The superiority of "chemical thinking" for understanding free human society according to hegel

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Volumn 988, Issue , 2003, Pages 313-321

  Nowacki, Mark R ^a   Ver Eecke, Wilfried ^b  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Chemical thinking; Free human society; Hegel; Latent group; Leader; Leadership; Mancur Olson; Mechanism; Public goods

Indexed keywords

CATALYST; CHEMICAL ANALYSIS; CHEMICAL STRUCTURE; CHEMISTRY; CONFERENCE PAPER; CONFORMATIONAL TRANSITION; LEADERSHIP; PHILOSOPHY; PHYSICS; SOCIETY; TECHNIQUE; THEORY; THINKING;

EID: 0038724159     PISSN: 00778923     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2003.tb06113.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (42)

1. Most of the relevant passages are to be found in Wissenschaft der Logik. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1-2. The following translation will be used for all quoted passages: HEGEL, G.W.F. 1989. Science of Logic. A.V. Miller, Trans. Humanities Press International. Atlantic Highlands, NJ. A valuable guide to understanding Hegel's thought that we have consulted is LÉONARD, A. 1974. Commentaire littéral de la logique de Hegel. J. Vrin. Paris. Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philsophie. Louvain.
2. Most of the relevant passages are to be found in Wissenschaft der Logik. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1-2. The following translation will be used for all quoted passages: HEGEL, G.W.F. 1989. Science of Logic. A.V. Miller, Trans. Humanities Press International. Atlantic Highlands, NJ. A valuable guide to understanding Hegel's thought that we have consulted is LÉONARD, A. 1974. Commentaire littéral de la logique de Hegel. J. Vrin. Paris. Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philsophie. Louvain.
3. Most of the relevant passages are to be found in Wissenschaft der Logik. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1-2. The following translation will be used for all quoted passages: HEGEL, G.W.F. 1989. Science of Logic. A.V. Miller, Trans. Humanities Press International. Atlantic Highlands, NJ. A valuable guide to understanding Hegel's thought that we have consulted is LÉONARD, A. 1974. Commentaire littéral de la logique de Hegel. J. Vrin. Paris. Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philsophie. Louvain.
4. For Hegel's discussion of mechanism and mechanistic thinking, see Science of Logic. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1.
5. Ibid., "Mechanism."
6. As Léonard comments: "en raison de l'extériorité réciproque des objets, cette efficience (Wirksamkeit) de chaque objet sur les autres (ou sur l'autre en général) demeure une relation extérieure qui n'affecte en rien la structure interne des objects. Ce type de relations extrinsèques entre objets composant un simple agrégat sans unité interne est le MÉCANISME FORMEL..." (Commentaire littéral. p. 438-439.)
7. Thus Hegel writes: "The relationship in which the unessential single bodies stand to one another is one of mutual thrust and pressure ..." (Science of Logic. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, subsect. C(a).)
8. Léonard brings out the violence implicit in mechanism quite clearly. Concerning the mechanistic object he observes: "il souffre VIOLENCE, car, dès lots qu'il est par ailleurs autosubsistant, la puissance efficiente qui agit sur lui est absolument étrangère à l'universe clos de l'objet et s'exerce donc sur lui aveuglément." (Commentaire littéral, 439.)
9. Mechanistic objects are "capable of mixing and aggregating and of becoming, as an aggregate, one object." (Science of Logic. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, subsect. B.)
10. Ibid., Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 1, subsect. C(a).
11. For Hegel's discussion of chemism and chemical thinking see Science of Logic. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 2. It is Hegel's recognition of the full generality of chemism, namely, that chemism employs a distinctive way of thinking applicable to diverse subject matters, that marks Hegel's account as a significant theoretical advance. (See Note 11 for a discussion of an important philosophical school that holds a position on chemical compounds similar to that of Hegel.)
12. Hegel advances this thought through a systematic development of the idea that chemical objects admit internal relations. He begins his discussion of chemism thus: "The chemical object is distinguished from the mechanical by the fact that the latter is a totality indifferent to determinateness, whereas in the case of the chemical object the determinateness, and consequently the relation to other and the kind and manner of this relation, belong to its nature." (Ibid., Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 2, subsect. A.)
