Rating the Sloba show: Will justice be served?

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 53-63

  Gordy, Eric ^a  

^a CLARK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038807678     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2003.11656039     Document Type: Review

References (45)

1. There are several good English-language accounts of the career of Slobodan Milošević and the wars of the Yugoslav succession from 1991 to 1999. See in particular Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995) and idem, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002); Nebojša Popov and Drinka Gojković (eds.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
2. There are several good English-language accounts of the career of Slobodan Milošević and the wars of the Yugoslav succession from 1991 to 1999. See in particular Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995) and idem, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002); Nebojša Popov and Drinka Gojković (eds.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
3. There are several good English-language accounts of the career of Slobodan Milošević and the wars of the Yugoslav succession from 1991 to 1999. See in particular Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995) and idem, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002); Nebojša Popov and Drinka Gojković (eds.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
4. There are several good English-language accounts of the career of Slobodan Milošević and the wars of the Yugoslav succession from 1991 to 1999. See in particular Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995) and idem, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002); Nebojša Popov and Drinka Gojković (eds.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
5. An account of the events leading to the founding of the ICTY is provided by Vladan Vasiljević, Zlocin i odgovornost: Ogled o medjunarodnom krivicnom pravu i raspadu Jugoslavije (Crime and Responsibility: A Study of International Criminal Law and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia) (Belgrade: Prometej, 1995).
6. The relevant Security Council legislation comprises Resolution 808 (1993), which instructed the secretary-general to lay the groundwork for establishing an international tribunal, and Resolution 827 (1993), which established the ICTY and set forth its statute. Both resolutions specify that the tribunal was established in the belief that it would "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace." The full text of Resolution 808 is available at www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-808_93.htm, and that of Resolution 827 at www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm.
7. Richard Goldstone, "Comment: The Tribunal's Progress," IWPR Tribunal Update, no. 220 (May 7-12, 2001), available at www.iwpr.net.
8. Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 207.
9. Ibid., p. 223.
10. A continually updated list of detainees currently held in (forty-seven as of March 2003) or on provisional release from (ten as of March 2003) detention at ICTY is available at www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm. A full list of the tribunal's eighty public indictments is available at the same site. The listing does not include sealed indictments. How many of these there are has not been disclosed.
11. The thesis that criminal trials for violations of international humanitarian law serve crucial social purposes in addition to their legal purposes is a recurrent theme in scholarly discussions of transitional justice. On this point, see Stephen A. Garrett, "Models of Transitional Justice: A Comparative Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 2000), available at www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/; Naomi Roht-Arriaza. "The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An Interview with José Zalaquett," and Mark J. Osiel, "Making Public Memory, Publicly," both in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hesse and Robert Post (New York: Zone Books, 1999); Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001).
12. The thesis that criminal trials for violations of international humanitarian law serve crucial social purposes in addition to their legal purposes is a recurrent theme in scholarly discussions of transitional justice. On this point, see Stephen A. Garrett, "Models of Transitional Justice: A Comparative Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 2000), available at www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/; Naomi Roht-Arriaza. "The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An Interview with José Zalaquett," and Mark J. Osiel, "Making Public Memory, Publicly," both in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hesse and Robert Post (New York: Zone Books, 1999); Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001).
13. The thesis that criminal trials for violations of international humanitarian law serve crucial social purposes in addition to their legal purposes is a recurrent theme in scholarly discussions of transitional justice. On this point, see Stephen A. Garrett, "Models of Transitional Justice: A Comparative Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 2000), available at www.ciaonet.org/isa/gas02/; Naomi Roht-Arriaza. "The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An Interview with José Zalaquett," and Mark J. Osiel, "Making Public Memory, Publicly," both in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hesse and Robert Post (New York: Zone Books, 1999); Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001).
14. Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).
15. There are three indictments against Milošević: one for crimes committed in Kosovo, filed in 1999 and amended in 2001; one for crimes committed in Croatia, filed in 2001 and amended in 2002; and one for crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, filed in 2001. The full text of these indictments, as well as of all other indictments that have been made public by the ICTY, is available at www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
16. Quoted in D. Bisenić, "Prvo pojavljivanje Slobodana Milošević pred Haškim tribunalom: Smatram ovaj sud lažnim" (The First Appearance of Slobodan Milošević Before The Hague Tribunal: I consider this court false), Danai (July 4, 2001).
17. Karleusa gave his testimony in July 2002, For an interview with him about the findings of his investigation, see Vreme (November 1, 2001). An English-language translation of the interview is available at www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/vreme/vreme105.html.
18. One of the best sources for continuing coverage of the Milošević trial is the ongoing collection of reports by Judith Armatta of the Coalition for International Justice. See www.cij.org.
19. See the discussion in Vreme (February 27, 2003). Vasiljković un- dermined some of the effect of his testimony when he changed several crucial elements under cross-examination by Milošević and in public statements after his court appearance.
20. The text of the initial indictment filed against Milošević on April 2, 2001 is available at www.xs4all.nl/̃freeserb/facts/2001/02042001.html.
21. The full text of Milošević's April 2 appeal was published by the daily newspaper Danas and is available at www.danasnews.com/20010403/dokumenti.htm.
