Clinton and the economy: The paradox of policy success and political mishap

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 111, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 403-433

  Weatherford, M Stephen ^a   McDonnell, Lorraine M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037658944     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2151969     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. Journalists Bob Woodward and Elizabeth Drew reflect much elite opinion in emphasizing the administration's diffuse policy agenda and fragmented advisory structure. If only, the suggestion goes, Clinton had measured up to the quality of presidential leadership shown by Reagan or Johnson, then the legislative branch would have worked in tandem to accomplish the president's program. See Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
2. Journalists Bob Woodward and Elizabeth Drew reflect much elite opinion in emphasizing the administration's diffuse policy agenda and fragmented advisory structure. If only, the suggestion goes, Clinton had measured up to the quality of presidential leadership shown by Reagan or Johnson, then the legislative branch would have worked in tandem to accomplish the president's program. See Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
3. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
4. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
5. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
6. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
7. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
8. Researchers differ on the reasons for this, with some suggesting that the president's programs have been too liberal and hence have not fulfilled his promise to govern as a New Democrat, while others note that the public has been unusually ill informed about Clinton's proposals and attribute the voters' low level of support to other causes, including media coverage fixated on political competition and strategy rather than the search for policy solutions, the well-funded negative campaigns of conservative interest groups, or an unusually uncompromising tactic of opposition pursued by congressional Republicans. See Harold W. Stanley, "The Parties, the President, and the 1994 Midterm Elections" in Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), 188-211; Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Samuel C. Patterson, "Congress Bashing and the 1992 Election" in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Democracy's Feast: Elections in America (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 11; Graham K. Wilson, "The Clinton Administration and Interest Groups" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 212-233; Paul J. Quirk and Joseph Hinchliffe, "Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 262-89; Barbara Sinclair, "Trying to Govern Positively in a Negative Era: Clinton and the 103rd Congress" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 88-125.
9. Paul J. Quirk, "Presidential Competence" in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), chap. 6.
10. Phil Duncan and Steven Langdon, "When Congress Had to Choose, It Voted to Back Clinton," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 18 December 1993.
11. Drew, On the Edge, 62.
12. This summary is based on the following statistical tables in the Economic Report: growth, Table B-1; unemployment, Table B-40; consumer sentiment, Table B-16; profit rate, Table B-18; investment, Table B-91; inflation, Tables B-3 and B-4; debt and federal discretionary spending, Table B-78. For reference, see William J. Clinton, Economic Report of the President (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, [hereafter GPO], 1995).
13. Blumenthal, for instance, notes several important legislative victories - the Earned Income Tax Credit, National Service, the Motor Voter Registration Law, Family and Medical Leave - "but those achievements had gone mostly unacknowledged, because of the ragged diversions and the tumultuous, close-run budget battle." See Sidney Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," The New Yorker, 24 January 1994, 31-43.
14. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
15. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
16. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
17. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
18. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
19. M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining and Policy Consistency," Governance, an International Journal of Policy and Administration 7 (April 1994): 135-65; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Macroeconomic Policymaking Beyond the Electoral Constraint" in George C. Edwards III, Steven A. Shull, and Norman C. Thomas, eds., The Presidency and Public Policymaking (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985); M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "Ideology and Economic Policy" in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Presidency (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), chap. 7; M. Stephen Weatherford, "Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policymaking," British Journal of Political Science 24 (January 1994): 1-31; M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, "The Role of Presidential Ideology in Economic Policy Making," Policy Studies Journal 12 (June 1984): 691-704; M. Stephen Weatherford, "The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles," Journal of Politics 49 (November 1987): 925-52.
20. Walter Dean Burnham, "The Legacy of George Bush: Travails of an Understudy" in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., The Election of 1992 (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), chap. 1.
21. Gary C. Jacobson, "Congress: Unusual Year, Unusual Election" in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1992 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), chap. 7.
22. As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Winter 1988-89): 613-35; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-making, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 19-40.
23. As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Winter 1988-89): 613-35; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-making, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 19-40.
24. As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Winter 1988-89): 613-35; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-making, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 19-40.
25. As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Winter 1988-89): 613-35; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-making, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 19-40.