13. Hegel is not the first philosopher to insist that certain combinations of elements result in essentially new compounds that cannot be reduced to the sum of their elemental parts: Aristotle adopted such an anti-reductionist stance more than two thousand years earlier. The importance of accounting for such compounds is recognized by both medieval and contemporary exponents of Aristotelian philosophy. No less a figure than Thomas Aquinas dedicated an entire treatise to the problem: see his De Mixtione Elementorum. Two contemporary representatives of the Aristotelian tradition who have written on the subject of chemical combination are Alan Wolter and Joseph Bobik. For an excellent introduction, see: WOLTER, A.B. 1960. Chemical substance. In Philosophy of Science. St. John's University Press. Jamaica, NY. pp. 87-130. See also BOBIK, J. 1998. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame, IN. Bobik's work is noteworthy in that he uses the conceptual tools developed by Aristotle and Aquinas to answer contemporary questions such as how quarks can be said to exist in protons. Summarizing the position of Aquinas, which he believes can be defended on its own merits, Bobik writes: "A mixing (mixis, mixtio)... results neither in something which is like a heap, e.g., of bricks and stones, in which its constituents are simply thrown together; nor does it result in something which is like a house, i.e., something which is not simply thrown together, but carefully put together out of constituents, e.g., wood and bricks and stones, arranged in an orderly way, and held together by certain joining materials, e.g., nails and mortar and glue. It results rather in something, i.e., a mixed body (like a molecule of water, or a proton), which differs in kind from any and all of its constituents, and in which the constituents, having undergone a mutual interactive alteration, remain in a special way, i.e., virtually, though not actually - virtually, meaning: with their powers, but these powers appropriately altered by means of their preceding interactive alteration (as well as retrievably, dispositionally, and instrumentally); though not actually, meaning: not with their substantial forms, because a substance (e.g., a molecule of water, or a proton) can have actually but one substantial form, its own." (Ibid., p. 272.)
14. Hegel is not the first philosopher to insist that certain combinations of elements result in essentially new compounds that cannot be reduced to the sum of their elemental parts: Aristotle adopted such an anti-reductionist stance more than two thousand years earlier. The importance of accounting for such compounds is recognized by both medieval and contemporary exponents of Aristotelian philosophy. No less a figure than Thomas Aquinas dedicated an entire treatise to the problem: see his De Mixtione Elementorum. Two contemporary representatives of the Aristotelian tradition who have written on the subject of chemical combination are Alan Wolter and Joseph Bobik. For an excellent introduction, see: WOLTER, A.B. 1960. Chemical substance. In Philosophy of Science. St. John's University Press. Jamaica, NY. pp. 87-130. See also BOBIK, J. 1998. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame, IN. Bobik's work is noteworthy in that he uses the conceptual tools developed by Aristotle and Aquinas to answer contemporary questions such as how quarks can be said to exist in protons. Summarizing the position of Aquinas, which he believes can be defended on its own merits, Bobik writes: "A mixing (mixis, mixtio)... results neither in something which is like a heap, e.g., of bricks and stones, in which its constituents are simply thrown together; nor does it result in something which is like a house, i.e., something which is not simply thrown together, but carefully put together out of constituents, e.g., wood and bricks and stones, arranged in an orderly way, and held together by certain joining materials, e.g., nails and mortar and glue. It results rather in something, i.e., a mixed body (like a molecule of water, or a proton), which differs in kind from any and all of its constituents, and in which the constituents, having undergone a mutual interactive alteration, remain in a special way, i.e., virtually, though not actually - virtually, meaning: with their powers, but these powers appropriately altered by means of their preceding interactive alteration (as well as retrievably, dispositionally, and instrumentally); though not actually, meaning: not with their substantial forms, because a substance (e.g., a molecule of water, or a proton) can have actually but one substantial form, its own." (Ibid., p. 272.)
15. Hegel is not the first philosopher to insist that certain combinations of elements result in essentially new compounds that cannot be reduced to the sum of their elemental parts: Aristotle adopted such an anti-reductionist stance more than two thousand years earlier. The importance of accounting for such compounds is recognized by both medieval and contemporary exponents of Aristotelian philosophy. No less a figure than Thomas Aquinas dedicated an entire treatise to the problem: see his De Mixtione Elementorum. Two contemporary representatives of the Aristotelian tradition who have written on the subject of chemical combination are Alan Wolter and Joseph Bobik. For an excellent introduction, see: WOLTER, A.B. 1960. Chemical substance. In Philosophy of Science. St. John's University Press. Jamaica, NY. pp. 87-130. See also BOBIK, J. 1998. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame, IN. Bobik's work is noteworthy in that he uses the conceptual tools developed by Aristotle and Aquinas to answer contemporary questions such as how quarks can be said to exist in protons. Summarizing the position of Aquinas, which he believes can be defended on its own merits, Bobik writes: "A mixing (mixis, mixtio)... results neither in something which is like a heap, e.g., of bricks and stones, in which its constituents are simply thrown together; nor does it result in something which is like a house, i.e., something which is not simply thrown together, but carefully put together out of constituents, e.g., wood and bricks and stones, arranged in an orderly way, and held together by certain joining materials, e.g., nails and mortar and glue. It results rather in something, i.e., a mixed body (like a molecule of water, or a proton), which differs in kind from any and all of its constituents, and in which the constituents, having undergone a mutual interactive alteration, remain in a special way, i.e., virtually, though not actually - virtually, meaning: with their powers, but these powers appropriately altered by means of their preceding interactive alteration (as well as retrievably, dispositionally, and instrumentally); though not actually, meaning: not with their substantial forms, because a substance (e.g., a molecule of water, or a proton) can have actually but one substantial form, its own." (Ibid., p. 272.)
