The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process

Issues and Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 9, 1997, Pages 1-30

  Tsai, George W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Institutional channels; Policy choices; The "dual leadership" system; The CLGTA; The COTA; The TAO

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038842264     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. For more on mainland China's decisionmaking formulas, see Carol Lee Hamrin, "Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1994), 77-109; and George W. Tsai, "Beijing's Decisionmaking Formulas and Behavior," Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly) (Taipei) 31, no. 4 (April 1997): 99-111.
2. For more on mainland China's decisionmaking formulas, see Carol Lee Hamrin, "Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1994), 77-109; and George W. Tsai, "Beijing's Decisionmaking Formulas and Behavior," Zhonggong yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly) (Taipei) 31, no. 4 (April 1997): 99-111.
3. A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 137; Tai Ming Cheung, "The Impact of Research Institutes in the Post-Mao Period of Peking's Foreign Policymaking," Issues & Studies 23, no. 7 (July 1987): 88.
4. A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 137; Tai Ming Cheung, "The Impact of Research Institutes in the Post-Mao Period of Peking's Foreign Policymaking," Issues & Studies 23, no. 7 (July 1987): 88.
5. "Leadership" means that a relationship of administrative subordination exists and subordinate units must obey the orders of superior units; "guidance" refers to coordination of operations among parallel units or units without a superior-subordinate relationship that should be respected by all units involved.
6. David L. Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," The China Quarterly, no. 110 (June 1987): 280.
7. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), xxix.
8. Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 10.
9. It should be noted that despite all this, important decisions are never made by an individual but are made only after group discussion, indicating that all members share the responsibility. See Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xlvi; a mainland Chinese scholar also stated Beijing's verbal attacks and military intimidation moves against Taiwan in 1996 as an example, pointing out that the CCPCC had asked Politburo members to share responsibility by giving their opinions in written form.
10. See Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 9-12; readjustments were made after the CCP's Thirteenth National Congress. For more on the CCPCC Secretariat's power expansion and its golden age, see Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxii. In fact, up to now, outsiders have remained unclear about the operations of the CCPCC Secretariat and the Politburo.
11. See Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 9-12; readjustments were made after the CCP's Thirteenth National Congress. For more on the CCPCC Secretariat's power expansion and its golden age, see Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxii. In fact, up to now, outsiders have remained unclear about the operations of the CCPCC Secretariat and the Politburo. See H. Lyman Miller, "Politics Inside the Ring Road: On Sources and Comparisons," ibid., 211.
12. See Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 9-12; readjustments were made after the CCP's Thirteenth National Congress. For more on the CCPCC Secretariat's power expansion and its golden age, see Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxii. In fact, up to now, outsiders have remained unclear about the operations of the CCPCC Secretariat and the Politburo. See H. Lyman Miller, "Politics Inside the Ring Road: On Sources and Comparisons," ibid., 211.
13. Michael Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making" (Paper prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, published by the Rand Corporation in 1996), 28. In July 1996, an official of the CCPCC General Office told the author that except for very few special cases, important Taiwan affairs information from Party, government, and military organizations must go through the CCPCC General Office before being reported to higher-echelon units.
14. Leading groups under the CCPCC are task forces composed of Party, government, and military decisionmakers. These groups' decisions depend on the issue, the power and work style of its leaders, and the circumstances. See Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxiv. The six known CLGTA members include Head Jiang Zemin (CCP general secretary and state president): Deputy Head Qian Qichen (foreign minister and vice-premier); Wang Zhaoguo (United Front Work Department head, ex-director of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, and ex-director of the Central Office for Taiwan Affairs); Jia Chunwang (minister of state security); Xiong Guangkai (deputy chief of general staff of the PLA); and Wang Daohan (chairman of the ARATS and former mayor of Shanghai). Wang Zhaoguo is concurrently secretary-general of the group. In 1997, Chen Yunlin, originally deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council, was promoted to director of the same office. It is still unclear whether he will take over Wang Zhaoguo's position, but it appears certain that the group has decided to abolish the post of secretary-general.
15. Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxiii-xxxiv.
16. Ken E. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1995, 562-64.
17. Ibid., 564. However, the two organizations still have different functions The COTA. mainly responsible for handling and conveying the CCP's Taiwan policy, represents the Party's stand, but the State Council's TAO is responsible for handling the PRC,s Taiwan work and represents its stand on Taiwan affairs.
18. This was related to the author by an official of the CCPCC General Office during his visit to mainland China in July-August 1996, and is consistent with the results of Michael Swaine's research. See Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making, 62-63.
19. Ibid., 70-71.
20. Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu (Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong memoirs) (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1993), 209, 212.
21. Relatively speaking, the State Council is mainly responsible for administrative affairs while the CCPCC Secretariat, parallel in status to the State Council, is the principal organ in charge of political affairs. See Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 54; and Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxii.
22. Relatively speaking, the State Council is mainly responsible for administrative affairs while the CCPCC Secretariat, parallel in status to the State Council, is the principal organ in charge of political affairs. See Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 54; and Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xxxii.
23. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 29-30.
