Feminism, multiculturalism, oppression, and the state

Ethics

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 84-113

  Spinner Halev, Jeff ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0037934929     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/322741     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Ayelet Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation," Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 285-305, p. 287.
2. Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 107.
3. Shachar devotes little space to integrative multiculturalism, and most of my comments on this aspect of multiculturalism are directed toward Susan Moller Okin.
4. My definition of oppression has been influenced by Melissa Williams's Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 15-16.
5. Compare generally Will Kymlicka's argument in pt. 2 of Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) to his Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6. Compare generally Will Kymlicka's argument in pt. 2 of Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) to his Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
7. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 30-31, 177-81. Okin argues that Kymlicka doesn't give cultural rights to groups that are illiberal, but this is a misinterpretation of Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka argues that national minorities ought to be internally liberal, but he is unwilling to impose liberalism on national minorities. He has no such compunction, however, in insisting that polyethnic groups not be given the ability to deny individual rights to their members. Kymlicka argues that any liberal theory of minority rights must also safeguard individual rights, but in practice he is not willing to interfere in national minorities. Susan Moller Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions," Ethics 108 (1998): 661-84, pp. 678-79; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 164.
8. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 30-31, 177-81. Okin argues that Kymlicka doesn't give cultural rights to groups that are illiberal, but this is a misinterpretation of Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka argues that national minorities ought to be internally liberal, but he is unwilling to impose liberalism on national minorities. He has no such compunction, however, in insisting that polyethnic groups not be given the ability to deny individual rights to their members. Kymlicka argues that any liberal theory of minority rights must also safeguard individual rights, but in practice he is not willing to interfere in national minorities. Susan Moller Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions," Ethics 108 (1998): 661-84, pp. 678-79; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 164.
9. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 30-31, 177-81. Okin argues that Kymlicka doesn't give cultural rights to groups that are illiberal, but this is a misinterpretation of Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka argues that national minorities ought to be internally liberal, but he is unwilling to impose liberalism on national minorities. He has no such compunction, however, in insisting that polyethnic groups not be given the ability to deny individual rights to their members. Kymlicka argues that any liberal theory of minority rights must also safeguard individual rights, but in practice he is not willing to interfere in national minorities. Susan Moller Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions," Ethics 108 (1998): 661-84, pp. 678-79; Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 164.
10. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
11. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
12. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
13. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
14. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
15. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680. Among other theorists, Iris Young and Bhikhu Parekh do argue for rights of immigrants, though Okin mentions neither of them: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Bhikhu Parekh, "Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy," in Defining and Measuring Democracy, ed. David Beetham (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994). For arguments for group rights that either do not include immigrants or expect them to largely integrate, see Joseph H. Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Charles Taylor, "Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition,'" in Multiculturalism and the "Politics of Recognition," ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Williams.
16. While Kymlicka offers legal mechanisms to protect the group autonomy of national minorities, and strong integrative rights to oppressed groups, another one of Okin's targets, Chandran Kukathas, refrains from offering these groups any form of rights. Kukathas is against giving group rights to immigrants or to any group in the article cited by Okin. Okin recognizes this, of course, but his place as a multicultural defender is a bit curious. Okin aims in her work to criticize the "prominent defenders of multicultural group rights," but two of her three targets give very little in the way of rights to the kinds of groups she discusses. The title of one of Kukathas's articles is telling: "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference," Political Theory 26 (1998): 686-99. The article Okin cites is Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" Political Theory 20 (1992): 105-39. Oddly, Okin does not discuss the one article where Kukathas does give groups some autonomy; see his "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 69-104. Okin's criticisms are more on target in her discussion of Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, which I briefly discuss below.
17. While Kymlicka offers legal mechanisms to protect the group autonomy of national minorities, and strong integrative rights to oppressed groups, another one of Okin's targets, Chandran Kukathas, refrains from offering these groups any form of rights. Kukathas is against giving group rights to immigrants or to any group in the article cited by Okin. Okin recognizes this, of course, but his place as a multicultural defender is a bit curious. Okin aims in her work to criticize the "prominent defenders of multicultural group rights," but two of her three targets give very little in the way of rights to the kinds of groups she discusses. The title of one of Kukathas's articles is telling: "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference," Political Theory 26 (1998): 686-99. The article Okin cites is Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" Political Theory 20 (1992): 105-39. Oddly, Okin does not discuss the one article where Kukathas does give groups some autonomy; see his "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 69-104. Okin's criticisms are more on target in her discussion of Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, which I briefly discuss below.
