Sex offender registration and ommunity notification: Emerging legal and research issues

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

Volumn 989, Issue , 2003, Pages 337-351

  Logan, Wayne A ^a  

^a William Mitchell College of Law   (United States)

Author keywords

Community notification; Megan's laws; Sex offender; Sex offender registration

Indexed keywords

COMMUNITY; CONFERENCE PAPER; COST; CRIMINAL JUSTICE; CRIMINAL LAW; HUMAN; LEGAL ASPECT; REGISTRATION; RESEARCH; SEXUAL CRIME;

EID: 0037899151     PISSN: 00778923     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2003.tb07316.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (106)

1. See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 45 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1998). Roughly a decade earlier, in 1936, Philadelphia required registration of all criminal offenders, not merely sex offenders. See Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 295, 295 (1936-1937). In the ensuing decades the laws were repeatedly challenged; with the exception of Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the claims achieved little success. See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 169 (2000) (discussing Lambert, where the Court invalidated a general criminal registration law on notice grounds, and other court challenges).
2. See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 45 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1998). Roughly a decade earlier, in 1936, Philadelphia required registration of all criminal offenders, not merely sex offenders. See Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 295, 295 (1936-1937). In the ensuing decades the laws were repeatedly challenged; with the exception of Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the claims achieved little success. See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 169 (2000) (discussing Lambert, where the Court invalidated a general criminal registration law on notice grounds, and other court challenges).
3. See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 45 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1998). Roughly a decade earlier, in 1936, Philadelphia required registration of all criminal offenders, not merely sex offenders. See Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 295, 295 (1936-1937). In the ensuing decades the laws were repeatedly challenged; with the exception of Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the claims achieved little success. See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 169 (2000) (discussing Lambert, where the Court invalidated a general criminal registration law on notice grounds, and other court challenges).
4. See generally Samuel J. Brackel & James L. Cavenaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69 (2000).
5. The most prominent of these were the abduction by a masked gunman of 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling in Minnesota, in October1989; the brutal assault of Texas real estate agent Pam Lyncher, in August 1990; and most notably, the rape and murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka by a recidivist sex offender who lived nearby, in July 1994.
6. See The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Act, Pub. L. No.103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §14071 (1994 & Supp. IV. 1998).
7. See The Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (Supp. IV 1998).
8. BRIAN McGoRY, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1.
9. Center for Sexual Offender Management, Community Notification and Education 2 (April 2001).
10. See Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-115, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (d) (1994) (threatening loss of federal law enforcement funds unless states "release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under [the Act]"). See also Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 581-82 (Jan. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Guidelines].
11. See Devon B. Adams, Summary of State Sex Offender Registries, 2001 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 2002).
12. See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 602-19 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1092 (D. Conn. 1996) (stating that the laws seek "to protect the public from devastating crimes. This goal certainly is one within the traditionally broad police powers of the State.").
14. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
15. th Cir. 1997); Akella v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Mich. 1999); People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433 (I11. 2000).
16. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 916 P. 2d 1183 (Az. Ct. App. 1996); In re Registrant J.G., 2001 WL 799557 (N.J. 2001).
17. See, e.g., Miller v. Taft, 151 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ohio W. Div. 2001).
18. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
19. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1210 (1999) (citing cases). The courts have also rejected due process challenges to laws making it a felony to violate registration requirements, on the rationale that the heavy penalty is rationally related to the important goals and purposes of registration. See, e.g., People v. Marsh, 768 N.E.2d 108 (I11. Ct. App. 2002).
20. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1210 (1999) (citing cases). The courts have also rejected due process challenges to laws making it a felony to violate registration requirements, on the rationale that the heavy penalty is rationally related to the important goals and purposes of registration. See, e.g., People v. Marsh, 768 N.E.2d 108 (I11. Ct. App. 2002).
21. 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003).
22. th Cir,. 1997) (denying claim); E.B .v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (granting claim); Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2001) (granting claim); Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (granting claim); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001) (denying claim); Noble v. Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P. 2d 990 (Or. 1998) (granting claim).; State v. Bani, 36 P. 3d 1255 (Haw. 2001) (granting claim).
