "Property Tax Trends in Montana," Montana Policy Review 5 (Fall 1997): 37-40.
33. Bruce Weber and Monica G. Fisher, Oregon's Fiscal Choices: Historical Context and Long-term Implications (Corvalis, OR: Oregon Fiscal Choices Project, Oregon State University, 1977).
34. As calculated from annual Census of Governments data, fiscal years 1975 through 1992.
35. The following details of public education funding in Michigan are based on Ronald C. Fisher and Robert W. Wassmer, "Centralizing Educational Responsibility in Michigan and other States: New Constraints on States and Localities," National Tax Journal 48 (September 1995): 417-428; Robert J. Kleine, "Michigan: Rethinking Fiscal Priorities," The Fiscal Crisis of the States: Lessons for the Future ed. Steven D. Gold (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), pp. 296-326;
36. The following details of public education funding in Michigan are based on Ronald C. Fisher and Robert W. Wassmer, "Centralizing Educational Responsibility in Michigan and other States: New Constraints on States and Localities," National Tax Journal 48 (September 1995): 417-428; Robert J. Kleine, "Michigan: Rethinking Fiscal Priorities," The Fiscal Crisis of the States: Lessons for the Future ed. Steven D. Gold (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995), pp. 296-326;
37. Robert W. Wassmer and Ronald C. Fisher, "An Evaluation of the Recent Move to Centralize the Finance of Public Schools in Michigan," Public Budgeting & Finance 16 (Fall 1996): 90-112.
38. William Celis, 3d, "Michigan Votes for Revolution in Financing Its Public Schools," New York Times 17 March 1994, pp. Al, A9.
39. A contrary view suggested that other states were not likely to follow Michigan's example because most had far lower property taxes (Michigan had the third highest school taxes in relation to personal income in 1991) and lacked the same degree of political pressure for local tax relief. Steven D. Gold, "School, Property Taxes Under Fire," Government Finance Review 10 (August 1994): 33-37.
40. Scott Mackey, "The Property Tax Predicament," State Legislatures 20 (August 1994): 23-26; Scott Mackey, "Ways to Skin the Property Tax Cat," State Legislatures 22 (September 1996): 28-30; Scott Mackey "State Property Tax Relief in 1997," NCSL Legisbrief 5 (November/December 1997).
41. Scott Mackey, "The Property Tax Predicament," State Legislatures 20 (August 1994): 23-26; Scott Mackey, "Ways to Skin the Property Tax Cat," State Legislatures 22 (September 1996): 28-30; Scott Mackey "State Property Tax Relief in 1997," NCSL Legisbrief 5 (November/December 1997).
42. Scott Mackey, "The Property Tax Predicament," State Legislatures 20 (August 1994): 23-26; Scott Mackey, "Ways to Skin the Property Tax Cat," State Legislatures 22 (September 1996): 28-30; Scott Mackey "State Property Tax Relief in 1997," NCSL Legisbrief 5 (November/December 1997).
43. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Revenues and Expenditures," Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1994), Volume 2, Table 36.
44. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 156.
45. United States Advisory Commission Intergovernmental Relations, "Revenues and Expenditures," Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1992), Volume 1, Table 60 and Table 64.
46. U.S. Census data on government finances as reported in National Conference of State Legislatures, Critical Issues in State-Local Fiscal Policy: A Guide to Local Option Taxes (Denver, CO: NCSL, 1997), Table 2.
47. State aid and property taxes each represented about a third of local government general revenues in FY 1977, but property taxes dropped to 28 percent in FY 1995 while state aid was 34 percent of general revenues. U.S. Census data on government finances as reported in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Revenues and Expenditures," Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1994), Volume2, Table 14 and Table 22, and Census website for FY 1995 data.
48. California Legislative Analyst's Office, "Major Milestones: 25 Years of the State-Local Fiscal Relationship," California Update 1 (December 1997).
49. Kenneth L. Weaver, "Property Tax Trends in Montana," 38.
50. Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 125.
51. Gold and Ritchie, "State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties," 40.
52. U.S. Advisory Commission, Tax and Expenditure Limits, p. 32.
53. This sense of obligation was apparent in the 1930s, when states assisted local governments to fund their programs in the face of depression-induced property tax declines. A number of states at that time adopted their first general sales taxes and allocated shares to local governments. U.S. Advisory Commission, State Constitutional and Statutory Resctrictions, p. 38.
54. Gold, The fiscal Crisis of the States, p. 33; Gold and Ritchie, "State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties," 27-35.
55. Gold, The fiscal Crisis of the States, p. 33; Gold and Ritchie, "State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties," 27-35.
56. Berman, "State-Local Relations."
57. The property tax also serves other state policy objectives. For example, most state governments assist agriculture and provide some support for land conservation by assessing farmland for taxation purposes at use value rather than the higher market values. See Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 191.
58. Jeffrey I. Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis," The Fiscal Crisis of the States, pp. 104-140.
59. Sokolow, "The Changing Property Tax in the West."
60. Berman, "State-Local Relations."
61. Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 126; William H. Oakland, "Proposition 13 - Genesis and Consequences," National Tax Journal 32 (June 1979): 387-407.
62. Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 126; William H. Oakland, "Proposition 13 - Genesis and Consequences," National Tax Journal 32 (June 1979): 387-407.
63. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 210-211; Daniel R. Mullins and Philip G. Joyce, "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment," Public Budgeting & Finance 16 (Spring 1996): 75-101; Steven M. Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy Perspective," The Future of State and Local Taxation, ed. David Brunori (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1998), p. 18.
64. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 210-211; Daniel R. Mullins and Philip G. Joyce, "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment," Public Budgeting & Finance 16 (Spring 1996): 75-101; Steven M. Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy Perspective," The Future of State and Local Taxation, ed. David Brunori (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1998), p. 18.
65. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 210-211; Daniel R. Mullins and Philip G. Joyce, "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment," Public Budgeting & Finance 16 (Spring 1996): 75-101; Steven M. Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy Perspective," The Future of State and Local Taxation, ed. David Brunori (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1998), p. 18.
66. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 210-211; Daniel R. Mullins and Philip G. Joyce, "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure: An Empirical Assessment," Public Budgeting & Finance 16 (Spring 1996): 75-101; Steven M. Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax: A Political Economy Perspective," The Future of State and Local Taxation, ed. David Brunori (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1998), p. 18.
67. Alvin D. Sokolow, "State-Local Relations," The International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration, ed. Jay M. Shafritz (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 2130-2133, Volume 4.
68. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Local Government Autonomy: Needs for State Constitutional, Statutory, and Judicial Clarification (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1993).
69. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 120; Royce Hanson, "Effect on Metropolitan Growth: The Washington, D.C., Area," Tax and Expenditure Limitations: How to Implement and Live Within Them, ed. Jerome G. Rose (Rutgers, NJ: The State University of New Jersey, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1982), pp. 203-211.
70. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 120; Royce Hanson, "Effect on Metropolitan Growth: The Washington, D.C., Area," Tax and Expenditure Limitations: How to Implement and Live Within Them, ed. Jerome G. Rose (Rutgers, NJ: The State University of New Jersey, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1982), pp. 203-211.
71. Bowman, "Recent Changes in Property Taxation," 100; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 120; Royce Hanson, "Effect on Metropolitan Growth: The Washington, D.C., Area," Tax and Expenditure Limitations: How to Implement and Live Within Them, ed. Jerome G. Rose (Rutgers, NJ: The State University of New Jersey, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1982), pp. 203-211.
72. David Lowery, "Public Opinion, Fiscal Illusion, and Tax Revolution: The Political Demise of the Property Tax," Public Budgeting & finance 5 (Fall 1985): 76-88; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, p. 59; Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 160.
73. David Lowery, "Public Opinion, Fiscal Illusion, and Tax Revolution: The Political Demise of the Property Tax," Public Budgeting & finance 5 (Fall 1985): 76-88; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, p. 59; Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 160.
74. David Lowery, "Public Opinion, Fiscal Illusion, and Tax Revolution: The Political Demise of the Property Tax," Public Budgeting & finance 5 (Fall 1985): 76-88; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions, p. 59; Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 160.
75. Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 210; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 216; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 127; Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax."
76. Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 210; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 216; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 127; Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax."
77. Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 210; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 216; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 127; Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax."
78. Fisher, The Worst Tax? p. 210; Gold, Property Tax Relief, p. 216; Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 127; Sheffrin, "The Future of the Property Tax."
79. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
80. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
81. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
82. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
83. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
84. This description of post-Proposition 13 patterns is based on the author's observations and a summary of the following works: Chapman, "California: The Enduring Crisis"; Jeffrey I. Chapman, "The Continuing Redistribution of Fiscal Stress: The Long Run Consequences of Proposition 13," (draft of report prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, October 1997); O'Sulivan, Property Taxes and Tax Revolts; Alvin D. Sokolow, "State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in Californiasís Central Valley," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 23 (Winter 1993):53-69. Also included in this summary are the views of several California local officials recorded in two public forums held in the 1980s, six and ten years after the passage of Proposition 13: Linda Martin, ed. Local Government Autonomy in California (Davis, CA: Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1984), pp. 23-32; Paul Hahn, ed., Proposition 13, Ten Years Later: Finances, Local Control and the Common Good (Davis, CA: California Policy Seminar, 1998), pp. 31-43.
85. Fisher and Wassmer, "Centralizing Educational Responsibility in Michigan and Other States," 423.
86. William A. Fischel, "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?" National Tax Journal 42 (December 1989): 465-473.
87. Fisher, The Worst Tax? pp. 211-212.
88. Hale, "Proposition 2-1/2 a Decade Later," 127.
89. Judy A. Temple, " Community Composition and Voter Support for Tax Limitations: Evidence from Home-Rule Elections," Southern Economic Journal 62 (April 1996): 1002-1016.
90. The conventional wisdom about dislike for the property tax is based largely on past ACIR-sponsored surveys; the federal income tax replaced it as the least popular tax in these polls in the 1980s. See Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 161. A more recent national phone survey conducted by a marketing firm gives the property tax high markings (60 percent of respondents said they received their money's worth from this tax) than state or federal income taxes and social security payments. Tibbett L. Speer, "Taxing Times," American Demographics 19 (April 1997): 41-44. A limitation in the ACIR surveys is that they did not compare the property tax with other local revenue sources.
91. The conventional wisdom about dislike for the property tax is based largely on past ACIR-sponsored surveys; the federal income tax replaced it as the least popular tax in these polls in the 1980s. See Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations, p. 161. A more recent national phone survey conducted by a marketing firm gives the property tax high markings (60 percent of respondents said they received their money's worth from this tax) than state or federal income taxes and social security payments. Tibbett L. Speer, "Taxing Times," American Demographics 19 (April 1997): 41-44. A limitation in the ACIR surveys is that they did not compare the property tax with other local revenue sources.
92. A May 1998, statewide field poll in California found that 53 percent of respondents would vote for Proposition 13 today, 20 years after the passage of the measure. Dan Bernstein, "Prop 13 Still Supported by Most Voters in Survey," Sacramento Bee, 18 May 1998, p. A3.