Cosmopolitanism: Moral and political

Political Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 421-442

  Dallmayr, Fred ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

Global ethics; Globalization; Parliament of the World's Religions; Political praxis; Postmodern ethics; Stoicism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038722878     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591703031003004     Document Type: Review

References (58)

1. The idea of a "struggle for recognition" goes back to Hegel's Phenomenology where the process is described, somewhat darkly or starkly, as a "struggle of life and death." See G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 229-40. In an attenuated form, the idea of mutual recognition has been taken up and developed by Charles Taylor, especially in "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25-73.
2. The idea of a "struggle for recognition" goes back to Hegel's Phenomenology where the process is described, somewhat darkly or starkly, as a "struggle of life and death." See G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 229-40. In an attenuated form, the idea of mutual recognition has been taken up and developed by Charles Taylor, especially in "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition", edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25-73.
3. Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (New York: Crossroad, 1991). For the text of the "Declaration toward a Global Ethics" see Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World's Religions (New York: Continuum, 1995). In the latter text, Küng provides comments on the "history, significance and method" of the Declaration (pp. 43-76), while Kuschel traces the historical development of the Parliament of the World's Religions from 1893 to 1993 (pp. 77-105). Compare also Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith Dialogue (New York: Crossroad, 1992).
4. Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (New York: Crossroad, 1991). For the text of the "Declaration toward a Global Ethics" see Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World's Religions (New York: Continuum, 1995). In the latter text, Küng provides comments on the "history, significance and method" of the Declaration (pp. 43-76), while Kuschel traces the historical development of the Parliament of the World's Religions from 1893 to 1993 (pp. 77-105). Compare also Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith Dialogue (New York: Crossroad, 1992).
5. Hans Küng, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic (New York: Crossroad, 1991). For the text of the "Declaration toward a Global Ethics" see Hans Küng and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World's Religions (New York: Continuum, 1995). In the latter text, Küng provides comments on the "history, significance and method" of the Declaration (pp. 43-76), while Kuschel traces the historical development of the Parliament of the World's Religions from 1893 to 1993 (pp. 77-105). Compare also Marcus Braybrooke, Pilgrimage of Hope: One Hundred Years of Global Interfaith Dialogue (New York: Crossroad, 1992).
6. Küng, Global Responsibility, xv-xvi, 9, 28, 35. Curiously, Küng adds (p. 35): "Postmodern men and women need common values, goals, ideals, visions." Despite the congruence of the idea of an "undivided" or universal ethics with central postulates of "modern" Western philosophy, the text repeatedly associates itself with a "postmodern" outlook-whose character, however, remains ambivalent and amorphous (being linked with such phenomena as feminism, post-industrialism, and post-colonialism; pp. 3-4, 17-20).
7. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
8. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
9. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
10. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
11. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
12. Ibid., 30, 32, 42. Specific references are made to Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelle politische Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 1958), 505-60; and Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1984). Turning against the critics of a transcendental-universal approach, Küng observes, "Those who want to dispense with a transcendent principle have to follow a long path of horizontal communication with the possibility that, in the end, they have just been going round in a circle" (Global Responsibility, 43).
13. Küng, Global Responsibility, 51, 53. As he adds confidently, Religion can unambiguously demonstrate why morality, ethical values and norms must be unconditionally binding (and not just where it is convenient for me) and thus universal (for all strata, classes, and races). Precisely in this way the humanum is rescued by being seen to be grounded in the divinum. (P. 87)
14. Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 14, 17, 19, 21-23, 36. Regarding the objections raised by Buddhist representatives see Küng's commentary, 61-65.
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). In some subsequent writings Rawls has toned down or qualified the universalism of his early work. Regarding Apel and Habermas compare Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, eds., The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
16. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). In some subsequent writings Rawls has toned down or qualified the universalism of his early work. Regarding Apel and Habermas compare Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, eds., The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).
17. For some of Martha Nussbaum's earlier writings see The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986); The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
18. For some of Martha Nussbaum's earlier writings see The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986); The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
19. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997): 1-3.
20. Ibid., 4-5, 7-8, 10, 12. For the reference to Marcus Aurelius see The Meditations, translated by G. M. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), IV:4; for the Kant reference see Kant: Political Writings, 2d ed., edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93-130.
21. Ibid., 4-5, 7-8, 10, 12. For the reference to Marcus Aurelius see The Meditations, translated by G. M. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), IV:4; for the Kant reference see Kant: Political Writings, 2d ed., edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93-130.
22. Ibid., 4-5, 7-8, 10, 12. For the reference to Marcus Aurelius see The Meditations, translated by G. M. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), IV:4; for the Kant reference see Kant: Political Writings, 2d ed., edited by Hans Reiss and translated by H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93-130.
23. Nussbaum, "Citizens of the World," in Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 52, 56-57, 59-61, 67. Nussbaum adds an attack on "difference politics" or "identity politics" (paralleling her cited attack on Nietzscheans): Frequently, groups who press for the recognition of their group think of their struggle as connected with goals of human respect and social justice. And yet their way of focusing their demands, because it neglects commonalities and portrays people as above all members of identity groups, tends to subvert the demand for equal respect and love, and even the demand for attention to diversity itself. (P. 67) Compare also Nussbaum, In Defense of Universal Values (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999).
