The Jeffersonian Idea of National Security: Commerce, the Atlantic Balance of Power, and the Barbary War, 1786-1805

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 519-544

  Sofka, James R ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0038115511     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00087     Document Type: Article

References (154)

1. Jefferson to Robert Livingston, 18 April 1802, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson, 12 vols. (Washington, 1903-1905), 9:364-66. Jefferson elaborated that through New Orleans, "the produce of three-eighths of our territory must pass to market."
2. Spirit of the Laws (1748), ed. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone (Cambridge, England, 1989), 343.
3. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
4. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
5. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
6. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
7. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
8. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
9. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
10. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
11. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
12. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
13. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
14. For a representative sample of these arguments see Louis Sears, "Jefferson and the Law of Nations," American Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (1919): 379-99; idem, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 1927); Joyce Appleby, "What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson" William and Mary Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1982): 287-309; idem, Capitalism and a New Social Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York, 1984); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975); idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, England, 1985); Daniel T. Rogers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (1992): 11-39; Peter Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolution, 1776-1814 (New York, 1993); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford, 1990); and Reginald Stuart, The Half-Way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson's View of War (Toronto, 1978).
15. Jefferson, "Report on the Privileges and Restrictions of the Commerce of the United States," 16 December 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:112-13 (emphasis added).
16. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
17. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
18. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
19. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
20. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
21. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
22. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
23. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
24. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
25. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
26. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
27. See Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1940): 98-121; Merrill Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793," William and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1965): 584-610; Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 1-30; idem, International Trade and Economic Development (New York, 1952); Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism, 2 vols. (New York, 1955); Michael Kammen, Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism (New York, 1970); Isabel Madariaga, Britain, Russia, and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (New Haven, 1962); John Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1993); Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1978); Carl Kulsrud, Maritime Neutrality to 1780 (Boston, 1936); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 1938); and Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), chap. 4.
28. Peterson, "Jefferson and Commercial Policy," 585.
29. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
30. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
31. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
32. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
33. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
34. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
35. See Max Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy, 1713-1778," in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. Richard Morris, (New York, 1939); Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1985); James Hutson, "Intellectual Foundations of Early American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History, 1, no. 1 (1977): 1-19; editorial note on French trade in Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 25 vols. to date (Princeton, 1950-), 13:52-91, 18:516-77. In 1816 Jefferson put the issue bluntly to Benjamin Austin: "He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us to dependence on that foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort." 9 January 1816, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:504. On the point regarding Hamilton and the international system see Albert Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly 71, no. 1 (1956): 18-41.
36. I have detailed this theory of the "Atlantic balance of power" in other contexts: see my "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment: Statecraft and Political Theory in Early Nineteenth Century Europe and America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1995), pt. 2, chap. 5. Regarding the continental powers, Jefferson argued that the United States should adopt a policy of "keep[ing] an eye on them, their connections and oppositions, that in a moment of need we may avail ourselves of their weakness with respect to others as well as ourselves." Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 21 December 1787, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 12:447. Thus when he wrote Monroe in 1823 that "the political interests of Europe" were "completely distinct from ours" and stressed that America should have nothing to do with "their balance of power," he was referring to the continental powers and not the maritime states. Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 June 1823, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 12:292.
37. I have detailed this theory of the "Atlantic balance of power" in other contexts: see my "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment: Statecraft and Political Theory in Early Nineteenth Century Europe and America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1995), pt. 2, chap. 5. Regarding the continental powers, Jefferson argued that the United States should adopt a policy of "keep[ing] an eye on them, their connections and oppositions, that in a moment of need we may avail ourselves of their weakness with respect to others as well as ourselves." Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 21 December 1787, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 12:447. Thus when he wrote Monroe in 1823 that "the political interests of Europe" were "completely distinct from ours" and stressed that America should have nothing to do with "their balance of power," he was referring to the continental powers and not the maritime states. Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 June 1823, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 12:292.
38. I have detailed this theory of the "Atlantic balance of power" in other contexts: see my "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment: Statecraft and Political Theory in Early Nineteenth Century Europe and America" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1995), pt. 2, chap. 5. Regarding the continental powers, Jefferson argued that the United States should adopt a policy of "keep[ing] an eye on them, their connections and oppositions, that in a moment of need we may avail ourselves of their weakness with respect to others as well as ourselves." Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 21 December 1787, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 12:447. Thus when he wrote Monroe in 1823 that "the political interests of Europe" were "completely distinct from ours" and stressed that America should have nothing to do with "their balance of power," he was referring to the continental powers and not the maritime states. Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 June 1823, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 12:292.
39. Jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, in Dickinson R.Adams, ed., Jeffersons's Extracts from the Gospels: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Second Series (Princeton, 1983), 398; Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 21 June 1797, in Ford, ed., Work of Jefferson 8:314; Jefferson to G. K. van Hogendorp, 13 October 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:633. He began the letter by claiming that "were I to indulge my own theory, I should wish [America] to practice neither commerce nor navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the same footing as China. We should thus avoid wars, and all our citizens would be husbandmen." Naturally his quick rejection of these hypothetical views suggests his underlying motive: that in a world of powerful and predatory commercial states, the United States should use its own commercial and economic leverage to secure a greater and safer share of the world market, especially in agricultural products vital to sustain the Southern economy.
40. Jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, in Dickinson R.Adams, ed., Jeffersons's Extracts from the Gospels: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Second Series (Princeton, 1983), 398; Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 21 June 1797, in Ford, ed., Work of Jefferson 8:314; Jefferson to G. K. van Hogendorp, 13 October 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:633. He began the letter by claiming that "were I to indulge my own theory, I should wish [America] to practice neither commerce nor navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the same footing as China. We should thus avoid wars, and all our citizens would be husbandmen." Naturally his quick rejection of these hypothetical views suggests his underlying motive: that in a world of powerful and predatory commercial states, the United States should use its own commercial and economic leverage to secure a greater and safer share of the world market, especially in agricultural products vital to sustain the Southern economy.
41. Jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, in Dickinson R.Adams, ed., Jeffersons's Extracts from the Gospels: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Second Series (Princeton, 1983), 398; Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 21 June 1797, in Ford, ed., Work of Jefferson 8:314; Jefferson to G. K. van Hogendorp, 13 October 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:633. He began the letter by claiming that "were I to indulge my own theory, I should wish [America] to practice neither commerce nor navigation, but to stand with respect to Europe precisely on the same footing as China. We should thus avoid wars, and all our citizens would be husbandmen." Naturally his quick rejection of these hypothetical views suggests his underlying motive: that in a world of powerful and predatory commercial states, the United States should use its own commercial and economic leverage to secure a greater and safer share of the world market, especially in agricultural products vital to sustain the Southern economy.
42. Albert Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Relations during the Federalist Era (Knoxville, 1974), 5; Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1954), 174; "Report on Commerce," 16 December 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:113; for an amplification of this idea see Viner, "Power versus Plenty," and Crowley, Neomercantilism, 156-63.
43. Albert Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Relations during the Federalist Era (Knoxville, 1974), 5; Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1954), 174; "Report on Commerce," 16 December 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:113; for an amplification of this idea see Viner, "Power versus Plenty," and Crowley, Neomercantilism, 156-63.
44. Albert Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Relations during the Federalist Era (Knoxville, 1974), 5; Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1954), 174; "Report on Commerce," 16 December 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:113; for an amplification of this idea see Viner, "Power versus Plenty," and Crowley, Neomercantilism, 156-63.
45. Albert Bowman, The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Relations during the Federalist Era (Knoxville, 1974), 5; Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1785), ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1954), 174; "Report on Commerce," 16 December 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:113; for an amplification of this idea see Viner, "Power versus Plenty," and Crowley, Neomercantilism, 156-63.
46. Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, 4 July 1790, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 16:601.
47. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
48. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
49. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
50. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
51. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
52. See Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 13:52-91, 18:516-77; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 6 vols. (New York, 1948-1981), vol. 2, chaps. 1-4. For Vergennes's view of Jefferson's commercial policy, which in general he considered to be dramatically out of proportion with American power and resources, see Oville Murphy, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719-1787 (Albany, 1982), chaps. 32-37. On Jefferson's reaction to the Eden Treaty see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:361-63, 11:66-78. This is not surprising, as Jefferson's entire diplomatic strategy was predicated upon manipulating Anglo-French antagonism to America's advantage. But the quick deterioration of the French economy in 1787 and the calling of the Estates-General soon overshadowed the Anglo-French agreement in Jefferson's diplomatic correspondence.
