Illusions of explanation: A critical essay on error classification

International Journal of Aviation Psychology

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 95-106

  Dekker, Sidney W A ^a  

^a LINKÖPING INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038674753     PISSN: 10508414     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1207/S15327108IJAP1302_01     Document Type: Review

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