Sovereign cat bonds and infrastructure project financing

Risk Analysis

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 611-626

  Croson, David ^a   Richter, Andreas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Catastrophe linked securities; Contingent capital; Infrastructure; Natural disasters; Project finance

Indexed keywords

COSTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PROBABILITY; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

SOVEREIGN CAT BONDS;

RISK MANAGEMENT;

FINANCIAL PROVISION; INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING; NATURAL DISASTER;

CALCULATION; CAPITAL; COST; DISASTER; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; GOVERNMENT; INFRASTRUCTURE; INSURANCE; PROBABILITY; REVIEW; RISK MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0038653198     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1539-6924.00341     Document Type: Review

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