Self-forgiveness and responsible moral agency

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 75-91

  Holmgren, Margaret R ^a  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038847853     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004260824156     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. See Margaret Holmgren, "Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons," American Philosophical Quarterly 30, 4 (October 1993).
2. From Fifteen Sermons Upon Human Nature by Joseph Butler (Charlottesville, Va.: Lincoln-Rembrandt Publishing, 1986).
3. Robert D. Enright and the Human Development Study Group, "Counseling Within the Forgiveness Triad: On Forgiving, Receiving Forgiveness, and Self-Forgiveness," Counseling and Values 40 (1996). This excellent article makes a substantial contribution to the philosophical discussion of forgiveness, as do Enright's other articles. See especially "Piaget on the Moral Development of Forgiveness: Identity or Reciprocity?", Human Development: 37 (1994). See also Nancy E. Snow, "Self-Forgiveness," The Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993), p. 76.
4. Robert D. Enright and the Human Development Study Group, "Counseling Within the Forgiveness Triad: On Forgiving, Receiving Forgiveness, and Self-Forgiveness," Counseling and Values 40 (1996). This excellent article makes a substantial contribution to the philosophical discussion of forgiveness, as do Enright's other articles. See especially "Piaget on the Moral Development of Forgiveness: Identity or Reciprocity?", Human Development: 37 (1994). See also Nancy E. Snow, "Self-Forgiveness," The Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993), p. 76.
5. Robert D. Enright and the Human Development Study Group, "Counseling Within the Forgiveness Triad: On Forgiving, Receiving Forgiveness, and Self-Forgiveness," Counseling and Values 40 (1996). This excellent article makes a substantial contribution to the philosophical discussion of forgiveness, as do Enright's other articles. See especially "Piaget on the Moral Development of Forgiveness: Identity or Reciprocity?", Human Development: 37 (1994). See also Nancy E. Snow, "Self-Forgiveness," The Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993), p. 76.
6. As Jeffrie Murphy points out, we would not have an instance of self-forgiveness if the offender merely forgets what happens, or if she undergoes hypnosis to get the incident off her mind so she can better get on with her work. See Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
7. In "Counseling within the Forgiveness Triad," Enright and the Human Development Study Group suggest that "self-respect may allow one to see the offence and thus enter a self-forgiveness journey," p. 116.
8. A wrongdoer is certainly permitted to give a victim more restitution than he is due, if this is the course of action she prefers.
9. See Margaret Holmgren, "Punishment as Restitution: The Rights of the Community," Criminal Justice Ethics, 2 (1983).
10. H.J.N. Horsbrugh, "Forgiveness," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, IV, 2 (December 1974), p. 275.
11. Snow, op. cit., p. 76.
12. Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 87.
13. This theme is present throughout "Self-Forgiveness."
14. Enright, "Counseling Within the Forgiveness Triad," p. 119.
15. Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower (New York: Schoken Books, 1970).
16. This would be a consequential ist reason for forgiving oneself independently of the victim's forgiveness.
17. Horsbrugh, loc. cit.
18. Enright, "Counseling within the Forgiveness Triad," p. 117.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. For an excellent discussion of guilt and the role it plays in motivating us to address our wrongs, see P.S. Greenspan, "Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993), and "Guilt and Virtue," The Journal of Philosophy, XCI, 2 (February 1994).
22. For an excellent discussion of guilt and the role it plays in motivating us to address our wrongs, see P.S. Greenspan, "Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993), and "Guilt and Virtue," The Journal of Philosophy, XCI, 2 (February 1994).
23. George Harris, Strength and Duality of Character, unpublished manuscript.
24. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 227.
25. In writing this paper, I have benefited especially from discussions with Robert Enright, George Harris, Edwin Hettinger, Joseph Kupfer, Robin Sharp, and Gary Springsteel.