Supervenience and anomalous monism

Dialectica

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 3-24

  Brakel, J V ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038052474     PISSN: 00122017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1999.tb00060.x     Document Type: Article

References (127)

1. AUNE, B. (1988) Action and ontology, Philosophical Studies, 54: 195-213.
2. BALASHOV, Y. (1994) Uniformitarianism in cosmology: Background and philosophical implications of the steady-state theory, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 25: 933-958.
3. BECKERMANN, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim (eds.) (1992) Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
4. BELL, J.S. (1964) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. BLACKBURN, S. (1985)Superveniencerevisited,in Exercises in Analysis (I. Hacking, ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. BRADLEY, R. (1992) The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. CALLAWAY, H.G. and J. van Brakel (1996) No need to speak the same language, Dialectica, 50: 253-297.
8. CARTWRIGHT, N. (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
9. CARTWRIGHT, N. (1994) Fundamentalism vs. the patchwork of laws, Proceedings of the Aris-totelian Society, 94: 279-292.
10. CARTWRIGHT, N. (1997) Where do laws of nature come from?, Dialectica, 51: 65-78.
11. CASTAÑEDA, H.-N. (1990) Supervenience properties, emergence, and the hierarchy of concrete individuals, in his Intentionality, Modality and Supervenience, Rotterdamse Filosofische Reeks, Rotterdam: Erasmus University.
12. CHILD, W. (1993) Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations, The Philosophi-cal Review, 102: 215-245.
13. CHILD, W. (1994) Causality, Interpretation and the Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
14. CHURCHLAND, P.M. (1989) A Neurocomputational Perspective, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
15. CLELAND, C.E. (1985) Causality, chance and weak non-supervenience, American Philosophi-cal Quarterly, 22: 287-298.
16. CRANE, T. (1995) Mental causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99 (suppl. volume) 211-236.
17. CRANE, T. and D.H. Mellor (1990) There is no question of physicalism, Mind, 99: 185-206.
18. CURRIE, G. (1990) Supervenience, essentialism and aesthetic properties, Philosophical Studies, 58: 243-257.
19. CUSHING, J.T. (1994) Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
20. DALE, A.J. (1985) Hare on supervenience, Mind 94: 599-600.
21. DAVIDSON, D. (1980) Essays on Actions & Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
22. DAVIDSON, D. (1985) Replies to Essays X-XII, in B. Vermazen and M.B. Hintikka, eds., Essays on Davidson, Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
23. DAVIDSON, D. (1986) A nice derangement of epitaphs, in Truth and Interpretation (E. LePore, ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 433-446.
24. DAVIDSON, D. (1987) Knowing one's own mind, Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, 60: 441-458.
25. DAVIDSON, D. (1989) The myth of the subjective, in Relativism, Interpretation and Confrontation (M. Krausz, ed.), Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 159-172.
26. DAVIDSON, D. (1993) Thinking causes, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Ox-ford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3-18.
27. DAVIDSON, D. (1994) Interview with Donald Davidson in November 1993, by Lars Bergström and Dagfinn Føllesdal, Theoria, pp. 207-225.
28. DAVIDSON, D. (1995a) Laws and causes, Dialectica, 49: 263-279.
29. DAVIDSON, D. (1995b) Relations and transitions-An interview with Donald Davidson, Dialec-tica, 49: 75-86.
30. DREYFUS, H.L. (1992) What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, Cam-bridge MA: The MIT Press.
31. DUPRÉ, J. (1993) The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science,Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
32. EHRLICH, P. (1982) Negative, infinite and hotter than infinite temperatures, Synthese, 50: 233-277.
33. FODOR, J. A. (1974) Special sciences, Synthese, 28: 77-115.
34. also in his The Language of Thought, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 9-25.
35. GIERE, R. (1988) Laws, theories, and generalization, pp. 37-46.
36. The Limitations of Deduc-tivism (A. Grünbaum and W.C. Salmon, eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.
37. GRIMES, T.R. (1991) Supervenience, determination, and dependency, Philosophical Studies 62: 81-92.
38. HARE, R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
39. HARE, R.M. (1984) The inaugural address: Supervenience, Proceedings of The Aristotelian So-ciety, Suppl. Vol. 58: 1-16.
40. HAUGELAND, J. (1982) Weak supervenience, American Philosophical Quarterly, 19: 93-103.
41. HEALY, R.A. (1989) The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.