16. Hegel writes: "With regard to the expression chemism for the relation of the difference of objectivity as it has presented itself, it may be further remarked that the expression must not be understood here as though this relation only exhibited itself in the form of elemental nature to which the name chemism so called is strictly applied. Even the meteorological relation must be regarded as a process whose parts have the nature more of physical than chemical elements. In the animate world, the sex relation comes under this schema and it also constitutes the formal basis for the spiritual relations of love, friendship, and the like." (Science of Logic, Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 2, subsect. A.)
17. HOBBES, T. 1958. Leviathan: Parts I and II. [Introduction by Herbert W. Schneider.] Ch. 13. Macmillan. New York. Collier Macmillan. London.
18. As Thomas Hobbes writes in Leviathan, ch. 13: "Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of the body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet, when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he."
19. "From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavor to destroy or subdue one another." (Ibid.)
20. "Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man." (Ibid.)
21. "Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavors, as far as he dare (which among them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage and from others by the example." (Ibid.)
22. "The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will.... This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN (or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god) to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad." (Leviathan. Ch. 17.)
23. Making allowances for the advances in scientific chemistry that have occurred in the two centuries since Hegel wrote, it is clear that Hegel has, at the very least, a conception of a chemical "enabler," that is, the concept of an agent within a chemical reaction whose presence makes possible a second chemical reaction: "Even ordinary chemistry shows examples of chemical alterations in which a body, for example, imparts a higher oxidation to one part of its mass and thereby reduces another part to a lower degree of oxidation, in which lower degree alone it can enter into a neutral combination with another [chemically] different body brought into contact with it, a combination for which it would not have been receptive in that first immediate degree." (Science of Logic. Vol. 2, sect. 2, ch. 2, subsect. C.) While it would be difficult to read this as a strict application of the modern notion of a catalyst, it is clearly a step in that direction.
24. The specifically chemical notion of a catalyst has received considerably less philosophical attention than it deserves. Notable exceptions include: CERRUTI, L. 1999. Historical and philosophical remarks on Ziegler-Natta catalysts: A discourse on industrial catalysis. Hyle 5: 3-41; WITZEMANN, E.J. 1943. The role of catalysis in biological causation. Philos. Sci. 10: 176-183; and MCCLOSKEY, H.J. 1964. Some concepts of cause. Rev. Metaphys. 17: 586-607.
25. The specifically chemical notion of a catalyst has received considerably less philosophical attention than it deserves. Notable exceptions include: CERRUTI, L. 1999. Historical and philosophical remarks on Ziegler-Natta catalysts: A discourse on industrial catalysis. Hyle 5: 3-41; WITZEMANN, E.J. 1943. The role of catalysis in biological causation. Philos. Sci. 10: 176-183; and MCCLOSKEY, H.J. 1964. Some concepts of cause. Rev. Metaphys. 17: 586-607.
26. The specifically chemical notion of a catalyst has received considerably less philosophical attention than it deserves. Notable exceptions include: CERRUTI, L. 1999. Historical and philosophical remarks on Ziegler-Natta catalysts: A discourse on industrial catalysis. Hyle 5: 3-41; WITZEMANN, E.J. 1943. The role of catalysis in biological causation. Philos. Sci. 10: 176-183; and MCCLOSKEY, H.J. 1964. Some concepts of cause. Rev. Metaphys. 17: 586-607.
27. The usefulness of the concept of a catalyst has long been recognized in other intellectual domains. A brief survey reveals that the concept of a catalyst plays a pivotal role in such varied disciplines as social philosophy (see, for example, DONALDSON, T. 1990. Social contracts and corporations: A reply to Hodapp. J. Bus. Ethics 9,2: 133-137), business and professional ethics (for example, REEVES, M.F. 1994. The gadfly business ethics project. J. Bus. Ethics 13,8: 609-614), and philosophy of religion (for example, SCHALOW, F. 1989. Dread in a post-existentialist era: Kierkegaard reconsidered. Heythrop J. 30: 160-167).
