Illustrated examples of the effects of risk preferences and expectations on bargaining outcomes

Journal of Economic Education

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 169-180

  Dickinson, David L ^a  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Expected utility theory; Teaching of economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038809945     PISSN: 00220485     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00220480309595210     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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