22. The text of the law, as enacted by the federal government in the form of a decree on June 23, 2001, will be found in Danas (June 25, 2001).
23. The legal foundation for the decision was Article 16 of the 1992 federal constitution, which declares all international conventions and agreements to be a part of domestic law, and Article 135 of the 1990 Serbian constitution, which grants Serbia the right to ignore decisions of the federal government that it regards as contrary to the national interest. Both articles are part of constitutions - still in effect at the time - adopted unilaterally by governments under Milošević's control. The unusual Article 135 was most likely motivated by the conflict at the time between Milošević's nationalist-authoritarian Serbian regime and the liberal federal government of the last prime minister, Ante Marković. See Vreme (July 5, 2001).
24. Glas javnosti (June 4, 2002).
25. Blic (June 25, 2002).
26. Vreme (June 6, 2002).
27. Patricia M. Wald, "Note from the Field: Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal," Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 5 (2002): 220.
28. The indictment, judgment, and sentence of Akayesu as well as all other publicly released documents related to ICTR cases are available at www.ictr.org under "Cases."
29. David Cohen, "Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes," in Human Rights in Political Transitions; Gettysburg to Bosnia, ed. Carla Hesse and Robert Post (New York: Zone Books, 1999), pp. 53-92.
30. The implications of this may be implicit in the indictment filed against the ultra-right politician Vojislav Šešelj in 2003, where along with the evidence for his participation in the "joint criminal enterprise" led by Milošević it is noted that he "was a prominent political figure in the SFRY/ FRY in the time period relevant to this indictment." The Šešelj indictment is available at www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ses-ii030115e.htm.
31. The principle was articulated in 2001 in the ICTY's ruling on the case of the guards at the Čelebići camp, available at www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p564-e.htm. Interestingly, one figure who seems to have found a use for the category of de facto commander is Kosta Čavoški, in the name of the International Committee for the Truth About Radovan Karadžić. an advocacy group for the fugitive charged with genocide. In an essay on the group's Web site (www.Karadžić.org), Cavoski argues that Karadžić cannot be held responsible for the Srebrenica massacre because at the time effective control of the armed forces was exercised not by him but by Milošević.
32. The Latin term tu quoque (literally "you're another" or "you too") describes a rhetorical effort to deflect accusations by arguing that an accuser may also be guilty. As a defense under international humanitarian law, it amounts to a claim that "breaches of international humanitarian law, being committed by the enemy, justify similar breaches by a belligerent." The ICTY trial chamber rejects this sort of defense on the grounds that international humanitarian law "lays down absolute obligations, namely obligations that are unconditional or in other words not based on reciprocity," and, therefore, that the obligation to comply does not depend on the conduct of another party. See Cecile Meijer and Amardeep Singh, "News from the International Criminal Tribunals," Human Rights Brief 8, no. 2 (fall 2000).
33. Quoted in Ivan Djordjević, "Miloševićev problem" (Milošević Problem), Free Serbia (June 7, 2001), available at www.srpskadijaspora.info/komentar/Milošević/0607.asp. More detail is provided in a survey by the Belgrade-based Center for the Study of Alternatives reported in Nezavisna svetlost in March 2001. The survey reported that 82 percent of respondents agreed that Milošević should be tried for "war crimes, corruption, electoral fraud, and abuse of power," but only 4 percent agreed that he should be tried only for war crimes. On the question of whether Milošević should be sent to The Hague (the survey was carried out before his arrest), 56 percent of respondents with higher education said "yes," as did 45 percent of those with the equivalent of a high school education or less. Sixteen percent of those with higher education, and 24 percent of those without, were opposed to sending Milošević to The Hague. The results are summarized in Nezavisna svetlost (March 24-31, 2001). An interesting finding, although there is no assurance whatsoever of a random sample, can be found in the informal poll on the Web site of the weekly magazine NIN (www.nin.co.yu). NIN has been asking visitors to vote "yes" or "no" on the question "Should Milošević have been delivered to The Hague tribunal?" since the week he was remanded, with the results generally hovering at 35-40 percent in favor and 60-65 percent opposed since June 2001. A check of the site after the beginning of Milošević's trial, however, indicated a change. On February 14, 2002, the continuous informal poll showed 45.5 percent voting "yes" and 54.5 percent voting "no." These results should probably be taken with some reservations, however, because a number of factors could easily influence this sort of survey.
34. For a recent example, see Srečko Mihailović, Gradjani u susretu sa institucijama u tranziciji (Citizens Confront Institutions in Transition) (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, May 2002). The results are similar to those in a survey from the previous year: Srecko Mihailovic et al., Javno mnenje Srbije: Na pocetku novih deoba (Public Opinion in Serbia: The Beginning of New Divisions) (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, August 2001), All the published research reports of the center are available at www.cpa-cps.org.yu.
35. For a recent example, see Srečko Mihailović, Gradjani u susretu sa institucijama u tranziciji (Citizens Confront Institutions in Transition) (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, May 2002). The results are similar to those in a survey from the previous year: Srecko Mihailovic et al., Javno mnenje Srbije: Na pocetku novih deoba (Public Opinion in Serbia: The Beginning of New Divisions) (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, August 2001), All the published research reports of the center are available at www.cpa-cps.org.yu.
36. SMMRI, "Vidjenje istine u Srbij" (Perceptions of Truth in Serbia), May 2001, p. 15.
37. Ibid., p. 22.
38. Ibid., p. 27. However, according to the same survey, only 11.2 percent of those who named the Markale attack believed that it was committed by Serb forces. This is consistent with the claim by the state media at the time of the attack and afterward that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had manufactured this atrocity and others for purposes of publicity. Similarly, only 22.8 percent of those who knew about the massacre in Racak believed that the reports were true.
39. Ibid., p. 28.
40. Ibid., p. 31.
41. Ibid., p. 30.
42. Ibid., p. 73.
43. Ibid., p. 72.
44. Ibid., p. 71.
45. The case in question is the famous freezer truck incident in which the bodies of victims of massacres in Kosovo were apparently removed from the scene and destroyed. A diver found a freezer truck containing forty corpses in the Danube River near Kladovo in 1999, and the case was quickly suppressed. Local media reported extensively on the case after the information was publicly revealed in April 2001. In May 2001, prosecutors declared that they had traced the effort to destroy evidence of massacres directly to Milošević.