Cooperation via contract: An analysis of research and development agreements

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-24

  Ciccotello, Conrad S ^a   Hornyak, Martin J ^b  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract design; Joint R D; L14; O32; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037758286     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(99)00014-0     Document Type: Article

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