Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 173-180

  Borck, Rainald ^a  

^a DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Tax competition; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038455926     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00037-8     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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