Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel

Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics

Volumn 67, Issue 3, 2003, Pages

  Tamaki, Kiyoshi ^a   Koashi, Masato ^a   Imoto, Nobuyuki ^a  

^a GRADUATE UNIVERSITY FOR ADVANCED STUDIES   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS (INFORMATION THEORY); DATA PRIVACY; EIGENVALUES AND EIGENFUNCTIONS; MATRIX ALGEBRA; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; OPTIMIZATION; PHOTONS; POLARIZATION; QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY; SIGNAL ENCODING; SPURIOUS SIGNAL NOISE;

INDIVIDUAL ATTACK; PHOTON POLARIZATION; POSITIVE OPERATOR VALUED MEASURE; QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION;

SECURITY OF DATA;

EID: 0038514019     PISSN: 10502947     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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