53. So Jefferson intimated to Madison in 1789. Jefferson to Madison, 28 August 1789, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 15:364-65. See also Robert Palmer, "The Dubious Democrat: Thomas Jefferson in Bourbon France," Political Science Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1957): 388-404.
54. So Jefferson intimated to Madison in 1789. Jefferson to Madison, 28 August 1789, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 15:364-65. See also Robert Palmer, "The Dubious Democrat: Thomas Jefferson in Bourbon France," Political Science Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1957): 388-404.
55. Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 21 June 1797, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:313. As late as 1805 Jefferson remained convinced that this was still the best policy for the United States to pursue, even after the experience of the Quasi-War with France from 1798 to 1800. He told Madison that "the probability of an extensive war on the continent of Europe gives us our great desideratum, time. In truth, it places us quite at our ease. We are certain of one year of campaigning at least, and one year of negotiation for their peace arrangements. Should we be now forced into war, it is become much more questionable than it was whether we should not pursue it unembarrased by any alliance & free to retire from it whenever we can obtain our separate terms." Jefferson to Madison, 23 October 1805, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 10:176-77.
56. Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 21 June 1797, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:313. As late as 1805 Jefferson remained convinced that this was still the best policy for the United States to pursue, even after the experience of the Quasi-War with France from 1798 to 1800. He told Madison that "the probability of an extensive war on the continent of Europe gives us our great desideratum, time. In truth, it places us quite at our ease. We are certain of one year of campaigning at least, and one year of negotiation for their peace arrangements. Should we be now forced into war, it is become much more questionable than it was whether we should not pursue it unembarrased by any alliance & free to retire from it whenever we can obtain our separate terms." Jefferson to Madison, 23 October 1805, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 10:176-77.
57. See Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy"; Jefferson to Madison, 30 June 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 7:421 (emphasis in original); see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 25:597-618.
58. See Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy"; Jefferson to Madison, 30 June 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 7:421 (emphasis in original); see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 25:597-618.
59. See Bowman, "Jefferson, Hamilton, and American Foreign Policy"; Jefferson to Madison, 30 June 1793, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 7:421 (emphasis in original); see Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 25:597-618.
60. "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117.
61. Ibid., 112.
62. Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, 29 May 1797, ibid., 293 (emphasis in original). He went on to argue that "If the commercial regulations had been adopted which our legislature were at one time proposing [1791], we should at this moment have been standing on such an eminence of safety & respect as ages can never recover." Madison had introduced legislation in 1791 similar to Jefferson's reasoning in the "Report on Commerce," but it was voted down by Federalists echoing Hamilton's fear that it would cause a rupture with London. See McCoy, Elusive Republic, 137-45; Crowley, Neomercantilism, chap, 5; and "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117 (emphasis added).
63. Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, 29 May 1797, ibid., 293 (emphasis in original). He went on to argue that "If the commercial regulations had been adopted which our legislature were at one time proposing [1791], we should at this moment have been standing on such an eminence of safety & respect as ages can never recover." Madison had introduced legislation in 1791 similar to Jefferson's reasoning in the "Report on Commerce," but it was voted down by Federalists echoing Hamilton's fear that it would cause a rupture with London. See McCoy, Elusive Republic, 137-45; Crowley, Neomercantilism, chap, 5; and "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117 (emphasis added).
64. Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, 29 May 1797, ibid., 293 (emphasis in original). He went on to argue that "If the commercial regulations had been adopted which our legislature were at one time proposing [1791], we should at this moment have been standing on such an eminence of safety & respect as ages can never recover." Madison had introduced legislation in 1791 similar to Jefferson's reasoning in the "Report on Commerce," but it was voted down by Federalists echoing Hamilton's fear that it would cause a rupture with London. See McCoy, Elusive Republic, 137-45; Crowley, Neomercantilism, chap, 5; and "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117 (emphasis added).
65. Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, 29 May 1797, ibid., 293 (emphasis in original). He went on to argue that "If the commercial regulations had been adopted which our legislature were at one time proposing [1791], we should at this moment have been standing on such an eminence of safety & respect as ages can never recover." Madison had introduced legislation in 1791 similar to Jefferson's reasoning in the "Report on Commerce," but it was voted down by Federalists echoing Hamilton's fear that it would cause a rupture with London. See McCoy, Elusive Republic, 137-45; Crowley, Neomercantilism, chap, 5; and "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117 (emphasis added).
66. "Report on Commerce," in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 8:117.
