The arithmetic of defence policy

International Affairs

Volumn 77, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 509-529

  Alexander, Michael ^a   Garden, Timothy ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038529323     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00204     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. D. L. Crippen, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, stated in a report to the US Congress on 14 Sept. 2000 that the US defence budget 2000 needed to be increased from $276 bn to $327bn just to sustain current capabilities.
2. The Future Strategic Context for Defence (London: Ministry of Defence, Feb. 2001) assumes at para. 64: 'No conventional military threats to the UK are likely to emerge over the period to 2030.' The UK has recently indicated that the present generation of main battle tank will be its last.
3. Defence Policy 2001 (London: Ministry of Defence, Feb. 2001), para. 23, extends the UK's security interests beyond Europe to include North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf.
4. The Petersberg tasks were defined by the member states of the Western European Union at their meeting at Petersberg, just outside Bonn, on 19 June 1992. They define tasks other than mutual defence and cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management.
5. The Kosovo/Allied Force After Action report to the US Congress of 31 Jan. 2000 warns at p. xxi that casualties were expected, and should be planned for in future operations.
6. In 2000 the UK spent 2.4% of GDP on defence compared to a European NATO average of 2.1%.
7. The figures for decline in force levels are derived from annual defence white paper statistics, and performance reports since they have become available. The raw figures given do not necessarily indicate the change in combat capability. Some Cold War capabilities may no longer be necessary; technological improvements may allow smaller forces to do more. However, the absence of precision weapon capability, usable communications and problems with personal weapons during the Kosovo operation suggest that improvements to UK force capabilities still have some way to go.
8. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Kosovo: an account of the crisis (London: Ministry of Defence, Oct. 1999), shows at p. 30 that the UK carried out 1,618 air sorties of a total NATO effort of 38,004 (4.3%). On the more narrow measure of munitions dropped, the UK used 1,011 offensive weapons out of a NATO total of 23,614 (4.0%). As only 240 of these weapons were precision, the UK contribution was even more marginal than the raw data suggest.
9. MOD Performance Report 1999/2000, Cm 5000 (London: Ministry of Defence, Dec. 2000), p. 43.
10. For example, an experienced sergeant in 1975 was paid £3,800 p.a. If the pay for this rank had increased in line with inflation, he would earn some £19,000 p.a today. In fact, the figure is £23,000, some 20% higher.
11. MOD Performance Report 1999/2000, p. 43.
12. T. Garden, The technology trap (London: Brasseys, 1989), pp. 38-9.
13. A. Brookes, V Force (London: Jane's, 1982). Three (Valiant, Victor and Vulcan) were eventually deployed.
14. In his foreword to Britain's army for the 90s (London: Ministry of Defence, July 1991), Tom King said that NATO's new strategic concept had 'opened the way for us to make changes to our own force structure'. The work on Options for Change had started somewhat before the NATO meeting of May 1991. In the House of Commons on 25 July 1991. King stated, 'We believe that the new force structures that we envisage can give us strong and reliable defences, in changing circumstances, and at an affordable cost.'
15. In the foreword to the 1995 defence white paper, Cm 2800, May 1995, Malcolm Rifkind explained that the international situation some five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall was such that 'we can set a steady course for the future and inject a period of stability into defence planning and funding.'
16. In the foreword to the Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, July 1998, George Robertson claimed that 'By modernizing and reshaping our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century, this Review will give our Services the firm foundation they need to plan for the long term.'
17. HM Treasury Spending Review 2000, Cm 4807 (London, Treasury, July 2000), para. 12.3. Speaking in the House of Commons on 1 Nov. 2000, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, claimed: 'After years of successive cuts in defence spending under the Conservatives, we have announced the first real-terms, year-on-year increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war. Such sustained growth in the defence budget represents real investment by this Government in the continued quality and effectiveness of our armed forces.'
18. International data have been extracted from IISS Military Balance volumes for relevant years and confirmed from data in House of Commons Research Paper 00/09, dated 21 Dec. 2000.
19. Defence 2000: our future defence force (Canberra: Australia Defence Publishing Service, Oct. 2000).
20. Ibid. pp. 119-20.
21. Ibid, p. xvii.
22. The statement by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office to the US Senate budget committee on 14 Sept. 2000 painted a stark picture of funding shortfalls even to sustain current force requirements. An increase of nearly 20% in budget is proposed just to sustain today's US forces.
23. A force of 17 E-3A aircraft is operated by NATO with multinational crews from a base at Geilenkirchen in Germany. The aircraft are flagged by Luxembourg for legal reasons, but are operationally controlled by NATO.
24. IISS, The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).
25. It would be possible to imagine a pooled fleet, which would look after all the national C130 needs of Belgium (which operates 11), Denmark (3), Italy (15), Netherlands (2), Spain (12), Sweden (8) and Portugal (6). France with 14 C130s and the UK with 51 have larger transport aircraft fleets; but they could provide a partial contribution to the pooled arrangement. Greece (15 C130s) might choose not to depend on pooled aircraft.
26. In April 2001 Greece announced a deferment of its plan to buy Eurofighter. This is another indication of how the financial problems bite in each country.
27. Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, July 1998, para. 115.
28. Germany is already in considerable difficulty over funding its new defence structures.