How to interfere with nature

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 135-152

  Michael, Mark A ^a  

^a AUSTIN PEAY STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0037932124     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200123224     Document Type: Review

References (31)

1. "A Defense of the Deep Ecology Movement," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 266. See also Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
2. "A Defense of the Deep Ecology Movement," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 266. See also Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
3. Tom Regan, "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic," Environmental Ethics 3 (1981): 31-32. Regan makes it clear that this principle need not be restricted just to individual living things, since immediately after stating the principle he explains how it might be applied to the Colorado River.
4. The admonition to act naturally, to follow nature, or to allow nature to take its course can be understood as the positive expression of the principle of noninterference and is sometimes offered as an answer to these questions. This is not very helpful, however, since the idea of acting naturally is at least as obscure as the concept of interference. I discuss the idea of naturalness below, pp. 147-53.
5. Richard Sylvan, "A Critique of Deep Ecology: Part II," Radical Philosophy 41 (Fall 1985): 14.
6. Interesting examples of many of these scenarios can be found in Holmes Rolston, III's "Ethical Responsibilities toward Wildlife," Journal of the American Veterinary Medicine Association 200, no. 5 (1992): 618-22. Also see Robert Loftin's "The Medical Treatment of Wild Animals," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 231-39. The Niagara Falls example is suggested by Martin H. Krieger in "What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?" Science 179 (1973): 446-55.
7. Interesting examples of many of these scenarios can be found in Holmes Rolston, III's "Ethical Responsibilities toward Wildlife," Journal of the American Veterinary Medicine Association 200, no. 5 (1992): 618-22. Also see Robert Loftin's "The Medical Treatment of Wild Animals," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 231-39. The Niagara Falls example is suggested by Martin H. Krieger in "What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?" Science 179 (1973): 446-55.
8. Interesting examples of many of these scenarios can be found in Holmes Rolston, III's "Ethical Responsibilities toward Wildlife," Journal of the American Veterinary Medicine Association 200, no. 5 (1992): 618-22. Also see Robert Loftin's "The Medical Treatment of Wild Animals," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 231-39. The Niagara Falls example is suggested by Martin H. Krieger in "What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?" Science 179 (1973): 446-55.
9. Holmes Rolston, III, "Duties to Endangered Species," Bioscience 35, no. 11 (1985): 723.
10. John Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?" Inquiry 20 (1977): 115.
11. Such an analysis can be found in J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
12. For a discussion of some of the moral issues surrounding restoration, see Robert Elliot, "Faking Nature," Inquiry 25 (1982): 81-93; Alistair Gunn "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 291-310; Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 231-41.
13. For a discussion of some of the moral issues surrounding restoration, see Robert Elliot, "Faking Nature," Inquiry 25 (1982): 81-93; Alistair Gunn "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 291-310; Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 231-41.
14. For a discussion of some of the moral issues surrounding restoration, see Robert Elliot, "Faking Nature," Inquiry 25 (1982): 81-93; Alistair Gunn "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 291-310; Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 231-41.
15. A number of writers have made similar points. For example, J. Baird Callicott says, "If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species not essentially different in this respect from all the others, as Snyder reminds us, then the works of man, however precocious, are as natural as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that dramatically modify their habitats," in "Alternative Ideas of Wilderness," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 241. For other examples of this concern, see Richard Watson, "A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): esp. 251-56, and Alistair Gunn's "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," pp. 296-98. For a response see Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. I briefly discuss Rolston's response in n. 17 below.
16. A number of writers have made similar points. For example, J. Baird Callicott says, "If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species not essentially different in this respect from all the others, as Snyder reminds us, then the works of man, however precocious, are as natural as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that dramatically modify their habitats," in "Alternative Ideas of Wilderness," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 241. For other examples of this concern, see Richard Watson, "A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): esp. 251-56, and Alistair Gunn's "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," pp. 296-98. For a response see Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. I briefly discuss Rolston's response in n. 17 below.