67. See Jefferson's "Report on Negotiations with Spain," 18 March 1792, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 23:299-303. Once again the root of Jefferson's argument was economic: Spain, in controlling the Mississippi, was in a position to restrict the flow of American articles to New Orleans for transshipment to the Eastern seaboard, Caribbean, or Europe. For a development of this argument in relation to the West see Sofka, "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment," pt. 2, chap. 5; Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York, 1976); and Mary Adams, "Jefferson's Reaction to the Treaty of San Ildefonso," Journal of Southern History 21, no. 2 (1955): 173-88.
68. See Jefferson's "Report on Negotiations with Spain," 18 March 1792, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 23:299-303. Once again the root of Jefferson's argument was economic: Spain, in controlling the Mississippi, was in a position to restrict the flow of American articles to New Orleans for transshipment to the Eastern seaboard, Caribbean, or Europe. For a development of this argument in relation to the West see Sofka, "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment," pt. 2, chap. 5; Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York, 1976); and Mary Adams, "Jefferson's Reaction to the Treaty of San Ildefonso," Journal of Southern History 21, no. 2 (1955): 173-88.
69. See Jefferson's "Report on Negotiations with Spain," 18 March
70. See Jefferson's "Report on Negotiations with Spain," 18 March 1792, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 23:299-303. Once again the root of Jefferson's argument was economic: Spain, in controlling the Mississippi, was in a position to restrict the flow of American articles to New Orleans for transshipment to the Eastern seaboard, Caribbean, or Europe. For a development of this argument in relation to the West see Sofka, "Metternich, Jefferson, and the Enlightenment," pt. 2, chap. 5; Alexander DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana (New York, 1976); and Mary Adams, "Jefferson's Reaction to the Treaty of San Ildefonso," Journal of Southern History 21, no. 2 (1955): 173-88.
71. Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, 4 July 1790, in Boyd et al., eds. Papers of TJ 16:601. Jefferson was a steady proponent of American naval expansion from 1785 until after his retirement. While his decision in 1801 to build gunboats rather than large numbers of capital ships has often been criticized, Jefferson believed that these vessels would excel in the kind of inshore combat he expected in the Mediterranean or Mississippi. In 1794 Jefferson opposed the naval expansion bill debated in Congress, but he did so on the basis of political, rather than military, considerations. He was wary of the bill's favorable treatment of New England interests and believed that under a Federalist administration the navy and its largely northeastern officer corps would be a tool of his political opponents. By 1801, with the government safely in Republican hands, Jefferson returned to the position he had staked out in 1785.
72. For an overview of the political and strategic ramifications of Jefferson's naval policy see Craig Symond, Navalists and Anti-Navalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the Unite States, 1785-1827 (Newark, DE, 1980).
73. Jefferson to John Jay, 23 August 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 8:426-27.
74. Notes on the State of Virginia, 174-75.
75. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
76. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
77. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
78. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
79. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
80. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
81. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
82. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
83. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
84. For a general overview of the political situation of these regimes at the close of the eighteenth century see Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, 1931), chap. 1; Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (New York, 1904), chaps. 1 and 2; James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), chap. 2; Kola Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Pasha Yusuf Qaramanli (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1979); Seton Dearden, A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London, 1976); Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest (New York, 1977); Ann Thomson, Barbary and the Enlightenment: European Attitudes towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1987); Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66, 18:369-416; and Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 8-9, 189.
85. Sheffield, "Observations on the Commerce of the American States" (London, 1783), cited in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:373; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 16; Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:375.
86. Sheffield, "Observations on the Commerce of the American States" (London, 1783), cited in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:373; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 16; Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:375.
87. Sheffield, "Observations on the Commerce of the American States" (London, 1783), cited in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:373; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 16; Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:375.
88. See the editorial note on the depradations against American vessels in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10: 560-66, 18:349-416.
89. See the editorial note on the depradations against American vessels in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10: 560-66, 18:349-416.
90. For an overview of Jefferson's and Adams's diplomacy in relation to North Africa see ibid. 10:560-66; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 3; Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:27-32; and Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:86.
91. For an overview of Jefferson's and Adams's diplomacy in relation to North Africa see ibid. 10:560-66; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 3; Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:27-32; and Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:86.
92. For an overview of Jefferson's and Adams's diplomacy in relation to North Africa see ibid. 10:560-66; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 3; Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:27-32; and Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:86.
