Individual learning and social rationality

European Economic Review

Volumn 42, Issue 3-5, 1998, Pages 651-663

  Young, H Peyton ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Learning; Nash equilibrium; Spontaneous order; Stochastic dynamical systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037678328     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00143-8     Document Type: Article

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