23. 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
24. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
25. Doe, 271 F.3d at 49.
26. Id. at 57.
27. Ibid. Id.
28. Doe, 123 S. Ct. at 1164.
29. Ibid. Id.
30. Ibid. Id.
31. I b i d. Id.
32. Ibid. Id.
33. Ibid. Id.
34. The Court's appoach, while unfortunate, is not unprecedented. See Lanni v. Engler, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Patterson v. State, 985 P. 2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999); People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Wilkinson, 9 P. 3d 1 (Kan. 2000).
35. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 2, Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003). In addition, as of October 2002, pursuant to the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act of 2000, all U.S. jurisdictioons are required to use a similar compulsory approach with respect to eligible sex offenders on college campuses. Id.
36. However, this immediate cost impact might yield longer-term dividends insofar as individualized assessments might decrease the overall number of persons targeted by the laws, lessening adninistrative costs proportionately. This should be of particular concern in those jurisdictions that employ "active" (as opposed to "passive") notification methods. Costs aside, moreover, there is reason to believe that targeting the laws with greater selectivity will maximize the chance that the community will remain alert to risk. See In Re Registrant E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1997) ("[I]f Megan's Law is applied literally and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial purpose of this law will be impeded.") Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J. concurring) "[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless.").
37. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney General, 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 n.8 (Mass. 1997) (finding liberty interest under Massachusetts Constitution); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995) (finding liberty interest under New Jersey Constitution).
38. Doe, 123 S. Ct. at 1166 (Souter, J., concurring).
39. See, generally, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §§ 9.1.1-9.1.2, at 643-48 (2d ed. 2002).
40. Id. §§10.1.1-10.1.2, at 762-66. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4, at 423-24 (6th ed. 2000).
41. See supra notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Cutshall V. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999); Artway V. Att'y Gen., 81 F. 3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001).
43. See, e.g., State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (invalidating law because it permitted adult but not juvenile registrants to return to a home where a minor resides); People v. Felarca, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1999) (invalidating required registration of person convicted of oral copulation with a minor but not those convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor).
44. See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348 (1998) (concluding based on meta-analysis of 61 follow-up studies that only 13% of subjects committed new sex offenses within 4-5 year follow-up period).
45. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §775.21 (3) (a) (2002) (§Sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and repeat their offenses ..."); Tenn. Code Ann. sect. 40-39-101 (b) (1) (2002) ("sexual offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses after release ... and protection of the public from these offenders is a paramount public interest.").
46. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F. 3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that home addresses of registrants are entitled to some privacy protection but intrusion outweighed by purported public saftey benefits of notification); Doe. v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (holding that assembled information disseminated implicates privacy interest but that purported benefits of notification outweighed interest).
47. Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P. 2d 779 (Az. Ct. App. 1999).
48. Kelly v. State, 795 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).
49. Hyatt v. Comm., 72 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. 2002).
50. State v. Thompson, 752 N.E.2d 276 (Ohio 2001).
51. 36 P.3d 1255, 1261 n.4 (2001) (citing Haw. Stat. §
52. I b i d. Id.
53. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20-20.1 (2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 944-606(2) (West 2002); Okla. Stat. Ann, tit. 57, § 581(b) (West Supp. 2002). According to the Florida Legislature, Florida courts have a "duty" to uphold the laws, and that any contrary judicial action "unlawfully encroaches on the Legislature's exclusive power to make laws and places at risk significant public interests of the state." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.24(1) (West 2002).
54. See, e.g., note 34 and accompanying text.
55. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
56. See, e.g., State v. Thibodeaux, 680 So. 2d 50 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (because defendant not convicted of enumerated offense, registration not required); State v. McPherson, 758 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (same).
57. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9795.2(b)(1) (2002) (requiring registration if conviction elsewhere constitutes an "equivalent offense" for which registration is required under Pennsylvania law).
58. In re Nadel, 724 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). See also Radney v. State, 840 So. 2d 190 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (denying required registration because defendant convicted of federal not state offense; Alabama law required that conviction occur in state or municipal court); Graves v. State, 772 A.2d 1225 (Md. 2001) (denying use of nonstate conviction in "sexually violent predator" classification because state law did not expressly permit consideration of such convictions).
