Pragmatism in bioethics: Been there, done that

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 29-57

  Arras, John D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; ARTICLE; BIOETHICS; BIOETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; ETHICS; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; TECHNIQUE; UNITED STATES;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; BIOETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

BIOETHICS; DEMOCRACY; ETHICAL ANALYSIS; METHODS; PHILOSOPHY; PRINCIPLE-BASED ETHICS; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0037852111     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0265052502192028     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, eds. 1-5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001).
2. Beauchamp is a professor of philosophy at Georgetown University, and Childress taught there during the 1970s while they were working on the first edition of their book.
3. Casuistry in bioethics has been championed by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin as an alternative methodology to principlism, one that supposedly works from the "bottom up" by means of analogical case analyses-much like the common law-rather than "top down" by means of moral theories and theoretically derived principles. See Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See also John Arras, "Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, " Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1991): 29-51.
4. Casuistry in bioethics has been championed by Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin as an alternative methodology to principlism, one that supposedly works from the "bottom up" by means of analogical case analyses-much like the common law-rather than "top down" by means of moral theories and theoretically derived principles. See Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See also John Arras, "Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, " Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1991): 29-51.
5. Narrative ethics, like casuistry, gives pride of place to the particularities of persons and social contexts as these are articulated within personal narratives. The emphasis here is on the trajectory of the "patient's story" rather than on the abstractions of theory and principles. See John Arras, "Nice Story, But So What?: Narrative and Justification in Ethics, " in Hilde Lindemann Nelson, ed., Stories and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics (New York: Routledge, 1997).
6. Feminist criticism in bioethics has focused primarily on gender-related power imbalances in the health-care system. As contributors to the debate over method in bioethics, feminist critics of principlism have lamented the latter's alleged overemphasis on abstract principle and neglect of personal relations, the emotions, and power in the analysis of moral problems. Many feminists are also moral particularists, and thus have much in common with casuists and narrativists. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, ed., Feminism and Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992).
7. Feminist criticism in bioethics has focused primarily on gender-related power imbalances in the health-care system. As contributors to the debate over method in bioethics, feminist critics of principlism have lamented the latter's alleged overemphasis on abstract principle and neglect of personal relations, the emotions, and power in the analysis of moral problems. Many feminists are also moral particularists, and thus have much in common with casuists and narrativists. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, ed., Feminism and Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992).
8. In addition to the present essay, see John D. Arras, "Rorty's Pragmatism and Bioethics" (forthcoming); and John D. Arras, "Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics, " Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22, no. 2 (2001): 69-85.
9. In addition to the present essay, see John D. Arras, "Rorty's Pragmatism and Bioethics" (forthcoming); and John D. Arras, "Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics, " Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22, no. 2 (2001): 69-85.
10. Susan Wolf, "Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism, " American Journal of Law and Medicine 20, no. 4 (1994): 395-415.
11. See Morris Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
12. Franklin Miller, Joseph Fins, and Matthew Bacchetta, "Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey and Clinical Ethics, " Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 27-51.
13. Glenn McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999).
14. Jonathan Moreno, Deciding Together: Bioethics and Moral Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
15. As Rorty puts it: "It was as if pragmatism had been crushed between [Paul] Tillich and [Rudolph] Carnap, the upper and the nether millstones." See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism without Method, " in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:64. The collapse and recent rebirth of Dewey's influence in the United States is nicely chronicled in Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 350-71.
16. As Rorty puts it: "It was as if pragmatism had been crushed between [Paul] Tillich and [Rudolph] Carnap, the upper and the nether millstones." See Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism without Method, " in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1:64. The collapse and recent rebirth of Dewey's influence in the United States is nicely chronicled in Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 350-71.
17. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
18. Rorty's many other publications include: The Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers.
19. Rorty's many other publications include: The Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers.
20. Rorty's many other publications include: The Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers.
21. For an alternative view that underscores the continuities between "old" and "new" pragmatisms, see Richard Bernstein, "American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives, " in Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., ed., Rorty and Pragmatism (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press), 54-67.
22. Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms, " and Other Essays (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
23. An early example of the charge that pragmatism subordinates values to "getting results" can be found in Lewis Mumford's attacks on Dewey. See Lewis Mumford, "The Pragmatic Acquiescence, " in Gail Kennedy, ed., Pragmatism and American Culture (Boston, MA: Heath, 1950). Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin characterizes pragmatism as unprincipled and insouciant about individual rights. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). For bioethical examples, see Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Alta Charo, "Principles and Pragmatism, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6, no. 3 (1996): 321.
