Implications of the Bosman ruling for football transfer markets

Economic Affairs

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 13-18

  Simmons, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037812277     PISSN: 02650665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0270.00036     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. The Times 20 and 21 September 1995.
2. The Times 20 September 1995.
3. M. Illsdon (1997) 'The Bosman Ruling', Goal, January, pp. 44-47.
4. See G. Boon (1996) Deloitte and Touche Annual Review of Football Finance 1996, Manchester: Deloitte and Touche,
5. and S. Dobson and W. Gerrard (1997) 'Testing for Rent-Sharing in Football Transfer Fees: Evidence from the English Football League', Leeds University Business School Discussion Paper E97/03. English Leagues denotes English and Welsh clubs in the FA Premiership and Football League. UEFA and FIFA treat England and Wales as a separate area autonomous from Scotland or Northern Ireland for the purposes of their regulations.
6. J. Harding (1991) For the Good of the Game: The Official History of the Professional Footballers' Association, London: Robson Books.
7. A. Mason (1989) Sport in Britain: A Social History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. P. Sloane (1980) Sport in the Market?, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
9. A. Sanderson and J. Siegfried (1997) 'The Implications of Athlete Freedom to Contract: Lessons from North America', this volume.
10. A. Pigou (1912) Wealth and Welfare, London: Macmillan.
11. G. Becker (1975) Human Capital 2nd edn., New York: Columbia University Press.
12. Under-provision of training caused by the poaching externality is currently mitigated by government-funded youth training schemes. See G. Stewart and J. Sutherland (1996) 'The Trainee System in Professional Football in England and Wales', Education and Training, 24-29.
13. J. Harding, Education and Training, op. cit.
14. D. Thomas (1996) 'Recent Developments in Sporting Labour Markets: Free Agency and New Slavery?'. The Review of Policy Issues, 19-28.
15. A. Speight and D. Thomas (1997) 'Arbitration and Transfer Markets', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 198-215.
16. Court of Justice of the European Communities, Reports of Cases before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, Section I, Court of Justice, 1995-12, Case C-415/93, pp. 4,921-5,082.
17. In France, transfer fees are set, solely as compensation for costs of training, corresponding to the player's gross income in the preceding two years, assuming that training has lasted for more than three seasons.
18. The Independent, 17 January 1997.
19. The players concerned are G. Hagi (Romania) who moved from Barcelona to Galatasaray and G. Vlaovic (Croatia) who moved from Padua to Valencia.
20. P. Sloane (1969) 'The Labour Market in Professional Football', British Journal of Industrial Relations, 181-199.
21. F. Carmichael, D. Forrest and R. Simmons (1997) 'The Labour Market in Association Football: Who Gets Transferred and for How Much', University of Salford, mimeo.
22. S. Szymanski and R. Smith (1997) 'The English Football Industry: Profit, Performance and Industrial Structure', International Review of Applied Economics, 135-154.
23. J. Harding, International Review of Applied Economics, op. cit.
24. G. Boon, International Review of Applied Economics, op. cit.
25. G. Boon, International Review of Applied Economics, op. cit.
26. In North America, where individual contributions to many team sports are easier to measure and where confidentiality is less of a problem, some evidence shows that movement towards free agency is associated with increased inequality of players' earnings. See P. Porter and G. Scully (1996) 'The Distribution of Earnings and the Rules of the Game', Southern Economic Journal, 149-162.
27. F. Carmichael, D. Forrest and R. Simmons, Southern Economic Journal, op. cit.
28. J. Harding, Southern Economic Journal, op. cit.
29. A. Speight and D. Thomas, Southern Economic Journal, op. cit.