Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 23-38

  Faigle, Ulrich ^a   Kern, Walter ^b   Paulusma, Daniël ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperative game; Least core; NP hard; Nucleolus; Spanning tree

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037958846     PISSN: 14322994     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001860000059     Document Type: Article

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