42. HEIL, J. and A. Mele (eds.) (1993) Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
43. HEIL, J. (1992) The Nature of True Minds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. HEMPEL, C.G. (1988) Provisos: A problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories, pp. 19-36.
45. The Limitations of Deductivism (A. Grünbaum and W.C. Salmon,eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.
46. HORGAN, T. (1982) Supervenience and microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 29-43.
47. HORGAN, T. (1993) From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a ma-terial world, Mind, 102: 555-586.
48. HORGAN, T. and J. Tienson (1990) Soft laws, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15: 256-279.
49. HORGAN, T. and M. Timmons (1992) Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived, Synthese, 92: 221-260.
50. HORNSBY, J. (1980/81) Which physical events are mental events?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81: 73-92.
51. HURLEY, S.L. (1985) Supervenience and the possibility of coherence, Mind, 94: 501-525.
52. JAMES, W. (1907) Pragmatism, Indianapolis: Hackett (1981).
53. JANSSENS, S. and J. van Brakel (1990) Davidson's omniscient interpreter, Communication and Cognition, 23: 93-99.
54. KIM, J. (1984) Concepts of supervenience, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45: 153-176.
55. KIM, J. (1987) 'Strong' and 'global' supervenience revisited, Philosophy and Phenomenologi-cal Research, 48: 315-326.
56. KIM, J. (1989) The myth of nonreductive materialism, Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, 63: 31-47.
57. KIM, J. (1990) Supervenience as a philosophical concept, Metaphilosophy, 21: 1-27.
58. KIM, J. (1993) Can supervenience and 'non-strict laws' save anomalous monism, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 19-26.
59. KIM, J. (1993) Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
60. KLAGGE, J.C. (1987) Supervenience: Perspectives v. possible worlds, The Philosophical Quar-terly, 37: 312-315.
61. KLAGGE, J.C. (1988) Supervenience: ontological and ascriptive, Australasian Journal of Phil-osophy, 66: 461-470.
62. KLAGGE, J.C. (1990) Davidson's troubles with supervenience, Synthese 85: 339-352.
63. KLEE, R. (1992) Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus and psychological explanation, The Brit-ish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43: 389-403.
64. KLEE, R.L. (1984) Micro-determinism and concepts of emergence, Philosophy of Science 51: 44-63.
65. LANGE, M. (1993) Natural laws and the problem of provisos, Erkenntnis, 38: 233-248.
66. LEWIS, H.A. (1985) Is the mental supervenient on the physical?, in B. Vermazen and M.B.Hintikka (eds)., Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 159-172.
67. LOCKHEAD, G.R. (1992) Psychophysical scaling: Judgments of attributes of objects?, Brain and Behavioral Sciences, 15: 543-600.
68. LOWE, E.J. (1989) Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
69. LOWE, E.J. (1993) The causal autonomy of the mental, Mind, 102: 629-644.
70. MACH, E. (1919) Die Analyse der Empfindungen und des Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psy-chischen, Jena: Gustav Fischer; 8th edition; first published 1886.
71. MARRAS, A. (1993) Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism, Synthese, 95: 275-304.
72. MARRAS, A. (1994) Nonreductive materialism and mental causation, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24: 465-494.
73. MCDOWELL, J. (1994) Mind and World, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
74. MCFETRIDGE, I.G. (1985) Supervenience, realism, necessity, The Philosophical Quarterly, 35:245-258.
75. MCLAUGHLIN, B.P. (1993) On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism, in J.Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 27-40.
76. MEEHL, P.E. and W. Sellars (1956) The concept of emergence, in Minnesota Studies in the Phil-osophy of Science, Vol. I, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
77. MORRISON, M. (1995) Capacities, tendencies and the problem of singular cases, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 163-168.
78. MUMFORD, S. (1994) Dispositions, supervenience and reduction, The Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 419-438.
79. MUNDY, B. (1990) On empirical interpretation, Erkenntnis, 33: 345-369.
80. OWENS, D. (1992) Causes and Coincidences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
81. PEACOCKE, C. (1979) Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
82. PEPPER, S.C. (1926) Emergence, The Journal of Philosophy, 23: 241-245.
83. PLACE, U.T. (1989) Thirty five years on-is consciousness still a brain process?, Grazer Philos-ophische Studien, 36: 19-31.
84. POST, J.F. (1987) The Faces of Existence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
85. PRICE, H. (1992) Metaphysical pluralism, The Journal of Philosophy, 89: 387-409.
