Global systemic problems and interconnected duties

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 115-128

  Francis, Leslie Pickering ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038372291     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200325228     Document Type: Review

References (30)

1. Robin Attfield calls such problems of causal interrelatedness "global systemic problems." See The Ethics of the Global Environment (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999). See also Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998); David E. Camacho, ed., Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
2. Robin Attfield calls such problems of causal interrelatedness "global systemic problems." See The Ethics of the Global Environment (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999). See also Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998); David E. Camacho, ed., Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
3. Robin Attfield calls such problems of causal interrelatedness "global systemic problems." See The Ethics of the Global Environment (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999). See also Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998); David E. Camacho, ed., Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
4. Robin Attfield calls such problems of causal interrelatedness "global systemic problems." See The Ethics of the Global Environment (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999). See also Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998); David E. Camacho, ed., Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
5. Robin Attfield calls such problems of causal interrelatedness "global systemic problems." See The Ethics of the Global Environment (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1999). See also Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998); David E. Camacho, ed., Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Dimensions of Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, eds., Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
6. Who counts as a "local" is a complex question. Some such proximate entities - corporations, for example - may have multinational ties. Some "locals" will be individuals and others will be groups. For the purposes of this discussion of the import of the claim that locals have preservationist obligations, these issues can be set aside. A related inquiry to this paper, however, is whether the obligations of South Floridians to protect the Everglades are at all dependent on whether South Floridians, in whole or in part, are identifiable groups: Native Americans, Cuban-American immigrants, or "South Floridians" in general. The value of the Everglades might in part lie in its special significance to particular groups. If so, theories of group rights might support the claim that these groups have particular claims to preservation of the group treasure, as well as particular obligations to protect it. These rights might in turn generate a set of links to the preservationist obligations of the rest of us, in addition to the links under discussion here.
7. Theorists of applied ethics call this an "easy case" because defending interconnected obligations can be accomplished without choosing among central moral theories. Bryan Norton has argued for the importance of convergence among moral theories for environmentalists in Towards Unity among Environmentalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
8. Although there is widespread agreement on the connection between greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change, some dissent remains. See, for example, New York Times, 29 February 2000, "Science Tuesday," p. 1. If the dissenters are correct, which seems increasingly unlikely, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 2001: Third Assessment Report" (http://222.ipcc.ch and http://www.ipcc.ch/), the Everglades are not an example of global systemic problems of the type under scrutiny here. But there surely are other examples.
9. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 176. The Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development was development "that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (ibid., p. 8). The report continues: "The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. . . . Sustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent adopt life-styles within the planet's ecological means" (ibid., pp. 8-9).
10. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 176. The Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development was development "that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (ibid., p. 8). The report continues: "The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. . . . Sustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent adopt life-styles within the planet's ecological means" (ibid., pp. 8-9).
11. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 176. The Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development was development "that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (ibid., p. 8). The report continues: "The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. . . . Sustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent adopt life-styles within the planet's ecological means" (ibid., pp. 8-9).
12. Ibid.; Ranee K. L. Panjabi, The Earth Summit at Rio: Politics, Economics and the Environment (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997).
13. Ibid.; Ranee K. L. Panjabi, The Earth Summit at Rio: Politics, Economics and the Environment (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997).
14. Complete text of the protocol can be found at http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html.
15. E.g., David G. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
16. Soma Basu, "India Sticks to Stand on Climate Change," The Hindu, 11 March 1999. The agreement at Kyoto in 1997 was based on a reduction of 1990 emission rates and permitted exchanges to allow countries to trade unused portions of their allotted quotas. Commentators such as Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment, criticize the fairness of these historical benchmarks. They argue that even if the agreement is ever ratified, the allotment will be insufficient to allow for decent living standards for growing populations in developing areas of the world, and unfairly high for areas with high consumption levels in 1990.
17. E.g., German Advisory Council on Global Change, The Accounting of Biological Sinks and Sources under the Kyoto Protocol: A Step Forwards or Backwards for Global Environmental Protection? (Bremerhaven: WBGU, 1998).
18. Edmund L. Andrews, "Frustrated Europeans Set to Battle U.S. on Climate," New York Times, 16 July 2001, p. A13, col. 1.
19. Andrew C. Revkin, "178 Nations Reach a Climate Accord: U.S. Only Looks On," New York Times, 24 July 2001, p. A1, col. 5.
20. In such cases, the consequentialist problem is figuring out which combination of pollution reductions will achieve the goal with the least cost. The reciprocity issue is whether reductions by some should be returned by reductions by others. Fairness requires attention to the distribution of the burdens.
21. The discussion here is limited to implications of the claim that locals have duties. It does not extend either to defending the claim that there are such duties or to investigating the implications of rights claims by the locals.
22. None of these arguments are traditional "takings" claims, under which the locals argue that they should be compensated for property losses due to rights transfers or regulations. Such arguments might be made, but they are not the focus here. Nor are they implied by my argument in this paper.
23. See for example Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Knopf, 1961).
24. See David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), for a full and careful discussion of these issues.
25. In such a case, I would be obligated to cross the grass. But because it seems unlikely that environmental transgressions will encourage even more environmental protection elsewhere, we set aside this possibility. The darker side of this possibility is unfortunately more likely. My not crossing the grass might increase the likelihood of your crossing. You may believe, mistakenly, that because I did not cross it is environmentally safer for you to cross. Or you may be motivated to cross precisely because you are offended by what you regard as my sanctimoniousness in not crossing - much as people announce they will eat more meat because vegetarians are around. Or you might cross just to spite me, when you wouldn't otherwise have done so.
26. I should also note the possibility of mixed consequentialist and deontological theories such as the view that preservationist obligations hold unless they are extremely costly. My goal in this paper is to explore the relationship between each theory and interconnectedness. I would hypothesize that mixed theories would incorporate the conclusions reached about the pure theories, although I do not argue this point here, given the remarkable range of possible mixed theories.
27. Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 4.
28. See, e.g., Brian Blum, Contracts: Examples and Explanations (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 2001), p. 497, par. 16.11.1b.
29. This "fair share" principle might be defeated if some were so wealthy that it would seem fair to expect them to bear the entire costs of producing the benefit. It might also be defeated if some were so poor that it would seem unfair to expect them to bear any of the costs. Moreover, it would surely be defeated if the wealthy were wealthy at the expense of the poor. (I owe these points to Robert Hood, a referee for this journal). The possibility that the failure of these assumptions might undermine this fair share principle is very much with us when developing countries are expected to make sacrifices to reduce overall levels of greenhouse gas emissions. However, when the principle of fairness is directed to impose preservationist obligations on the United States, these assumptions clearly hold and the principle of fairness is not undermined.
30. E. M. Forster, Howard's End (New York: Vintage, 1921).