Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 423-436

  Núñez, Marina ^a   Rafels, Carles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Assignment games; Core; Exact games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038170365     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300128     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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