93. For an overview of Jefferson's and Adams's diplomacy in relation to North Africa see ibid. 10:560-66; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 3; Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:27-32; and Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:86.
94. Jefferson to Nathanael Greene, 12 June 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 9:168; Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786, in ibid. 10:225; Jefferson to John Page, 20 August 1785, ibid. 8:419.
95. Jefferson to Nathanael Greene, 12 June 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 9:168; Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786, in ibid. 10:225; Jefferson to John Page, 20 August 1785, ibid. 8:419.
96. Jefferson to Nathanael Greene, 12 June 1785, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 9:168; Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786, in ibid. 10:225; Jefferson to John Page, 20 August 1785, ibid. 8:419.
97. Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 November 1784, in ibid. 7:511-12.
98. Jefferson to Adams, 11 July 1786, in ibid. 10:123-24. This is the response to Adams's letter of 3 July quoted earlier. Jefferson's brief should be read in full.
99. Adams to Jefferson, 31 July 1786, in ibid., 176-77. On the failures of Jefferson's and Adams's Mediterranean diplomacy see Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 51-53.
100. Adams to Jefferson, 31 July 1786, in ibid., 176-77. On the failures of Jefferson's and Adams's Mediterranean diplomacy see Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 51-53.
101. On the background of Jefferson's proposed convention against the North African states see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:30; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 46-51; and Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66.
102. On the background of Jefferson's proposed convention against the North African states see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:30; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 46-51; and Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66.
103. On the background of Jefferson's proposed convention against the North African states see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 2:30; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 46-51; and Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 10:560-66.
104. Indeed, Jefferson went so far as to suggest that American forces capture Turkish sailors and hold them as hostages to exchange for American prisoners, because in his view the Ottoman rulers of North Africa were treated as "a superior order of Beings" in the region and such a policy would compel Constantinople to restrict the maritime policy of its provinces. Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:406; Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786, ibid. 10:224-225.
105. Indeed, Jefferson went so far as to suggest that American forces capture Turkish sailors and hold them as hostages to exchange for American prisoners, because in his view the Ottoman rulers of North Africa were treated as "a superior order of Beings" in the region and such a policy would compel Constantinople to restrict the maritime policy of its provinces. Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 18:406; Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786, ibid. 10:224-225.
106. On Vergennes's reaction to Jefferson's proposal see ibid., 565; and Murphy, Vergennes, chap. 36.
107. On Vergennes's reaction to Jefferson's proposal see ibid., 565; and Murphy, Vergennes, chap. 36.
108. On the Algerian accords see H. G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War of 1785-1797 (Oxford, 1966). On the diplomatic relations of the United States and these regimes from 1786 to 1801 see Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chaps. 4-7; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 27-48. The sultan of Morocco declared war on the United States in June 1802, and Jefferson learned of this development in August of that year. Jefferson responded by sending reinforcements to the Mediterranean to conduct operations against Morocco, but the sultan abruptly changed his mind and revoked his declaration in mid-September. Given that American operations against Tripoli were proceeding well in 1802, this may have influenced the sultan's decision, although evidence from the Moroccan side is lacking. Similarly, Algiers conducted limited hostilities against the United States in 1800, which were ended with a purchased peace authorized - not surprisingly - by President Adams. While Jefferson technically confined the American campaign to attacks on Tripolitan interests, the American squadron made frequent visits to Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis to "monitor" events and demonstrate American naval power to potential belligerents.
109. On the Algerian accords see H. G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War of 1785-1797 (Oxford, 1966). On the diplomatic relations of the United States and these regimes from 1786 to 1801 see Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chaps. 4-7; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 27-48. The sultan of Morocco declared war on the United States in June 1802, and Jefferson learned of this development in August of that year. Jefferson responded by sending reinforcements to the Mediterranean to conduct operations against Morocco, but the sultan abruptly changed his mind and revoked his declaration in mid-September. Given that American operations against Tripoli were proceeding well in 1802, this may have influenced the sultan's decision, although evidence from the Moroccan side is lacking. Similarly, Algiers conducted limited hostilities against the United States in 1800, which were ended with a purchased peace authorized - not surprisingly - by President Adams. While Jefferson technically confined the American campaign to attacks on Tripolitan interests, the American squadron made frequent visits to Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis to "monitor" events and demonstrate American naval power to potential belligerents.