24. An early example of the charge that pragmatism subordinates values to "getting results" can be found in Lewis Mumford's attacks on Dewey. See Lewis Mumford, "The Pragmatic Acquiescence, " in Gail Kennedy, ed., Pragmatism and American Culture (Boston, MA: Heath, 1950). Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin characterizes pragmatism as unprincipled and insouciant about individual rights. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). For bioethical examples, see Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Alta Charo, "Principles and Pragmatism, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6, no. 3 (1996): 321.
25. An early example of the charge that pragmatism subordinates values to "getting results" can be found in Lewis Mumford's attacks on Dewey. See Lewis Mumford, "The Pragmatic Acquiescence, " in Gail Kennedy, ed., Pragmatism and American Culture (Boston, MA: Heath, 1950). Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin characterizes pragmatism as unprincipled and insouciant about individual rights. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). For bioethical examples, see Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Alta Charo, "Principles and Pragmatism, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6, no. 3 (1996): 321.
26. An early example of the charge that pragmatism subordinates values to "getting results" can be found in Lewis Mumford's attacks on Dewey. See Lewis Mumford, "The Pragmatic Acquiescence, " in Gail Kennedy, ed., Pragmatism and American Culture (Boston, MA: Heath, 1950). Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin characterizes pragmatism as unprincipled and insouciant about individual rights. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). For bioethical examples, see Leon Kass, Toward a More Natural Science (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Alta Charo, "Principles and Pragmatism, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6, no. 3 (1996): 321.
27. See Russell B. Goodman, ed., Pragmatism: A Contemporary Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995).
28. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, "Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, " in Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 254-74; and Richard A. Posner, "Pragmatic Adjudication, " in Dickstem, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 235-53.
29. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, "Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, " in Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 254-74; and Richard A. Posner, "Pragmatic Adjudication, " in Dickstem, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 235-53.
30. See Arras, "Freestanding Pragmatism."
31. John Dewey, "Nature in Experience, " in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Later Works, 1925-1953 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-1997), 14:150, cited in James T. Kloppenberg, "An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?" in Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 105.
32. John Dewey, "Nature in Experience, " in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Later Works, 1925-1953 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-1997), 14:150, cited in James T. Kloppenberg, "An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?" in Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 105.
33. William James, "Pragmatism: What Pragmatism Means, " in Goodman, ed., Pragmatism, 60.
34. Many of these points are nicely summed up by James in ibid., 55-56: A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction., from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.
35. Martin Benjamin, "Pragmatism and the Determination of Death, " in McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 191.
36. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Middle Works, 1899-1924 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 12:94.
37. Jennifer Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 193.
38. Ibid., 8.
39. This contrast is nicely drawn in Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and Law, " in Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 310.
40. Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes (New York: United Hospital Fund of New York, 1994); Moreno, Deciding Together.
41. Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes (New York: United Hospital Fund of New York, 1994); Moreno, Deciding Together.
42. This collaborative and democratic model of contemporary bioethical practice contrasts sharply with H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.'s characterization of bioethicists as moral experts and secular priests. See, in this volume, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "The Ordination of Bioethicists as Secular Moral Experts." Although Engelhardt tells a plausible story here about the rise of contemporary bioethics to public prominence against the backdrop of our society's loss of faith in technocratic expertise and the public pronouncements of church leaders, his account of the social function of bioethicists is based upon highly selective evidence and, thus, bears little resemblance to the everyday reality of most bioethicists.
43. See Glenn McGee, "Pragmatic Method and Bioethics, " in McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 19: "John Dewey produced perhaps the clearest account of how pragmatism can revolutionize bioethics in his book about method, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry."
44. See Glenn McGee, "Pragmatic Method and Bioethics, " in McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 19: "John Dewey produced perhaps the clearest account of how pragmatism can revolutionize bioethics in his book about method, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry."
45. Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought, 68.
46. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: Heath, 1910), 72, quoted in Miller et al., "Clinical Pragmatism, " 33.
47. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: Heath, 1910), 72, quoted in Miller et al., "Clinical Pragmatism, " 33.
48. See, e.g., Alfred F. Connors et al., "A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), " Journal of the American Medical Association 274, no. 20 (1995): 1591ff.
49. An analogous case of principlism failing to exploit its own latent resources has come to light through the feminist critique of bioethics. Although the principle of justice could, in theory, have provided principlists with ample resources with which to reveal and criticize various forms of gender-based inequities in medicine and research, it was not until the advent of the feminist critique that principlists began noticing the existence of a problem.