24. For these disagreements see Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 70, 94-96. In the words of Kuschel: "The assessment that the 1893 Parliament was still shaped by 'a strong dose of Anglo-Saxon triumphalism' may also be true" (p. 83).
25. For these disagreements see Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 70, 94-96. In the words of Kuschel: "The assessment that the 1893 Parliament was still shaped by 'a strong dose of Anglo-Saxon triumphalism' may also be true" (p. 83).
26. G. W. F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in Early Theological Writings, translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 212-15; Hegel's Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967), 75-79. Nussbaum does refer to the role of inclinations (under the rubric of "passions") but without drawing implications for the primacy of universalism.
27. G. W. F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in Early Theological Writings, translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 212-15; Hegel's Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1967), 75-79. Nussbaum does refer to the role of inclinations (under the rubric of "passions") but without drawing implications for the primacy of universalism.
28. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), 226, 236-37. For a somewhat inadequate translation see Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury, 1973), 229, 240-41. Compare also my "The Politics of Nonidentity: Adorno, Postmodernism, and Edward Said," in Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 47-69.
29. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), 226, 236-37. For a somewhat inadequate translation see Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury, 1973), 229, 240-41. Compare also my "The Politics of Nonidentity: Adorno, Postmodernism, and Edward Said," in Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 47-69.
30. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), 226, 236-37. For a somewhat inadequate translation see Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Seabury, 1973), 229, 240-41. Compare also my "The Politics of Nonidentity: Adorno, Postmodernism, and Edward Said," in Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 47-69.
31. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, The Use of Pleasure, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1986), 26-28. Compare also his portrayal of moral practices or "arts of existence" as those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (P. 27)
32. Ibid., 28, 54-55, 73; and vol. 3, The Care of the Self, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). See also "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 29, 1984," translated by J. D. Gauthier, in The Final Foucault, edited by James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 4-7.
33. Ibid., 28, 54-55, 73; and vol. 3, The Care of the Self, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). See also "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 29, 1984," translated by J. D. Gauthier, in The Final Foucault, edited by James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 4-7.
34. Ibid., 28, 54-55, 73; and vol. 3, The Care of the Self, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). See also "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 29, 1984," translated by J. D. Gauthier, in The Final Foucault, edited by James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 4-7.
35. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 13, 31, 34-36, 48, 54. On the relation between Foucault and Levinas see Barry Smart, "Foucault, Levinas, and the Subject of Responsibility," in The Later Foucault, edited by Jeremy Moss (London: Sage, 1998), 78-92. On this issue, I am drawn to Paul Ricoeur's balanced position (inspired by Aristotle); see my "Oneself as Another: Paul Ricoeur's 'Little Ethics,'" in Achieving Our World, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 171-88.
36. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 13, 31, 34-36, 48, 54. On the relation between Foucault and Levinas see Barry Smart, "Foucault, Levinas, and the Subject of Responsibility," in The Later Foucault, edited by Jeremy Moss (London: Sage, 1998), 78-92. On this issue, I am drawn to Paul Ricoeur's balanced position (inspired by Aristotle); see my "Oneself as Another: Paul Ricoeur's 'Little Ethics,'" in Achieving Our World, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 171-88.
37. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 13, 31, 34-36, 48, 54. On the relation between Foucault and Levinas see Barry Smart, "Foucault, Levinas, and the Subject of Responsibility," in The Later Foucault, edited by Jeremy Moss (London: Sage, 1998), 78-92. On this issue, I am drawn to Paul Ricoeur's balanced position (inspired by Aristotle); see my "Oneself as Another: Paul Ricoeur's 'Little Ethics,'" in Achieving Our World, by Fred R. Dallmayr (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 171-88.
38. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2, 6, 16-17, 19. Among other feminist writers, the study refers especially to Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Regarding Kohlberg see his "Stage and Sequence," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, edited by David A. Goslin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), and "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 151-236; also Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas MCCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 69-94.
39. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2, 6, 16-17, 19. Among other feminist writers, the study refers especially to Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Regarding Kohlberg see his "Stage and Sequence," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, edited by David A. Goslin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), and "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 151-236; also Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas MCCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 69-94.
40. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2, 6, 16-17, 19. Among other feminist writers, the study refers especially to Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Regarding Kohlberg see his "Stage and Sequence," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, edited by David A. Goslin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), and "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 151-236; also Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas MCCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 69-94.
41. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2, 6, 16-17, 19. Among other feminist writers, the study refers especially to Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Regarding Kohlberg see his "Stage and Sequence," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, edited by David A. Goslin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), and "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 151-236; also Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas MCCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 69-94.
42. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 2, 6, 16-17, 19. Among other feminist writers, the study refers especially to Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). Regarding Kohlberg see his "Stage and Sequence," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, edited by David A. Goslin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), and "From Is to Ought," in Cognitive Development and Epistemology, edited by Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 151-236; also Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by Thomas MCCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 69-94.
43. Luce Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to Community, translated by Stephen Pluhacek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 136-37, 139-41. Irigaray's arguments had been prepared in some of her earlier studies, especially Je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1993), and I Love to You, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1995).
44. Luce Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to Community, translated by Stephen Pluhacek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 136-37, 139-41. Irigaray's arguments had been prepared in some of her earlier studies, especially Je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1993), and I Love to You, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1995).
45. Luce Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to Community, translated by Stephen Pluhacek (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 136-37, 139-41. Irigaray's arguments had been prepared in some of her earlier studies, especially Je, tu, nous: Toward a Culture of Difference, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1993), and I Love to You, translated by Alison Martin (New York: Routledge, 1995).
46. Thus, she writes, The Vedas, the Upanishads, and Yoga have for their principal function to assure the articulation between the instant and immortality or eternity. . . . The Vedic gods, the Brahmins, and the yogis care about the maintenance of the life of the universe and that of their body as cosmic nature. . . . What I wish to see become from these ancient texts, alas too neglected in our Westem(ized) teaching, is that love come to pass between two freedoms. (Between East and West, 31, 63)
47. Tu Wei-ming, "Neo-Confucian Religiosity and Human Relatedness," in Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 138-39, 145-46. Compare also his essay "The 'Moral Universal' from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought," in the same volume, 19-34.
48. Tu Wei-ming, "Neo-Confucian Religiosity and Human Relatedness," in Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 138-39, 145-46. Compare also his essay "The 'Moral Universal' from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought," in the same volume, 19-34.
49. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 4, n. 11, 5, 8, 12, 14; and "Citizens of the World," 52, 57, 59-60. The sidelining of politics in favor of morality was also clearly evident in the deliberation of the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993; see in this respect Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 54, 56.
50. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 4, n. 11, 5, 8, 12, 14; and "Citizens of the World," 52, 57, 59-60. The sidelining of politics in favor of morality was also clearly evident in the deliberation of the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993; see in this respect Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 54, 56.
51. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 4, n. 11, 5, 8, 12, 14; and "Citizens of the World," 52, 57, 59-60. The sidelining of politics in favor of morality was also clearly evident in the deliberation of the Parliament of the World's Religions in 1993; see in this respect Küng and Kuschel, A Global Ethic, 54, 56.
52. Foucault, The Care of the Self, 82, 86, 89, 94. As he adds, displaying admirable (nearly Aristotelian) good judgment, The basic attitude that one must have toward political activity was related to the general principle that whatever one is, it is not owing to the rank one holds, to the responsibility one exercises, to the position in which one finds oneself-above or beneath other people. What one is, and what one needs to devote one's attention to as to an ultimate purpose, is the expression of a principle that is singular in its manifestation within each person, but universal by the form it assumes in everyone, and collective by the community bond it establishes between individuals. Such is, at least for the Stoics, human reason as a divine principle present in all of us. (P. 93)
53. Peter Euben, "The Polis, Globalization, and the Politics of Place," in Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and the Vicissitudes of the Political, edited by Aryeh Botwinick and William E. Connolly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 266, 268-70. As he adds, highlighting the political effects of exclusiveness, Stoicism denied in practice the radical political possibilities of its philosophical commitments. Even when the Stoic ideal of virtuous and capable man was not primarily defined in political terms, it proved, nonetheless, especially congenial to monarchical and personal rule. Its leveling potential remained abstract, because (especially) early Stoics frequently refused to relate their thinking to the political and material conditions in which men lived their daily lives. (P. 270)
54. Ibid., 271-74. Soberly, Euben continues, This is not to claim that cosmopolitanism is necessarily ethnocentric, but to caution against the unobtrusive ways in which dominant particulars represent themselves as the universal and actually become them in the sense of being the point of reference in relation to which others recognize themselves as particular. (P. 274)
55. In his words, "The challenge is to keep the critical moral edge of cosmopolitanism and the political focus of the polis in tension" (Ibid., 270). Euben also adopts the notion of "parallel polis," articulated by Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik, as "a way of naming the places within civil society where participatory opportunities existed that were otherwise denied by mendacious regimes" (Ibid., 282).
56. In his words, "The challenge is to keep the critical moral edge of cosmopolitanism and the political focus of the polis in tension" (Ibid., 270). Euben also adopts the notion of "parallel polis," articulated by Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik, as "a way of naming the places within civil society where participatory opportunities existed that were otherwise denied by mendacious regimes" (Ibid., 282).
57. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 25. On bifocal justice see my "'Rights' versus 'Rites' : Justice and Global Democracy," in Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village, 253-76.
58. Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," 25. On bifocal justice see my "'Rights' versus 'Rites' : Justice and Global Democracy," in Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village, 253-76.