110. On the Algerian accords see H. G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War of 1785-1797 (Oxford, 1966). On the diplomatic relations of the United States and these regimes from 1786 to 1801 see Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chaps. 4-7; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 27-48. The sultan of Morocco declared war on the United States in June 1802, and Jefferson learned of this development in August of that year. Jefferson responded by sending reinforcements to the Mediterranean to conduct operations against Morocco, but the sultan abruptly changed his mind and revoked his declaration in mid-September. Given that American operations against Tripoli were proceeding well in 1802, this may have influenced the sultan's decision, although evidence from the Moroccan side is lacking. Similarly, Algiers conducted limited hostilities against the United States in 1800, which were ended with a purchased peace authorized - not surprisingly - by President Adams. While Jefferson technically confined the American campaign to attacks on Tripolitan interests, the American squadron made frequent visits to Morocco, Algiers, and Tunis to "monitor" events and demonstrate American naval power to potential belligerents.
111. Jefferson to William Cary Nicholas, 11 June 1801, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 9:265.
112. Jefferson himself set the pattern for historiographical treatment of the war by minimizing the archival record of the matter. He made few references to the war in his correspondence and only token explanations in his messages to Congress. He left only a fragment of notes of the cabinet meeting of 15 May 1801 in which war was decided on. A master of indirection, Jefferson no doubt sought to distance himself from a risky venture that might fail and thus play into the hands of his political opponents. Moreover, he had campaigned on a platform of peace and sedulously avoided any statements that might lead to charges of inconsistency. In the tradition of cabinet statecraft, he arrived at his decision, plotted strategy, and conducted his campaign within a limited circle of advisers with little congressional input. While several excellent monographs on the war have been published, most deal almost exclusively with military affairs. Neither Jefferson's admirers nor detractors find the campaign palatable, as it refutes most of their assumptions regarding his alleged "pacifist" and "idealist" diplomatic philosophy. In their recent and well-received study of Jefferson's foreign policy, for example, Tucker and Hendrickson argue that "In sending a naval force to the Mediterranean Jefferson plainly demonstrated that he had no compunction against the use of force. But the use of force was not synonymous with war in any but a formal sense." Such an elliptical approach to Jefferson's decision for war - itself thoroughly consistent with the practice of raison d'etat Tucker and Hendrickson claim he repudiated - is the norm rather than the exception in the scholarly literature. Eager to attack Jefferson's supposed "idealist" inclinations in foreign policy, Tucker and Henrickson conspicuously relegate their discussion of the war to a footnote.
113. Text of notes of cabinet meeting of 15 May 1801, Jefferson Papers, reel 38, Library of Congress (microfilm). See also Noble E. Cunningham, The Process of Government under Jefferson (Princeton, 1978), 48-50, for a discussion of this meeting. Madison to William Eaton, 20 May 1801, in J. C. A. Stagg et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, 3 vols. to date (Charlottesville, 1986-), 1:199-200.
114. Text of notes of cabinet meeting of 15 May 1801, Jefferson Papers, reel 38, Library of Congress (microfilm). See also Noble E. Cunningham, The Process of Government under Jefferson (Princeton, 1978), 48-50, for a discussion of this meeting. Madison to William Eaton, 20 May 1801, in J. C. A. Stagg et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, 3 vols. to date (Charlottesville, 1986-), 1:199-200.
115. Notes of 15 May cabinet meeting, Jefferson Papers, reel 38.
116. Jefferson to Madison, 19 February 1812, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:226;
117. Jefferson to Madison, 19 February 1812, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:226; Cunningham, Process of Governmment, 49-50. On the infamous "Mediterranean Fund" see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 53; Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 43; and Raymond Walters, Albert Gallatin (New York, 1957), 150-52.
118. Jefferson to Madison, 19 February 1812, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:226; Cunningham, Process of Governmment, 49-50. On the infamous "Mediterranean Fund" see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 53; Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 43; and Raymond Walters, Albert Gallatin (New York, 1957), 150-52.
119. Jefferson to Madison, 19 February 1812, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:226; Cunningham, Process of Governmment, 49-50. On the infamous "Mediterranean Fund" see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 53; Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 43; and Raymond Walters, Albert Gallatin (New York, 1957), 150-52.
120. Jefferson to Madison, 19 February 1812, in Ford, ed., Works of Jefferson 11:226; Cunningham, Process of Governmment, 49-50. On the infamous "Mediterranean Fund" see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 53; Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 43; and Raymond Walters, Albert Gallatin (New York, 1957), 150-52.
121. Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 18 February 1806, Jefferson Papers, reel 56; Jefferson to John Tyler, 29 March 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 52.
122. In a noteworthy exception, Jefferson removed Richard V. Morris, the commander of the American squadron in the Mediterranean, on the grounds of "excessive timidity" in 1804. Allen, Our Navy, 134-35. The best account of the naval campaign is to be found in Allen. It is extremely readable and well documented. For specific engagements and campaigns see the collection of documents published under the title Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, ed. Captain Dudley Knox, 6 vols. (Washington, 1939-44). These volumes contain excellent chronologies, maps, tables, and synopses of battles but are almost exclusively concerned with military matters. On Nelson's remark see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 60.
123. In a noteworthy exception, Jefferson removed Richard V. Morris, the commander of the American squadron in the Mediterranean, on the grounds of "excessive timidity" in 1804. Allen, Our Navy, 134-35. The best account of the naval campaign is to be found in Allen. It is extremely readable and well documented. For specific engagements and campaigns see the collection of documents published under the title Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, ed. Captain Dudley Knox, 6 vols. (Washington, 1939-44). These volumes contain excellent chronologies, maps, tables, and synopses of battles but are almost exclusively concerned with military matters. On Nelson's remark see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 60.
124. In a noteworthy exception, Jefferson removed Richard V. Morris, the commander of the American squadron in the Mediterranean, on the grounds of "excessive timidity" in 1804. Allen, Our Navy, 134-35. The best account of the naval campaign is to be found in Allen. It is extremely readable and well documented. For specific engagements and campaigns see the collection of documents published under the title Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, ed. Captain Dudley Knox, 6 vols. (Washington, 1939-44). These volumes contain excellent chronologies, maps, tables, and synopses of battles but are almost exclusively concerned with military matters. On Nelson's remark see Field, America and the Mediterranean, 60.
125. The Danish consul in Tripoli, who acted as a contact between the Americans and the captured crew of the Philadelphia, was commended by Jefferson for his invaluable humanitarian assistance.
126. On the Russian dimension of Jefferson's Mediterranean policy see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:1442-43; N. Hans, ed., "Tsar Alexander and Jefferson: Unpublished Correspondence," Slavonic and East European Review 32, no. 1 (1953): 215-25. For the Russian estimate of the North African situation see Norman Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), chap. 4.
127. On the Russian dimension of Jefferson's Mediterranean policy see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:1442-43; N. Hans, ed., "Tsar Alexander and Jefferson: Unpublished Correspondence," Slavonic and East European Review 32, no. 1 (1953): 215-25. For the Russian estimate of the North African situation see Norman Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), chap. 4.
128. On the Russian dimension of Jefferson's Mediterranean policy see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:1442-43; N. Hans, ed., "Tsar Alexander and Jefferson: Unpublished Correspondence," Slavonic and East European Review 32, no. 1 (1953): 215-25. For the Russian estimate of the North African situation see Norman Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807 (Chicago, 1970), chap. 4.
129. As Madison put it to Eaton in his letter of 20 May 1801, while the objectives of the campaign were set by the president, "the means must be left in a great degree to your knowledge of the local and other circumstances, which cannot be understood at this distance." Stagg et al., eds., Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series 1:200; Madison to William Eaton, 22 August 1802, in ibid. 3:505-6.
130. As Madison put it to Eaton in his letter of 20 May 1801, while the objectives of the campaign were set by the president, "the means must be left in a great degree to your knowledge of the local and other circumstances, which cannot be understood at this distance." Stagg et al., eds., Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series 1:200; Madison to William Eaton, 22 August 1802, in ibid. 3:505-6.
131. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
132. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
133. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
134. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
135. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
136. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
137. For a better understanding of the personality that conceived this enterprise see L. B. Wright, The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805 (Princeton, 1945). Madison and Jefferson personally approved Eaton's plan in May 1804. See Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 143-44; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 52-53. Malone attempts to distance Jefferson from this scheme by implying that Eaton acted on his own authority. Jefferson and His Time 5:40-41. Eaton, however, readily acknowledged in his correspondence that he had received the president's permission before beginning the coup against Yusuf, and Madison's letters to him remove all seeds of doubt on the issue. See the correspondence between Madison and Eaton in The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series, vol. 3. Given Jefferson's view of the North African situation, it is not surprising that he would have endorsed such a move if he believed that it had a reasonable chance of success. The story of the Derna offensive is well recounted by Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 146-49, and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 14.