18. While Kymlicka offers legal mechanisms to protect the group autonomy of national minorities, and strong integrative rights to oppressed groups, another one of Okin's targets, Chandran Kukathas, refrains from offering these groups any form of rights. Kukathas is against giving group rights to immigrants or to any group in the article cited by Okin. Okin recognizes this, of course, but his place as a multicultural defender is a bit curious. Okin aims in her work to criticize the "prominent defenders of multicultural group rights," but two of her three targets give very little in the way of rights to the kinds of groups she discusses. The title of one of Kukathas's articles is telling: "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference," Political Theory 26 (1998): 686-99. The article Okin cites is Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" Political Theory 20 (1992): 105-39. Oddly, Okin does not discuss the one article where Kukathas does give groups some autonomy; see his "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 69-104. Okin's criticisms are more on target in her discussion of Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, which I briefly discuss below.
19. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680.
20. Ibid., p. 679.
21. Okin has noted the problems that discrimination within the family poses for liberal theory in her earlier work; see her Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic, 1989).
22. Laurie Olsen, Made in America: Immigrant Students in Our Public Schools (New York: New Press, 1997), p. 129.
23. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680.
24. Richard D. Alba, Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988); Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
25. Richard D. Alba, Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988); Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
26. Richard D. Alba, Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988); Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
27. Richard D. Alba, Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), and Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990); Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988); Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
28. I discuss religious conservatives and liberal democracy in my Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
29. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p. 680; Okin's emphasis.
30. Ibid., p. 683.
31. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 89-90. Kymlicka cites Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993);
32. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 89-90. Kymlicka cites Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993);
33. Taylor; and Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination," Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 439-61.
34. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p 679. criticize the self-respect argument in more detail in my "The Universal Pretensions of Cultural Rights Arguments," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (2001), in press.
35. Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," p 679. criticize the self-respect argument in more detail in my "The Universal Pretensions of Cultural Rights Arguments," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (2001), in press.
36. Jennifer Crocker, "Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: Situational Construction of Self-Worth," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35 (1999): 89-107.
37. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law," "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Identity Groups, the State and Individual Rights," in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87-111, and "On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability," Political Theory 28 (2000): 64-89. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal also make this mistake. They want to grant group autonomy to all cultural groups, oppressed or not. Their main example, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, are not an oppressed group but use the group autonomy they have to oppress women - and, as Okin points cut, often men too; see their "Liberalism and the Right to Culture," Social Research 61 (1994): 491-510. Okin's insightful criticisms of their argument can be found in "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 670-74.
38. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law," "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Identity Groups, the State and Individual Rights," in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87-111, and "On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability," Political Theory 28 (2000): 64-89. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal also make this mistake. They want to grant group autonomy to all cultural groups, oppressed or not. Their main example, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, are not an oppressed group but use the group autonomy they have to oppress women - and, as Okin points cut, often men too; see their "Liberalism and the Right to Culture," Social Research 61 (1994): 491-510. Okin's insightful criticisms of their argument can be found in "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 670-74.
39. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law," "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Identity Groups, the State and Individual Rights," in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87-111, and "On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability," Political Theory 28 (2000): 64-89. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal also make this mistake. They want to grant group autonomy to all cultural groups, oppressed or not. Their main example, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, are not an oppressed group but use the group autonomy they have to oppress women - and, as Okin points cut, often men too; see their "Liberalism and the Right to Culture," Social Research 61 (1994): 491-510. Okin's insightful criticisms of their argument can be found in "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 670-74.
40. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law," "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Identity Groups, the State and Individual Rights," in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87-111, and "On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability," Political Theory 28 (2000): 64-89. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal also make this mistake. They want to grant group autonomy to all cultural groups, oppressed or not. Their main example, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, are not an oppressed group but use the group autonomy they have to oppress women - and, as Okin points cut, often men too; see their "Liberalism and the Right to Culture," Social Research 61 (1994): 491-510. Okin's insightful criticisms of their argument can be found in "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 670-74.
41. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, p. 109.
42. Margaret Moore, "Beyond the Cultural Argument for Liberal Nationalism," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (1999): 26-47, p. 40, and, more generally, her The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 56-69.
43. Margaret Moore, "Beyond the Cultural Argument for Liberal Nationalism," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (1999): 26-47, p. 40, and, more generally, her The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 56-69.
44. For accounts of cultural sharing in India, see Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses, and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 33-43.
45. For accounts of cultural sharing in India, see Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses, and Kings: Muslims and Christians in South Indian Society, 1700-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Peter van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 33-43.
