On the convergence to homogeneous expectations when markets are complete

Econometrica

Volumn 67, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 663-672

  Araujo, Aloisio ^a   Sandroni, Alvaro ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038414645     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00042     Document Type: Article

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