138. On the peace and its political consequences see Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 10; and Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44.
139. On the peace and its political consequences see Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 10; and Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44.
140. On the peace and its political consequences see Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, chap. 10; and Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44.
141. Allen, Our Navy, 255; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 157-59.
142. Allen, Our Navy, 255; Irwin, Diplomatic Relations, 157-59.
143. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
144. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
145. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
146. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
147. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
148. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
149. On later developments with Hamet see Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:40-44; Irwin, Diplomatic Relation; chap. 10; and Allen, Our Navy, chap. 15. See Malone, Jefferson and His Time 5:38-44; and Irving Brant, James Madison: Secretary of State, 1801-1809 (Indianapolis, 1953), 308-10, for political reactions to the treaty. Gallatin to Jefferson, 12 September 1805, Jefferson Papers, reel 54; Allen, Our Navy, 214. It is unclear whether Jefferson was informed of the Vatican's endorsement of his policy. He, and his political opponents, would certainly have found it wryly ironic and amusing.
150. In an effort to smooth over differences with Tunis, Jefferson and Madison went to extraordinary lengths in their dealings with Mellimelli, the Tunisian minister. They stressed that the United States had peaceful intentions toward the North African states as long as they ceased attacks on American shipping. In an effort to smooth negotiations with Mellimelli, Jefferson and Madison eased the ambassador's loneliness by supplying him with a Greek prostitute and charged her expenses to the State Department budget as "appropriations for foreign intercourse." See Brant, Madison 4:306; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 54-64. Beyond these diplomatic successes, it is important to note that Jefferson's war had increased the size and military capability of the navy. New naval construction benefited from the experience of Mediterranean combat, and commanders and crews developed tactics that would be repeated in the highly successful American naval campaign in the War of 1812. Indeed, John Adams informed Jefferson in 1822 that he considered the U.S. Navy as "Jefferson's child," as it had been "born" during the Barbary War. Adams to Jefferson, 15 October 1822, in Lester Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill, 1987), 583.
151. In an effort to smooth over differences with Tunis, Jefferson and Madison went to extraordinary lengths in their dealings with Mellimelli, the Tunisian minister. They stressed that the United States had peaceful intentions toward the North African states as long as they ceased attacks on American shipping. In an effort to smooth negotiations with Mellimelli, Jefferson and Madison eased the ambassador's loneliness by supplying him with a Greek prostitute and charged her expenses to the State Department budget as "appropriations for foreign intercourse." See Brant, Madison 4:306; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 54-64. Beyond these diplomatic successes, it is important to note that Jefferson's war had increased the size and military capability of the navy. New naval construction benefited from the experience of Mediterranean combat, and commanders and crews developed tactics that would be repeated in the highly successful American naval campaign in the War of 1812. Indeed, John Adams informed Jefferson in 1822 that he considered the U.S. Navy as "Jefferson's child," as it had been "born" during the Barbary War. Adams to Jefferson, 15 October 1822, in Lester Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill, 1987), 583.
152. In an effort to smooth over differences with Tunis, Jefferson and Madison went to extraordinary lengths in their dealings with Mellimelli, the Tunisian minister. They stressed that the United States had peaceful intentions toward the North African states as long as they ceased attacks on American shipping. In an effort to smooth negotiations with Mellimelli, Jefferson and Madison eased the ambassador's loneliness by supplying him with a Greek prostitute and charged her expenses to the State Department budget as "appropriations for foreign intercourse." See Brant, Madison 4:306; and Field, America and the Mediterranean, 54-64. Beyond these diplomatic successes, it is important to note that Jefferson's war had increased the size and military capability of the navy. New naval construction benefited from the experience of Mediterranean combat, and commanders and crews developed tactics that would be repeated in the highly successful American naval campaign in the War of 1812. Indeed, John Adams informed Jefferson in 1822 that he considered the U.S. Navy as "Jefferson's child," as it had been "born" during the Barbary War. Adams to Jefferson, 15 October 1822, in Lester Cappon, ed., The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel Hill, 1987), 583.
153. Jefferson to Adams, 8 February 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 9:264.
154. Jefferson to Adams, 8 February 1786, in Boyd et al., eds., Papers of TJ 9:264.