The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 22, Issue 8-9, 1998, Pages 1187-1207

  Arifovic, Jasmina ^a   Eaton, B Curtis ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

C63; C70; C72; Communication; D82; D83; Evolution; Genetic algorithms; Signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038417794     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00009-8     Document Type: Article

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