46. I discuss the role of oppression in a general framework of group rights in my "Land, Culture and Justice: A Framework for Group Rights and Recognition," Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000): 319-42. It's worth noting that the specter of oppression is ambiguous in Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka clearly wants to give power to groups with a weak cultural structure; that one of his main examples in his writings is indigenous peoples reinforces the impression that group oppression is a factor in who gets group rights. However, Kymlicka grants group rights only to national minorities, whether they are oppressed or not. Oppressed groups which are not national minorities (such as Indian and Israeli Muslims) do not receive strong group rights under Kymlicka's argument. This is clearly highlighted in his book on Canada. There Kymlicka argues for minority rights for both indigenous peoples and the Québécois but devotes considerably more time to the latter. Conversely, I argue here that oppressed groups have the strongest case for group rights. Whether they are a national minority or not should be immaterial to the moral case for rights. Being a national minority may help determine what kind of rights a group can have, not whether or not the group deserves rights. Kymlicka's argument on Canada is found in his Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).
47. I discuss the role of oppression in a general framework of group rights in my "Land, Culture and Justice: A Framework for Group Rights and Recognition," Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000): 319-42. It's worth noting that the specter of oppression is ambiguous in Kymlicka's argument. Kymlicka clearly wants to give power to groups with a weak cultural structure; that one of his main examples in his writings is indigenous peoples reinforces the impression that group oppression is a factor in who gets group rights. However, Kymlicka grants group rights only to national minorities, whether they are oppressed or not. Oppressed groups which are not national minorities (such as Indian and Israeli Muslims) do not receive strong group rights under Kymlicka's argument. This is clearly highlighted in his book on Canada. There Kymlicka argues for minority rights for both indigenous peoples and the Québécois but devotes considerably more time to the latter. Conversely, I argue here that oppressed groups have the strongest case for group rights. Whether they are a national minority or not should be immaterial to the moral case for rights. Being a national minority may help determine what kind of rights a group can have, not whether or not the group deserves rights. Kymlicka's argument on Canada is found in his Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998).
48. On the differences between Hindu and Muslim education and income levels, see Abusaleh Shariff, "Socio-Economic and Demographic Differentials between Hindus and Muslims in India," Economic and Political Weekly 30 (1995): 2947-53.
49. Many rulers and wealthy people in India traditionally built and then endowed temples. Trustees, who often inherited their positions, then used the endowments to run the temples. There is no church hierarchy in Hinduism, and the trustees would often misuse the money earned from the endowments.
50. Donald Eugene Smith, India as a Secular State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 134, 291.
51. Kativa R. Khory, "The Shah Bano Case: Some Political Implications," in Religion and Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), pp. 121-38, p. 126; see also Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 148-53. On Muslim personal law generally, see Tahir Mahmood, Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1986).
52. Kativa R. Khory, "The Shah Bano Case: Some Political Implications," in Religion and Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), pp. 121-38, p. 126; see also Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 148-53. On Muslim personal law generally, see Tahir Mahmood, Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1986).
53. Kativa R. Khory, "The Shah Bano Case: Some Political Implications," in Religion and Law in Independent India, ed. Robert D. Baird (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), pp. 121-38, p. 126; see also Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 148-53. On Muslim personal law generally, see Tahir Mahmood, Personal Laws in Crisis (New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1986).
54. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Democracy and the State (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 103.
55. The new law allows Muslims at the time of marriage to elect to use a secular code to adjudicate disputes between spouses instead of family law, but few Muslim couples choose this option, a point I return to below.
56. Jayal, p. 103.
57. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, p. 105 This statement is hyperbolic not only because Nussbaum understands that issues of identity, not just money, were at stake in the case, but because $18 a month is quite a sun to some Indians.
58. Ibid., p. 109.
59. Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chap. 3.
60. Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994), p. 80. There are many personal laws in Israel: besides Muslim and Jewish laws, there are personal laws for the Druze (an offshoot of Islam), the Bahai, and ten different Christian communities. For the sake of simplicity, I will only discuss Muslims here.
61. Susan Sachs, "Egypt's Women Win Equal Rights to Divorce," New York Times, March 1, 2000.
62. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, p. 109.
63. Susan Moller Okin, "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed. Matthew Howard, Martha Nussbaum, and Joshua Cohen (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 9.
64. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law," pp. 296-303. Shachar discusses the joint governance model in all her writings cited in this article.
65. Ayelet Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar? Women's Rights and the Multicultural Dilemma," in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 199-223, p. 210, "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability," p. 100, and "Group Identity and Women's Rights," pp. 296-97.
66. Ayelet Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar? Women's Rights and the Multicultural Dilemma," in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 199-223, p. 210, "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability," p. 100, and "Group Identity and Women's Rights," pp. 296-97.
67. Ayelet Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar? Women's Rights and the Multicultural Dilemma," in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, ed. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 199-223, p. 210, "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability," p. 100, and "Group Identity and Women's Rights," pp. 296-97.
68. Shachar, "The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Identity Groups, the State and Individual Rights," p. 100.
69. Shachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights," p. 303; Shachar's emphasis.
70. Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar?" p. 220.