59. See generally Michael L. Skoglund, Note, Private Threats, Public Stigma? Avoiding False Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the Juvenile Justice System, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1805 (2000). For an overview of the varied approaches taken by states, see In re J.G., 2001 WL 799557 (N.J. 2001).
60. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 290(a)(2)(E) (West 2002) (crimes committed "as a result of sexual compulsion or for the purpose of sexual gratification"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-254(a) (2002) (crimes "committed for a sexual purpose.").
61. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4902(c)(14) (2001).
62. 963 P.2d 436 (Kan. 1998).
63. Id. at 440. See also, e.g., People v. Meidinger, 987 P. 2d 937 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding registration of offender who pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a nonenumerated offense, because of the "underlying circumstances of the offense."); Sequeira v. State, 534 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (invalidating registration because law did not specify that it could be based on "conduct underlying a criminal conviction," even if conduct was sexual in nature); State v. Halstien, 857 P.2d 270 (Wash. 1993) (upholding registration of a paperboy who broke into home and stole a box of condoms and vibrator sex toy); Andrews v. State 40 P. 3d 708 (Wyo. 2002) (invalidating registration for burglary involving women's clothing because not an enumerated offense).
64. Donna D. Schram & Cheryl D. Milloy, Community Notification: A Study of Offender Characteristics and Recidivism 3 (1995).
65. Geneva Adkins et al., The Iowa Sex. Offender Registry and Recidivism (2000).
66. Of note, in Washington, the authors found that among juvenile registrants, as to which there was no comparative cohort, the recidivism rate was very high (79%). See Schram & Milloy, supra note 61, at 19.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 19. Work recently done in Britain suggests that registrant information is used by police to intervene in and prevent potential criminal activity in high-risk situations, yet that it enjoys only limited use in investigations and prosecutions. See Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, Where are They Now?: An Evaluation of Sex Offender Registration in England and Wales, Police Research Series Paper 126, at 41-42 (2000).
69. In the Washington study, for instance, only 14% of registrants in the State's highest risk category were arrested for new sexual offenses. Schram & Milloy, supra note 61, at 3.
70. See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 62-63 (1954) (identifying the rearrest of those who failed to comply with registration requirements as a "principal" objective of circa 1950s registration laws).
71. See David Chanen, A Decade Later, It's Imperfect, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 10, 2001, at A1 (noting that in Illinois 3000 of 16,200 sex offenders were returned to prison for registration violations).
72. ANTHONY J. PETROSINO & CAROLYN PETROSINO, The Public Safety Potential of Megan's Law in Massachusetts: An Assessment From a Sample of Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 140 (1999). The study's authors hastened to add a caveat: "It is important to note that even if a potential victim was notified and took preventive steps, it does not mean that the specific offender would have stopped committing offenses. The crime or crimes might simply have been displaced toward other more vulnerable targets." Id. at 152.
73. See Lawrence Greenfield, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1997) (reporting that 90% of sexual assault victims knew their assailants).
74. This is especially so with respect to intrafamilial victimizations where notification of the wider community has dubious educational value, in the absence of an established likelihood of future victimizations of nonfamily members, and might actually prove counterproductive. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Grant T. Harris et al., Appraisal and Management of Risk in Sexual Aggressors: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 4 J. PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 73 (1998).
76. See, e.g., Nathaniel J. Pallone, Identifying Pedophiles "Eligible" for Community Notification Under Megan's Law: A Multivariate Model for Actuarially Anchored Decisions, 28 J. OF OFF. REHAB. 41 (1998).
77. So too must work be done to ensure that the laws are being applied consistently within jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Walker & Gwen Ervin-McLarty, Sex Offenders in Arkansas: Characteristics of Offenders and Enforcement of Sex Offender Laws (Ark. Crime Information Center 1999) (noting "alarming" discrepancies among local approaches to assessing registrants' risk for purposes of notification).
78. This is especially so with respect to the thousands of registrants who are not under parole or probation supervision; for them, authorities must rely solely on the good faith of registrants and any compliance mechanism used. Moreover, experience has shown that registry inaccuracies can result in stigmatization and harassment of persons wrongly thought to be registrants. With the increasing use of the Internet, and its greater capacity for mass communication, the accuracy and completeness of registration becomes all the more important.
79. See, e.g., Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Sex Offenses in Washington State: An Update 40 (1998) (reporting compliance rate of 84%). Cf. Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, Where are They Now?: An Evaluation of Sex Offender Registration in England and Wales, Police Research Series Paper 126, 6-7 (2000) (reporting a compliance rate of 94.7%, but noting that the rate is "misleading").
