Between-group communication and conflict resolution in assurance and chicken games

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 326-339

  Bornstein, Gary ^a   Gilula, Zohar ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Assurance; Chicken; Communication; Intergroup conflict; Team games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037934450     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002703047003004     Document Type: Review

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