Between liberalism and democracy

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 213-233

  Samet, Dov ^a   Schmeidler, David ^a,b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Consent rules; Democracy; Liberalism; Majority; Self determination; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038348080     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00080-2     Document Type: Article

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