Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 177-187

  Safra, Zvi ^a   Weissengrin, Einat ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037968688     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200161     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Fishburn PC (1982) Foundations of expected utility theory. Reidel, Dordrecht
2. Harsanyi JC (1953) Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-bearing. J Polit Econ 61: 434-435
3. Harsanyi JC (1955) Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparison of utility. J Polit Econ 63: 309-321
4. Harsanyi JC (1977) Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
5. Karni E (1998) Impartiality: definition and representation. Econometrica 66: 1405-1415
6. Kami E, Safra Z (2000) An extension of a theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an application to social choice theory. J Math Econ 34: 315-327
7. Kami E, Weymark JA (1998) An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 15: 321-332
8. Mongin P (1999) The impartial observer theorem of social ethics. Econ Phil 17 (forthcoming)
9. Weymark JA (1991) A reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen debate on utilitarianism. In: Elster J, Roemer JE (eds) Interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 255-320