Building institutions in post-conflict African economies

Journal of International Development

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 471-485

  Aron, Janine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; DESIGN; IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT;

AFRICA;

EID: 0038206673     PISSN: 09541748     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jid.997     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. Addison T, Alemayehu Geda, Le Billon P, Murshed SM. 2001. Financial reconstruction in conflict and 'post-conflict' economies. Discussion Paper 2001/90. UNU/WIDER: Helsinki.
2. Alesina A, Weder B. 1999. Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? NBER Working Paper No. 7108. National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA.
3. Aron J. 1996. The institutional foundations of growth. In Africa Now: People, Policies and Institutions, Ellis S (ed.). James Currey/Heinemann: London and Karthala: Paris.
4. Aron J. 2000. Growth and institutions: a review of the evidence. World Bank Research Observer 15(1): 99-135.
5. Aron J. 2002. Building institutions in post-conflict African economies. Discussion Paper 2002/124. UNU/WIDER: Helsinki.
6. Bates R. 1989. Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Rural Kenya. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
7. Burnside C, Dollar D. 2000. Aid, Growth, the Incentive Regime and Poverty Reduction. In The World Bank: Structure and Policies, Gilbert CL, Vines D (eds). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
8. Clement C, Murrell P. 1999. Assessing the value of law in the economic transition from socialism: an introduction. In Assessing the Value of Law in the Economic Transition from Socialism, Murrell P (ed.). College Park: IRIS (Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector), University of Maryland.
9. Collier P. 1996. The role of the African state in building agencies of restraint. In New Directions in Development Economics: Growth, Environmental Concerns and Government in the 1990s, Lundahl M, Ndulu B (eds). Studies in Development Economics, Vol. 3. Routledge: London and New York; 282-98.
10. Collier P. 1998a. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 50(4): 563-73.
11. Collier P. 1998b. The political economy of ethnicity. WPS-98-8. World Bank: Washington, DC.
12. Collier P. 1999. On the economic consequences of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 51: 168-83.
13. Collier P, Gunning J. 1999. Explaining African economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature 37(1): 64-111.
14. Cooter R. 1997. The rule of state law and the rule-of-law state: economic analysis of the economic foundations of development. In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1996. World Bank: Washington, DC; 189-217.
15. David P. 1994. Why are institutions the carriers of history? Path dependence and the evolution of conventions, organizations and institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 5(2): 205-220.
16. David P. 1997. Rethinking technology transfers: incentives, institutions and knowledge-based industrial development. In Chinese Technology Transfer in the 1990s: Current Experience, Historical Problems and International Perspectives, Feinstein C, Howe C (eds). Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
17. Drèze J, Sen A. 1995. India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford University Press: New Delhi.
18. Easterly W. 2000. Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict? Working Paper 2482. World Bank: Washington, DC.
19. Elster J. 1995. The impact of constitutions on economic performance. In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994. World Bank: Washington, DC; 209-226.
20. Fafchamps M. 1996. The enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana. World Development 24(3): 427-448.
21. Fafchamps M, Minten B. 2001. Property rights in a flea market economy. Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(2): 229-267.
22. Friedman S. 1999. Agreeing to differ: African democracy-its obstacles and pitfalls. Social Research 66(3): 825-858.
23. Gambetta D (ed.). 1988. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Blackwell: Oxford and New York.
24. Gambetta D. 1993. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA and London.
25. Gray C. 1997a. Comment on Cooter. In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1996. World Bank: Washington, DC; 218-221.
26. Gray C. 1997b. Reforming legal systems in developing and transition economies. Finance and Development 94(3).
27. Greif A. 1995. Markets and legal systems: the development of markets in late medieval Europe and the transition from community responsibility to individual legal doctrine. IRIS Working Paper Series 159: 1-34.
28. Haque, N UI, Aziz H. 1999. The quality of governance: 'second-generation' civil service reform in Africa. Journal of African Economies 8(Suppl. 1): 68-106.
29. Hay J, Schleifer A, Vishny RW. 1996. Privatization in transition economies: towards a theory of legal reform. European Economic Review 40(315): 559-568.
30. Intriligator MD. 1994. Privatization in Russia has led to criminalization. Australian Economic Review 105(April-June): 4-14.
31. Kibreab G. 2003. Displaced Communities and the Reconstruction of Livelihoods in Eritrea. In From Conflict to Recovery in Africa, Addison T (ed.). Oxford University Press for UNU/WIDER: Oxford.
32. Kiguel M, Lizondo JS, O'Connell S (eds). 1997. Parallel Exchange Rates in Developing Countries. Macmillan: London and St. Martin's: New York.
33. Mankiw NG, Romer D. Weil DN. 1992. A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2): 407-437.
34. Messick R. 1999. Judicial reform and economic development: a survey of the issues. World Bank Research Observer 14(1): 117-136.
35. Milgrom P, North D, Weingast B. 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law of merchants, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics 2: 1-23.
36. Mubarak J. 1997. The 'hidden hand' behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia. World Development 25(12): 2027-2041.
37. Murphy K, Schleifer A, Vishny RW. 1991. The allocation of talent: implications for growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics May: 503-530.
38. North D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
39. North D. 1997. The contribution of the new institutional economics to an understanding of the transition problem. WIDER Annual Lectures 1. UNU/WIDER: Helsinki.
40. North D, Weingast B. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803-832.
41. Posner R. 1998. Creating a legal framework for economic development. World Bank Research Observer 13(1): 1-11.
42. Putnam RD. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
43. Stiglitz J. 1986. The new development economics. World Development 14(2) (Special Issue): 257-265.
44. Stiglitz J. 1994. The role of the state in financial markets. In Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1993. World Bank: Washington, DC.
45. Varese F. 2001. The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
46. Woolcock M, Narayan D. 2000. Social capital: implications for development theory, research and policy. World Bank Research Observer 15(2): 225-249.
47. World Bank. 1994. Governance: The World Bank's Experience. World Bank: Washington, DC.
48. World Bank. 1997. The State in a Changing World. World Development Report. Oxford University Press: New York.
49. World Bank. 2002. Building Institutions for Markets. World Development Report. Oxford University Press: New York.