86. PUTNAM, H. (1987) The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle: Open Court.
87. PUTNAM, H. (1990) Is the causal structure of the world itself something physical?, pp. 80-95.
88. in his Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
89. PUTNAM, H. (1992) Renewing Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
90. PUTNAM, H. (1994) Sense, nonsense, and the senses: An inquiry into the powers of the human mind, The Journal of Philosophy, 91: 445-517.
91. QUINE, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.
92. QUINE, W.V.O. (1978) Otherworldly, New York Review of Books, November 23, 1978.
93. QUINE, W.V.O. (1985) Events and reification, pp. 151-161.
94. in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
95. QUINE, W.V.O. (1993) In praise of observation sentences, The Journal of Philosophy, 90:107-116.
96. RAMBERG, B.T. (1989) Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
97. REDHEAD, M. (1991) Review of J.D. Barrow's Theories of Everything, Times Literary Supplement, July 26, 1991.
98. REDHEAD, M. (1995) From Physics to Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
99. SCHEIBE, E. (1991) Substances, physical systems, and quantum mechanics, in Advances in Scientific Philosophy (G. Schurz and G.J.W. Dorn, eds.), Amsterdam: Rodopi.
100. SEAGER, W.E. (1988) Weak supervenience and materialism, Philosophy and Phenomenologi-cal Research, 48: 697-709.
101. SEAGER, W.E. (1991) Disjunctive laws and supervenience, Analysis 51: 93-98.
102. SEARLE, J.R. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
103. SELLARS, W. (1963) Science, Perception and Reality, London: Routledge.
104. SENCHUK, D.M. (1991) Consciousness naturalized: Supervenience without physical determin-ism, American Philosophical Quarterly, 28: 37-47.
105. SKLAR, L. (1990) How free are initial conditions?, PSA 1990, 2: 551-564.
106. SOSA, E. (1993) Davidson's thinking causes, in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 41-50.
107. SPECTOR, H. (1987) Dale on Supervenience, Mind, 96: 93-94.
108. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1986) The chemistry of substances and the philosophy of natural kinds, Syn-these, 69: 291-324.
109. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1991) The limited belief in chance, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 22: 499-513.
110. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1992a) Natural kinds and manifest forms of life, Dialectica, 46: 243-263.
111. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1992b) Ceteris paribus laws, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15: 584-585.
112. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1993a) Peirce's limited belief in chance, in E.S. Moore and R.S. Robin (eds.), From Time to Chance to Consciousness: Studies in the Metaphysics of Charles Peirce, Providence RI: Berg, pp. 128-148.
113. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1993b) The analysis of sensations as the foundation of all sciences, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16: 163-164.
114. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1996) Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: the priority of the manifest image, Synthese, 106: 253-297.
115. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1997) Chemistry as the science of the transformation of substances, Synthese, 111: 253-282.
116. VAN BRAKEL, J. (1998) Epistemische deugden en hun verantwoording, Tijdschrift voor Filo-sofie, in press.
117. VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. (1989) Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
118. VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. (1991) Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Oxord: Clarendon Press.
119. VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. (1992) From vicious circle to infinite regress, and back again, PSA 1992, 2: 6-29.
120. VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. (1993) Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on Laws and Symmetry, Phil-osophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 431-444.
121. VAN GULICK, R. (1992) Three bad arguments for intentional property epiphenomenalism, Er-kenntnis, 36: 311-332.
122. VAN HILGEVOORD, J. (ed.) (1994) Physics and Our View of the World Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
123. WEINGARTNER, P. (1997) Can the laws of nature (physics) be complete?, pp 429-446.
124. Logic and Scientific Method (M.L. Dalla Chiara et al.), Dordrecht: Kluwer.
125. WIGGINS, D. (1980) Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Blackwell.
126. WILSON, M. (1990) Law along the frontier: Differential equations and their boundary condi-tions, PSA 1990, 2: 565-575.
127. ZANGWILL, N. (1993) Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson, Philos-ophical Studies, 71: 59-79.