Korean changes, Asian challenges and the US role

Survival

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 53-70

  Campbell, Kurt M ^a   Reiss, Mitchell B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038215105     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/survival/43.1.53     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. See Chung In Moon, 'Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korea Peninsula', in Chung In Moon and David I. Steinberg (eds.), Kim Dae Jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 35-56.
2. Perry presented the major findings of his 'Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea' in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on 12 October 1999. This testimony was reprinted by the Nautilus Organization as a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, 12 October 1999.
3. See, for example, Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); and 'Hastening Korean Reunification', Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 77-92.
4. See, for example, Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); and 'Hastening Korean Reunification', Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 77-92.
5. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1995), pp. 263-271; Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 95-123.
6. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1995), pp. 263-271; Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 95-123.
7. On the difficulties of negotiating with the North Koreans, see Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999); Mitchell B. Reiss, 'How to Handle A Rogue Regime', Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2000.
8. On the difficulties of negotiating with the North Koreans, see Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, 1999); Mitchell B. Reiss, 'How to Handle A Rogue Regime', Asian Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2000.
9. Concerning sources of foreign direct investment, Peter M. Beck has nicely summarised the prevailing wisdom: 'Non-Korean investors will be governed by purse strings rather than heart strings'. Korea Insight, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 2000), p. 1. For a thoughtful examination of the impact on North Korea of external economic assistance, see Bradley Babson and Eun Sook Kim, 'Challenges in Expanding External Economic Relations with North Korea', Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, 15 May 2000.
10. Concerning sources of foreign direct investment, Peter M. Beck has nicely summarised the prevailing wisdom: 'Non-Korean investors will be governed by purse strings rather than heart strings'. Korea Insight, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 2000), p. 1. For a thoughtful examination of the impact on North Korea of external economic assistance, see Bradley Babson and Eun Sook Kim, 'Challenges in Expanding External Economic Relations with North Korea', Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, 15 May 2000.
11. For an excellent critique of the term 'rogue regime' and its harmful effects on the conduct of US foreign policy, see Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).
12. The redeployment of US troops from Korea to the United States would result in a cost increase due the subsidies the ROK currently provides. Only if these troops were redeployed and eliminated would a cost-savings result.
13. To compensate for the loss of its strategic partner, Seoul accelerated its secret development of nuclear weapons. See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 68-74. For an insightful analysis of US-ROK relations during this time, see William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999).
14. To compensate for the loss of its strategic partner, Seoul accelerated its secret development of nuclear weapons. See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 68-74. For an insightful analysis of US-ROK relations during this time, see William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1999).
15. See Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
16. For an interesting examination of this trilateral relationship, see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).