50. Wolf, "Shifting Paradigms, " 403ff.
51. Typical examples of such empirical studies include the SUPPORT project (see note 34); Betty Wolder Levin et al., "The Treatment of Non-HIV-Related Conditions in Newborns at Risk for HIV: A Survey of Neonatologists, " American Journal of Public Health 85, no. 11 (1995): 1507-13; Susan E. Kelly et al., "Understanding the Practice of Ethics Consultation: Results of an Ethnographic Multi-Site Study, " Journal of Clinical Ethics 8, no. 2 (1997): 136-49; and Leslie J. Blackhall et al., "Ethnicity and Attitudes towards Life Sustaining Technology, " Social Science and Medicine 48, no. 12 (1999): 1779-89.
52. Typical examples of such empirical studies include the SUPPORT project (see note 34); Betty Wolder Levin et al., "The Treatment of Non-HIV-Related Conditions in Newborns at Risk for HIV: A Survey of Neonatologists, " American Journal of Public Health 85, no. 11 (1995): 1507-13; Susan E. Kelly et al., "Understanding the Practice of Ethics Consultation: Results of an Ethnographic Multi-Site Study, " Journal of Clinical Ethics 8, no. 2 (1997): 136-49; and Leslie J. Blackhall et al., "Ethnicity and Attitudes towards Life Sustaining Technology, " Social Science and Medicine 48, no. 12 (1999): 1779-89.
53. Typical examples of such empirical studies include the SUPPORT project (see note 34); Betty Wolder Levin et al., "The Treatment of Non-HIV-Related Conditions in Newborns at Risk for HIV: A Survey of Neonatologists, " American Journal of Public Health 85, no. 11 (1995): 1507-13; Susan E. Kelly et al., "Understanding the Practice of Ethics Consultation: Results of an Ethnographic Multi-Site Study, " Journal of Clinical Ethics 8, no. 2 (1997): 136-49; and Leslie J. Blackhall et al., "Ethnicity and Attitudes towards Life Sustaining Technology, " Social Science and Medicine 48, no. 12 (1999): 1779-89.
54. Dewey's emphasis on understanding the social context of moral problems thus meshes nicely with Allen Buchanan's call, in this volume, for the development of a "Social Moral Epistemology."
55. Dewey's rejection of the kind of objectivity demanded by the spectator view did not lead him to reject any and all conceptions of moral objectivity. Rather, he sought objectivity in our capacity to resolve conflicts and achieve agreement on shared values. Dewey would have thus fully concurred with Hilary Putnam's dictum: "[A]ccess to a common reality does not require access to something preconceptual. It requires, rather, that we be able to form shared concepts." See Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism: An Open Question (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995), 21. I thank Frances Kamm for requesting clarification of this point.
56. For more on the Ayala case, see "Two Having a Baby to Save Daughter, " New York Times, February 17, 1990, 10.
57. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 1932), 304. See also John Dewey, "Logical Method and Law, " Cornell Law Quarterly 10 (1925): 22 ("[G]eneral principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has been found helpful to treat concrete cases").
58. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt, 1932), 304. See also John Dewey, "Logical Method and Law, " Cornell Law Quarterly 10 (1925): 22 ("[G]eneral principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has been found helpful to treat concrete cases").
59. Bernard Gert et al. charge that Beauchamp and Childress's principles function as mere "chapter headings"-i.e., as categories of important values to consider as we make moral choices-as opposed to precise, action-guiding rules of conduct. See Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Interestingly, Dewey would side with Beauchamp and Childress in this debate, challenging the belittling qualifier "mere." Thus, even though contemporary pragmatists have opposed much in the method of principlism, the latter's principal exponents agree with Dewey that principles are initially framed at such a level of generality that they cannot be definitively action-guiding in the absence of additional specification, balancing, and good judgment.
60. Note in this connection Moreno's claim that within a naturalistic or pragmatist approach to ethics, facts tend to overwhelm theory. See Jonathan Moreno, "Bioethics Is a Naturalism, " in McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 13.
61. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1957), 221.
62. See Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 313; and Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 221.
63. See Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 313; and Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 221.
64. For an instructive account of this episode in moral history, see Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry.
65. Miller et al., "Clinical Pragmatism, " 142.
66. According to Rawls, principles are developed both to systematize our firmest intuitions about particular propositions and to extend our judgments in less clear cases. Importantly, however, he observes that principles can also be revised or rejected on the basis of particularly firm moral intuitions. The goal of moral reflection, he claims, is to continually adjust our principles, our firmest intuitions, and our background theories of persons and society until they harmonize in "reflective equilibrium." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 20-22.
67. This is not to say that everyone operating within the field of bioethics always employs principles in this flexible way. Secular thinkers of a more traditional bent, such as Leon Kass, or conservative Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, are far from embracing pragmatist modes of moral thought. See, e.g., Kass, Toward a More Natural Science; John J. O'Connor, "Abortion: Questions and Answers, " Human Life Review 16, no. 3 (1990): 65-96; Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); and David Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas: A Jewish Perspective (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1998).