71. Will Kymlicka, "An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars: Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev," in Joppke and Lukes, eds., pp. 112-29, p. 118. Here oppression is what moves Kymlicka's argument, but this argument cannot support the group autonomy he argues that other national minorities should have.
72. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
73. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic, 1977), p. 107. Walzer defines what is shocking in a way that is more minimal than I do here.
74. I discuss the right to exit further in my Surviving Diversity, chap. 3.
75. Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Tolerance," in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 345-79, p. 377. Nussbaum too endorses internal reform, saying an effort should be made to "promote liberal Muslim viewpoints and to encourage internal reform of the system of personal law" ( Women and Human Development, p. 230). She has little to say, however, about how this encouragement might take place.
76. Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Tolerance," in Secularism and Its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 345-79, p. 377. Nussbaum too endorses internal reform, saying an effort should be made to "promote liberal Muslim viewpoints and to encourage internal reform of the system of personal law" ( Women and Human Development, p. 230). She has little to say, however, about how this encouragement might take place.
77. While Indian Muslim couples can choose to use secular law and not Muslim personal law to arbitrate disputes, the fact that few couples choose this option shows that this narrow formal right to exit is not enough for at least two reasons. First, the secular law option must be chosen at the time of marriage. A spouse may not want to bring up this option for fear it is a sign of mistrust in the marriage. Since she can't change her mind after the wedding, the exit option is still severely curtailed under current Indian law. Second, the personal laws are a symbol of Muslim identity that many Muslims, including nonbelievers, may not want to relinquish. Eschewing Muslim marriage may even be seen as an act of treachery by other Muslims.
78. Martha Chen, "A Matter of Survival: Women's Rights to Employment in India and Bangladesh," in Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 37-57. Nussbaum often cites Chen in her own work about women in developing countries.
79. Celia W. Dugger, "In India, Lower Caste Women Turn Village Rule Upside Down," New York Times, May 3, 1999; Bidyut Mohanty, "Panchayat Raj Institutions and Women," in From Independence towards Freedom: Indian Women since 1947, ed. Bharati Ray and Aparna Basu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mary Anne Weaver, "Gandhi's Daughters: India's Poorest Women Embark on an Epic Social Experiment," New Yorker, January 10, 2000.
80. Celia W. Dugger, "In India, Lower Caste Women Turn Village Rule Upside Down," New York Times, May 3, 1999; Bidyut Mohanty, "Panchayat Raj Institutions and Women," in From Independence towards Freedom: Indian Women since 1947, ed. Bharati Ray and Aparna Basu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mary Anne Weaver, "Gandhi's Daughters: India's Poorest Women Embark on an Epic Social Experiment," New Yorker, January 10, 2000.
81. Celia W. Dugger, "In India, Lower Caste Women Turn Village Rule Upside Down," New York Times, May 3, 1999; Bidyut Mohanty, "Panchayat Raj Institutions and Women," in From Independence towards Freedom: Indian Women since 1947, ed. Bharati Ray and Aparna Basu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mary Anne Weaver, "Gandhi's Daughters: India's Poorest Women Embark on an Epic Social Experiment," New Yorker, January 10, 2000.
82. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, chap. 3.
83. Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy," in Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), pp. 156-75, p. 171.
84. My discussion here centers on groups with personal law systems.
85. Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar?" p. 210. Nussbaum endorses a uniform civil code and argues that group membership should be voluntary in Sex and Social Justice, pp. 99-100. While Okin does not argue against voluntary membership in religious groups, her views of religion are less generous than Nussbaum's views. See Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 668-69, and "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" pp. 121-23.
86. Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar?" p. 210. Nussbaum endorses a uniform civil code and argues that group membership should be voluntary in Sex and Social Justice, pp. 99-100. While Okin does not argue against voluntary membership in religious groups, her views of religion are less generous than Nussbaum's views. See Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 668-69, and "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" pp. 121-23.
87. Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar?" p. 210. Nussbaum endorses a uniform civil code and argues that group membership should be voluntary in Sex and Social Justice, pp. 99-100. While Okin does not argue against voluntary membership in religious groups, her views of religion are less generous than Nussbaum's views. See Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 668-69, and "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" pp. 121-23.
88. Shachar, "Should Church and State Be Joined at the Altar?" p. 210. Nussbaum endorses a uniform civil code and argues that group membership should be voluntary in Sex and Social Justice, pp. 99-100. While Okin does not argue against voluntary membership in religious groups, her views of religion are less generous than Nussbaum's views. See Okin, "Feminism and Multiculturalism," pp. 668-69, and "Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?" pp. 121-23.
89. The Cyprus option is not an ideal solution, since it is advantageous to those with the resources to travel overseas and makes it much harder to have family and friends at one's wedding. It can also make divorce difficult, since there is no civil divorce in Israel. Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 116-21.