17. A number of writers have made similar points. For example, J. Baird Callicott says, "If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species not essentially different in this respect from all the others, as Snyder reminds us, then the works of man, however precocious, are as natural as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that dramatically modify their habitats," in "Alternative Ideas of Wilderness," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 241. For other examples of this concern, see Richard Watson, "A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): esp. 251-56, and Alistair Gunn's "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," pp. 296-98. For a response see Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. I briefly discuss Rolston's response in n. 17 below.
18. A number of writers have made similar points. For example, J. Baird Callicott says, "If man is a natural, a wild, an evolving species not essentially different in this respect from all the others, as Snyder reminds us, then the works of man, however precocious, are as natural as those of beavers, or termites, or any of the other species that dramatically modify their habitats," in "Alternative Ideas of Wilderness," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 241. For other examples of this concern, see Richard Watson, "A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): esp. 251-56, and Alistair Gunn's "The Restoration of Species and Natural Environments," pp. 296-98. For a response see Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991): 370-77. I briefly discuss Rolston's response in n. 17 below.
19. Assuming that the destructive or harmful act is performed by amoral agent. Of course, if it isn't, then while the behavior counts as interference, since it is harmful, it cannot be morally wrong. But that does not affect the point I am making here, that on this account whenever a moral agent interferes it will turn out to be wrong just because of the way in which interference has been characterized.
20. Elliot Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," Philosophy of Science 47 (1980): 350-83. Also see Daniel Simberloff, "A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essentialism to Materialism and Probabilism," Synthese 43 (1980): 3-39.
21. Elliot Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," Philosophy of Science 47 (1980): 350-83. Also see Daniel Simberloff, "A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: Essentialism to Materialism and Probabilism," Synthese 43 (1980): 3-39.
22. Sober, "Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism," p. 374.
23. J. Baird Callicott, "The Value of Ecosystem Health," Environmental Values 4 (1995): 348.
24. Eric Katz, "Artifacts and Functions," in Nature as Subject : Human Obligations and Natural Communities (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. 122. He makes a number of similar points in "The Call of The Wild: The Struggle against Domination and the Technological Fix of Nature," Nature as Subject, especially pp. 114-16.
25. Eric Katz, "Artifacts and Functions," in Nature as Subject : Human Obligations and Natural Communities (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. 122. He makes a number of similar points in "The Call of The Wild: The Struggle against Domination and the Technological Fix of Nature," Nature as Subject, especially pp. 114-16.
26. Ibid., p. 126.
27. In some of his work Holmes Rolston contrasts the natural with the cultural. His distinction appears to be very closely related to Katz's even if it is not identical to it. For example, he says, "But, continuing the analysis, surely the fallacy is to think that a nature allegedly improved by humans is anymore real nature at all. The values intrinsic to wilderness cannot, on pain of both logical and empirical contradiction, be 'improved' by deliberate human management, because deliberation is the antithesis of wildness. . . . On the meaning of 'natural' at issue here, that of nature proceeding by evolutionary and ecological processes, any deliberated human agency, however well-intended, is intention nevertheless and interrupts these spontaneous processes and is inevitably artificial, unnatural." Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991), p. 371. Also see his "Treating Animals Naturally?" Between the Species 5 (Summer 1989): 131-37.
28. In some of his work Holmes Rolston contrasts the natural with the cultural. His distinction appears to be very closely related to Katz's even if it is not identical to it. For example, he says, "But, continuing the analysis, surely the fallacy is to think that a nature allegedly improved by humans is anymore real nature at all. The values intrinsic to wilderness cannot, on pain of both logical and empirical contradiction, be 'improved' by deliberate human management, because deliberation is the antithesis of wildness. . . . On the meaning of 'natural' at issue here, that of nature proceeding by evolutionary and ecological processes, any deliberated human agency, however well-intended, is intention nevertheless and interrupts these spontaneous processes and is inevitably artificial, unnatural." Holmes Rolston, III, "The Wilderness Idea Reaffirmed," The Environmental Professional 13 (1991), p. 371. Also see his "Treating Animals Naturally?" Between the Species 5 (Summer 1989): 131-37.
29. Most arguments against interference focus on the negative effects of interference on either humans or the ecosystem itself. But Katz's line of argument is broadly Kantian rather than utilitarian. See for example, Katz, "Artifacts and Functions," pp. 129-31, and Katz, "The Big Lie," pp. 239-40.
30. Most arguments against interference focus on the negative effects of interference on either humans or the ecosystem itself. But Katz's line of argument is broadly Kantian rather than utilitarian. See for example, Katz, "Artifacts and Functions," pp. 129-31, and Katz, "The Big Lie," pp. 239-40.
31. Katz discusses the domination of nature in the articles cited in n. 18.