Private information revelation in common-value auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 264-282

  Mares, Vlad ^a   Harstad, Ronald M ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Information revelation; Linkage principle; Public information

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038323839     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00012-7     Document Type: Article

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