68. This is not to say that everyone operating within the field of bioethics always employs principles in this flexible way. Secular thinkers of a more traditional bent, such as Leon Kass, or conservative Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, are far from embracing pragmatist modes of moral thought. See, e.g., Kass, Toward a More Natural Science; John J. O'Connor, "Abortion: Questions and Answers, " Human Life Review 16, no. 3 (1990): 65-96; Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); and David Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas: A Jewish Perspective (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1998).
69. This is not to say that everyone operating within the field of bioethics always employs principles in this flexible way. Secular thinkers of a more traditional bent, such as Leon Kass, or conservative Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, are far from embracing pragmatist modes of moral thought. See, e.g., Kass, Toward a More Natural Science; John J. O'Connor, "Abortion: Questions and Answers, " Human Life Review 16, no. 3 (1990): 65-96; Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); and David Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas: A Jewish Perspective (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1998).
70. This is not to say that everyone operating within the field of bioethics always employs principles in this flexible way. Secular thinkers of a more traditional bent, such as Leon Kass, or conservative Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, are far from embracing pragmatist modes of moral thought. See, e.g., Kass, Toward a More Natural Science; John J. O'Connor, "Abortion: Questions and Answers, " Human Life Review 16, no. 3 (1990): 65-96; Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); and David Bleich, Bioethical Dilemmas: A Jewish Perspective (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 1998).
71. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting link between pragmatism and a theory of practical reasoning in bioethics is to be found not in the writings of Dewey, but rather in the "pragmatic" writings of post-World War II Harvard philosophers W. V. O. Quine and John Rawls. Quine conceived of human knowledge as a "web of belief, " while Rawls eschewed foundationalism in moral theory in favor of reflective equilibrium. I thank Christopher Morris for this observation. See W. V. O. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1978). I would emphasize, however, that acknowledging such a connection between contemporary versions of pragmatism and current methods of bioethics does not advance the claim under discussion-namely, that we need to develop a pragmatist bioethics in order to improve the way we currently do ethics.
72. Lynn A. Jansen pursues this line of criticism in her helpful essay, "Assessing Clinical Pragmatism, " Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 8, no. 1 (1998): 23-36.
73. Miller et al., "Clinical Pragmatism, " 130.
74. Joseph Fins, Matthew Bacchetta, and Franklin Miller, "Clinical Pragmatism: A Model for Problem Solving, " in McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 30.
75. Jansen, "Assessing Clinical Pragmatism, " 27.
76. Although Dewey rejected traditional metaphysics, especially its attempt to ground human knowledge and behavior in an absolute, unchanging realm of being, he did develop a rival metaphysics of human nature based instead on our thoroughly contingent biological, social, and historical existence. See Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct.
77. Welchman, Dewey's Ethical Thought, 162.
78. Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: New American Library, 1974).
79. John Dewey, Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 431, quoted in Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 59.
80. John Dewey, Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 431, quoted in Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 59.
81. Festenstein's example; see Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, 61.
82. Plato, The Republic, 473c-489a.
83. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1927), 202-9.
84. See Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, 81.
85. Ibid., 8.
86. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 208.
87. Hilary Putnam, "A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, " reprinted in Goodman, ed., Pragmatism, 184-204.
88. To squeeze Putnam into our grid of old versus new pragmatists, it would perhaps be best to label him a "new old pragmatist" - new, because he is our contemporary, and old, because unlike Rorty he is trying to forge a philosophical argument for the justification of democracy that Dewey himself could have endorsed.
89. Fins et al., "Clinical Pragmatism, " 43.
90. See James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). It should be noted, however, that much of the current literature concerning the theory of deliberative democracy seems to owe a lot more to the influence of John Rawls's later work than it does to Dewey, whom it rarely mentions. See Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, " reprinted in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129-80.
91. See James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). It should be noted, however, that much of the current literature concerning the theory of deliberative democracy seems to owe a lot more to the influence of John Rawls's later work than it does to Dewey, whom it rarely mentions. See Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, " reprinted in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129-80.
92. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
93. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
94. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
95. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
96. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
97. See, e.g., Moreno, Deciding Together; Susan Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care, " Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858; Susan Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process, " Law, Medicine, and Health Care 20, no. 4 (1992): 278-90; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990); Ruth Ellen Bulger et al., eds., Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995); and Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus, Mediating Bioethical Disputes.
98. Evidence for this hypothesis can be found on the back cover of my edition of Dewey's The Public and Its Problems, which features a blurb from The Whole Earth Catalogue: "[I]n this book, the dazzlement [?] [of Dewey's ideas] is fully let loose in a series of far-out proposals for experimenting with altered life styles!" Far out, indeed.