80. See, e.g., Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Sex Offenses in Washington State: An Update 40 (1998) (reporting compliance rate of 84%). Cf. Joyce Plotnikoff & Richard Woolfson, Where are They Now?: An Evaluation of Sex Offender Registration in England and Wales, Police Research Series Paper 126, 6-7 (2000) (reporting a compliance rate of 94.7%, but noting that the rate is "misleading").
81. See, e.g., Karl J. Karlson, Study Finds Many Sex Offenders Not Properly Registered, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 2, 1998, at 1B (reporting that 70% of registrants were not living at their reported address).
82. See Lawrence Sussman, Sex Offender List Leaves Some Out; Out-of-State Man's Visit to Sheriff's Office Sparks Awareness in Grafton, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1A
83. See Peter Finn, Sex Offender Community Notification 12 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1997) (discussing impact in Washington and New Jersey).
84. Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Notification: Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & THE LAW 375, 381-84 (2000).
85. Id. at 387.
86. Id. at 387-88. Housing difficulties experienced by registrants, in particular, can have major collateral consequences, insofar as they serve to concentrate offenders in particular locales, possibly further impeding community reintegration. See Kevin Blocker, High-Risk Offenders Housed in Hotels, Motels, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), March 2, 2002 (noting that 40 of 53 of one apartment building's residents were registrants, with 13 of them classified as highest risk offenders). Moreover, by forcing registrants into transience it becomes more difficult to ensure compliance with registration requirements.
87. See, e.g., Candace Kruttschnitt et al., Predictors of Desistance Among Sex Offenders: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Social Controls, 17 JUSTICE QTLY. 61 (2000).
88. Zevitz & Farkas, supra note 80, at 389.
89. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 361 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1998).
90. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 361 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1998).
91. For a recent study of the role of community meetings, see Richard G. Zevitz & Marry Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Examining the Importance of Neighborhood Meetings, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 393 (2000).
92. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 351 (2001) (citing conflicting news accounts based on interviews with neighbors).
93. See, e.g., David Chanen, An Unwelcome Mat for Sex Offenders, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 13, 1999, at 1B (noting same); Mary H. Gottfried, Sex Offenders Live in Poorer Areas, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Mar. 8, 2002, at A1 (same).
94. See, e.g., David Chanen, An Unwelcome Mat for Sex Offenders, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 13, 1999, at 1B (noting same); Mary H. Gottfried, Sex Offenders Live in Poorer Areas, PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Mar. 8, 2002, at A1 (same).
95. See, e.g., Nat'l Criminal Justice Assoc., Policy Report, Sex Offender Community Notification 29 (Oct. 1997) (citing experiences in Louisiana where teen-age girls were molested by their stepfathers but were "fearful of being identified when their step-father's picture is published in the local newspaper.").
96. See, e.g., Kathleen Ingley, A Fearful Eye: Keeping Watch on the Valley's Sex Offenders; Monitoring Procedures Get Tougher, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 2, 1999, at A1; Kay Lazar, States Lack Money, Manpower to Do the Job, BOSTON HERALD, July 19, 1998, at 9.
97. See, e.g., Kathleen Ingley, A Fearful Eye: Keeping Watch on the Valley's Sex Offenders; Monitoring Procedures Get Tougher, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 2, 1999, at A1; Kay Lazar, States Lack Money, Manpower to Do the Job, BOSTON HERALD, July 19, 1998, at 9.
98. See Logan, supra, note 1, at 200-01 (discussing innovations such as "Megan's Mapper); Ronnie L. Paynter, Getting the Word Out, 26 LAW ENF. TECH. 76 (June 1999) (describing notification technologies).
99. See, e.g., Denise M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing Debate over Megan's Law; Some Question Whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at 2; Dave Morantz, Sex Offenders' Risk Often Slow to Be Assessed, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 28, 2001, at 1A.
100. See, e.g., Denise M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing Debate over Megan's Law; Some Question Whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at 2; Dave Morantz, Sex Offenders' Risk Often Slow to Be Assessed, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 28, 2001, at 1A.
101. See Cong. Rec. H4456, May 7, 1996 (remarks of Rep. Melvin Watt) (noting that while unfunded mandates have become politically unpopular, "in this area, somehow or another we cannot seem to justify allowing states to make their own decisions...All of a sudden, the Big Brother Government must direct the States to do something that is not even necessarily a Federal issue.").
102. See, e.g., News Service, Compliance Money Sought, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at B3 (reporting effort by county to obtain reimbursement from state for money spent as a result of state-mandated registration compliance measures).
103. See, e.g., Alison Bass, Suspects Battle to Stay Off Sex Offender Registry, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1999, at A1.
104. See H.J. Cummings, Courts Shield Young Sex Offenders; Judges Keeping Some Juveniles Off Registry, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneaspolis-St. Paul), Oct. 6, 2002, at 1A.
105. See LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT AND POPULISM 177-188 (1998); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 1111 (2000).
106. See LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT AND POPULISM 177-188 (1998); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 1111 (2000). 352-354