24. For the TAO's organization and functions, see Kuo Jui-hua, Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo zuzhi tixi gailun (An introduction to mainland China's Taiwan affairs organizations) (Taipei: Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 1996), 94-97.
25. For the establishment, organizational structure, and important functions of the ARATS, see ibid., 103-10.
26. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 564.
27. Hamrin and Zhao, Decision-Making in Deng's China, xli.
28. According to an article published in Hong Kong, there is also a Taiwan Affairs Office under the CMC. However, in interviews, mainland Chinese scholars and military officials denied the existence of such a unit. See Luo Bing, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," Cheng Ming (Contending) (Hong Kong), 1996, no. 4:10.
29. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," 69.
30. Ibid., 67-68; Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 563.
31. Ibid., 67-68; Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 563.
32. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," xi-xii. However according to David Shambaugh's observations in 1987, there was a tendency for civilian views and influence to become increasingly strong.
33. See Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," 285-86. Judging by mainland China's recent development trends, the author believes that in general, the influence of civilian organizations has gradually increased but the military still has the upper hand over issues involving Taiwan.
34. Luo, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," 10-11; Tian Tao, "Can Missile Attacks on Taiwan Win the Battle in Three Minutes?" Cheng Ming, 1996, no. 1:21; Li Zijing, "Mainland China Exaggerates the Results of Military Exercises," and "Zhang Wannian Says That Mainland China Is Able to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers," ibid., 1996, no. 4:12-15; Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), October 20, 1996, 10.
35. Luo, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," 10-11; Tian Tao, "Can Missile Attacks on Taiwan Win the Battle in Three Minutes?" Cheng Ming, 1996, no. 1:21; Li Zijing, "Mainland China Exaggerates the Results of Military Exercises," and "Zhang Wannian Says That Mainland China Is Able to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers," ibid., 1996, no. 4:12-15; Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), October 20, 1996, 10.
36. Luo, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," 10-11; Tian Tao, "Can Missile Attacks on Taiwan Win the Battle in Three Minutes?" Cheng Ming, 1996, no. 1:21; Li Zijing, "Mainland China Exaggerates the Results of Military Exercises," and "Zhang Wannian Says That Mainland China Is Able to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers," ibid., 1996, no. 4:12-15; Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), October 20, 1996, 10.
37. Luo, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," 10-11; Tian Tao, "Can Missile Attacks on Taiwan Win the Battle in Three Minutes?" Cheng Ming, 1996, no. 1:21; Li Zijing, "Mainland China Exaggerates the Results of Military Exercises," and "Zhang Wannian Says That Mainland China Is Able to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers," ibid., 1996, no. 4:12-15; Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), October 20, 1996, 10.
38. Luo, "Inside Information on Mainland China's Southeast War Zone," 10-11; Tian Tao, "Can Missile Attacks on Taiwan Win the Battle in Three Minutes?" Cheng Ming, 1996, no. 1:21; Li Zijing, "Mainland China Exaggerates the Results of Military Exercises," and "Zhang Wannian Says That Mainland China Is Able to Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers," ibid., 1996, no. 4:12-15; Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), October 20, 1996, 10.
39. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 565.
40. "An Analysis of Mainland China's Developments After the Mainland Chinese Military Exercises in the Taiwan Strait." in Zhonggong dui Tai zhengce ji liang'an guanxi zhi yanjiu (A study of mainland China's Taiwan policy and cross-Strait relations) (Taipei: KMT Central Committee Department of Mainland Affairs, 1996), 113-14.
41. Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, 4, 102.
42. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," xii. In fact, most mainland Chinese military researchers have negative views about Taiwan and favor the adoption of a hard-line Taiwan policy. The opinions of Wang Zaixi, a General Staff Headquarters researcher, provide a good example. See Wang Zaixi, Taihai qingshi huigu (A review of the Taiwan Strait situation) (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1996).
43. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," xii. In fact, most mainland Chinese military researchers have negative views about Taiwan and favor the adoption of a hard-line Taiwan policy. The opinions of Wang Zaixi, a General Staff Headquarters researcher, provide a good example. See Wang Zaixi, Taihai qingshi huigu (A review of the Taiwan Strait situation) (Beijing: Huayi chubanshe, 1996).
44. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," 61.
45. Dalu qingshi ABC (ABC of the situation of mainland China) (Taipei: KMT Central Committee Department of Mainland Affairs, August 1, 1993), 163.
46. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 565. However, according to information obtained by Taipei's Investigation Bureau, Beijing's Ministry of State Security has seventeen bureaus. See Kuo, Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo zuzhi tixi gailun, 125.
47. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 565. However, according to information obtained by Taipei's Investigation Bureau, Beijing's Ministry of State Security has seventeen bureaus. See Kuo, Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo zuzhi tixi gailun, 125.
48. IbId., 114-19. For categories of internal reference materials, see Kuo, Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo zuzhi tixi gailun, 237-39.
49. IbId., 114-19. For categories of internal reference materials, see Kuo, Zhonggong dui Tai gongzuo zuzhi tixi gailun, 237-39.
50. See Jin Zhong, "Report on Huang Wenfang's Visit to Taiwan," Kaifang (Open) (Hong Kong), 1996, no. 8:49-54. According to Xu Jiatun, the Xinhua Hong Kong Office is also responsible for intelligence collection, including information on Taiwan. Intelligence collectors are from the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, the PLA General Staff Headquarters, and the PLA General Political Department. Most of them are given positions in the security department of the Xinhua and some Beijing-funded organizations.
51. see Xu, Xu Jiatun Xianggang huiyilu, 52-55.
52. Gause, "China's Policy Towards Taiwan," 563-64.
53. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policy-Making," 69-70.
54. Jiang's "eight points" proposal was the result of more than a year of staff operations. According to Li Jiaquan, former deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing has already planned for the drafting of a Taiwan Basic Law, but considers the time not yet ripe for unveiling such a plan. See Lianhe bao, October 19, 1996, 9.