28. The usefulness of the concept of a catalyst has long been recognized in other intellectual domains. A brief survey reveals that the concept of a catalyst plays a pivotal role in such varied disciplines as social philosophy (see, for example, DONALDSON, T. 1990. Social contracts and corporations: A reply to Hodapp. J. Bus. Ethics 9,2: 133-137), business and professional ethics (for example, REEVES, M.F. 1994. The gadfly business ethics project. J. Bus. Ethics 13,8: 609-614), and philosophy of religion (for example, SCHALOW, F. 1989. Dread in a post-existentialist era: Kierkegaard reconsidered. Heythrop J. 30: 160-167).
29. The usefulness of the concept of a catalyst has long been recognized in other intellectual domains. A brief survey reveals that the concept of a catalyst plays a pivotal role in such varied disciplines as social philosophy (see, for example, DONALDSON, T. 1990. Social contracts and corporations: A reply to Hodapp. J. Bus. Ethics 9,2: 133-137), business and professional ethics (for example, REEVES, M.F. 1994. The gadfly business ethics project. J. Bus. Ethics 13,8: 609-614), and philosophy of religion (for example, SCHALOW, F. 1989. Dread in a post-existentialist era: Kierkegaard reconsidered. Heythrop J. 30: 160-167).
30. Summarizing the results of their study, we find the following claim: "Thus, it may be said that great men tend to make 'great groups' in the sense that both major factors of group performance - product and satisfaction of the members - are simultaneously increased." (BORGATTA, E.F., A.S. COUCH " R.F. BALES. 1966. Some findings relevant to the "great man theory of leadership" in Small Groups. In Studies in Social Interaction. A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta " R.F. Bales, Eds. Alfred A. Knopf. New York. pp. 700-706.)
31. For the material that follows, see OLSON, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA. The technical justification for the remarks on large groups is to be found in ch. 1.
32. Instead of "leaders," Olson prefers to couch his discussion in terms of "entrepreneurs." See Logic of Collective Action. pp. 175-177.
33. Olson discusses the necessity of lobbying Logic of Collective Action. pp. 10-11.
34. A "latent group" is characterized thus by Olson: "It is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react. Thus an individual in a 'latent' group, by definition, cannot make a noticeable contribution to any group effort, and since no one in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no incentive to contribute. Accordingly, large or 'latent' groups have no incentive to act to obtain a collective good because, however valuable the collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization working in the latent group's interest, or to bear in any other way any of the costs of the necessary collective action." (Ibid., pp. 50-51.)
35. Olson describes the situation thus: "Only a separate and 'selective' incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. In such circumstances group action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively toward the individuals in the group. The incentive must be 'selective' so that those who do not join the organization working of the group's interest, can be treated differently from those who do. These 'selective incentives' can be either negative or positive, in that they can either coerce by punishing those who fail to bear an allocated share of the costs of the group action, or they can be positive inducements offered to those who act in the group interest." (Ibid., p. 51. Olson's footnotes omitted.)
36. "The common characteristic which distinguishes all of the large economic groups with significant lobbying organizations is that these groups are also organized for some other purpose. The large and powerful economic lobbies are in fact the by-products of organizations that obtain their strength and support because they perform some function in addition to lobbying for collective goods." (Ibid., p. 132.) See also Olson's remarks on p. 133.
37. "Though all of the members of the group ... have a common interest in obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not." (Ibid., p. 21.)
38. Railroad unions have used this strategy. The incidence of injury to railroad workers was once so high that established insurance companies would refuse to insure railroad workers. The railroad unions were thus, for a time, the only source of health insurance open to railroad workers. See OLSON, Logic of Collective Action, p. 72.
39. As Olson summarizes: "If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives. Nor will such large groups form organizations to further their common goals in the absence of the coercion or the separate incentives just mentioned. These points hold true even when there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving it." (Ibid., p. 2.)
40. "[The] laboring, professional, and agricultural interests of the county make up large, latent groups that can organize and act effectively only when their latent power is crystallized by some organization which can provide political power as a by-product."' (Ibid., p. 143.)
41. "Thus entrepreneurs [that is, leaders] will strive mightily to organize large groups. Many of the entrepreneurial efforts in this area, as in markets for private goods, will come to naught. But in some cases... imaginative entrepreneurs will be able to find or create selective incentives that can support a sizeable and stable organization providing a collective good to a large group. The successful entrepreneur in the large group case, then, is above all an innovator with selective incentives." (Ibid., p. 177.)
42. We would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.