26. As divided government became the norm in the postwar years, Sundquist called for a "new theory" to explain the operation of separation of powers in contemporary politics. Two lines of response to this challenge can be discerned. Some have sought to place divided government into perspective, arguing that divided control is not all that unusual historically, across the states in the United States and in parliamentary systems in other advanced republics, or showing that divided control has few deleterious effects on the ability of the national government to carry out its purposes. Others have argued that the ideal type that underlies the responsible party model was never appropriate for the American political system. Looking back beyond the exceptional case of the New Deal, they give much more prominence to the strain of legislative autonomy in U.S. constitutional history. See James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (Winter 1988-89): 613-35; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan, 1992); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law-making, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); Demetrios Caraley, "Elections and Dilemmas of Democratic Governance: Reflections," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Spring 1989): 19-40.
27. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System.
28. James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1966); esp. Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, 4 ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986).
29. James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1966); esp. Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, 4 ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986).
30. James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); Roger H. Davidson, David M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1966); esp. Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, 4 ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986).
31. Charles O. Jones, "The Pendulum of Power" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., The New Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), chap. 7.
32. See Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, "The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena" (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Barbara Sinclair, "Change and Continuity in the Legislative Process: The U.S. House and Senate from the 1970s to the 1990s" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).
33. See Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, "The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena" (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Barbara Sinclair, "Change and Continuity in the Legislative Process: The U.S. House and Senate from the 1970s to the 1990s" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).
34. See Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, "The President in a More Partisan Legislative Arena" (paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Barbara Sinclair, "Change and Continuity in the Legislative Process: The U.S. House and Senate from the 1970s to the 1990s" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995).
35. For instance, during the Kennedy years, the 87th and 88th Congresses included on average 114 cross-pressured members, while Carter's Congresses (the 95th and 96th) averaged 74. In the 103rd Congress, Clinton found only 37 cross-pressured legislators, and only one of these was a Republican. Calculated from Table 2 of Fleisher and Bond, "Partisan Legislative Arena."
36. Dating the postreform Congress from the Ford administration, the number of pure party coalitions averaged fewer than ten from Ford through Bush, but rose to forty-eight in the 103rd Congress of 1992-1994. Correspondingly, the number of bipartisan coalitions averaged 26.2 from the Ford through the Bush administrations but fell to 19 in Clinton's first Congress. Calculated from Table 4 of ibid.
37. Bert A. Rockman, "Leadership and the Clinton Presidency" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., The Clinton Presidency, 325-62.
38. As Jones puts it, "The congressional Democrats have gotten used to being the opposition party to the White House Republicans. They have provided themselves with the resources needed to play that role aggressively." See Charles O. Jones, "The Diffusion of Responsibility: An Alternative Perspective," Governance: An International Journal of Political Administration 4 (April 1981): 150-67.
39. Kamlet and Mowrey show that this constraint worked long before Reagan, as one president's expenditure commitments narrowed the flexibility for his successors. Reagan's legacy of a virtually permanently diminished revenue stream (via both tax cuts and indexing), however, arguably amounts to a qualitative alteration in this constraint, not only tightening the budget but transforming virtually all policy proposals into budgetary debates. See Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowrey, "Budgetary Side-Payments and Government Growth, 1953-1968," American Journal of Political Science 27 (November 1983): 636-64.
40. Aaron Wildavsky, "President Reagan as a Political Strategist" in Charles O. Jones, ed., The Reagan Legacy, Promise and Performance (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), chap. 10, 295.
41. Ibid., 293.
42. Clinton did not entirely forsake the redistributive heritage of the Democratic party, but he focused his efforts in this area on the working poor, who he felt had been especially hard-hit by the combination of Reagan administration spending and tax cuts and the pattern of layoffs in the economy.
43. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Clinton for Government-Aided Reform," The Economist, October 1992, 21-23. This article by one of Clinton's economic brain trust reads like an updated version of the sort of plans James Tobin and Paul Samuelson were proposing to Kennedy in the summer before the 1960 election. On Kennedy economic policy, see Ronald F. King, Money, Time and Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Robert Reich's argument actually strengthens the relative emphasis on human over physical capital: Reich essentially provides an open-economy analysis of the same problems Walter Heller articulated, and uses it to show that publicly-funded incentives for education and training have both a larger and more certain payoff than those for physical capital. Robert E. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
44. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Clinton for Government-Aided Reform," The Economist, October 1992, 21-23. This article by one of Clinton's economic brain trust reads like an updated version of the sort of plans James Tobin and Paul Samuelson were proposing to Kennedy in the summer before the 1960 election. On Kennedy economic policy, see Ronald F. King, Money, Time and Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Robert Reich's argument actually strengthens the relative emphasis on human over physical capital: Reich essentially provides an open-economy analysis of the same problems Walter Heller articulated, and uses it to show that publicly-funded incentives for education and training have both a larger and more certain payoff than those for physical capital. Robert E. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
45. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Clinton for Government-Aided Reform," The Economist, October 1992, 21-23. This article by one of Clinton's economic brain trust reads like an updated version of the sort of plans James Tobin and Paul Samuelson were proposing to Kennedy in the summer before the 1960 election. On Kennedy economic policy, see Ronald F. King, Money, Time and Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). Robert Reich's argument actually strengthens the relative emphasis on human over physical capital: Reich essentially provides an open-economy analysis of the same problems Walter Heller articulated, and uses it to show that publicly-funded incentives for education and training have both a larger and more certain payoff than those for physical capital. Robert E. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
46. The details of Clinton's economic program are outlined below. This summary of general themes draws on Clinton and Gore, on Clinton's Inaugural Address, and on the Economic Report for 1994 and 1995. See William J. Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First: How We Can All Change America (New York: Times Books, 1992).
47. The details of Clinton's economic program are outlined below. This summary of general themes draws on Clinton and Gore, on Clinton's Inaugural Address, and on the Economic Report for 1994 and 1995. See William J. Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First: How We Can All Change America (New York: Times Books, 1992).
48. These themes appear repeatedly in Clinton's relationships with adults as he was growing up, including in addition to his mother, several influential teachers in high school and at Georgetown. And they have been central ones for Hillary Rodham Clinton, for whom they are also tied to her theological exposition of her religious beliefs. Maraniss suggests that Bill Clinton came to see Hillary as the personification of the theme of opportunity and responsibility. This theme first appears as a part of his public, political persona during his governorship of Arkansas, although one might argue that it is presaged in his speech at the 1980 Democratic convention. See David Maraniss, First in His Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 432.
49. The best source on Clinton's youth and his political experience in Arkansas is Maraniss, First in His Class.
50. These events are described in more detail at the following pages in ibid., 55, 158, 453, 226, 230, 285.
51. John R. Cranford, "New Clinton Economic Team Veers Toward the Center," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 December 1992.
52. Ibid.
53. Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," 31-33.
54. Roger B. Porter, Presidential Decision Making: The Economic Policy Board (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
55. Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); M. Stephen Weatherford and Thomas B. Mayhew, "Tax Policy and Presidential Leadership: Ideas, Interests, and the Quality of Advice," Studies in American Political Development 9 (Fall 1995): 287-330.
56. Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); M. Stephen Weatherford and Thomas B. Mayhew, "Tax Policy and Presidential Leadership: Ideas, Interests, and the Quality of Advice," Studies in American Political Development 9 (Fall 1995): 287-330.
57. Clinton and Gore, Putting People First; Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 76 (September 1972): 751-85; Roger B. Porter, "Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reagan," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983): 403-26.
58. Clinton and Gore, Putting People First; Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 76 (September 1972): 751-85; Roger B. Porter, "Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reagan," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983): 403-26.
59. Clinton and Gore, Putting People First; Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 76 (September 1972): 751-85; Roger B. Porter, "Economic Advice to the President: From Eisenhower to Reagan," Political Science Quarterly 98 (Fall 1983): 403-26.
60. Paul Starobin et al., "Clinton's A-Team," National Journal, 19 December 1992, 2892-96.
61. Rubin has now replaced Bentsen at Treasury, after a smooth confirmation process. See Paul Starobin, "The Broker," National Journal, 16 April 1994, 878-83.
62. Paul Starobin, "The World According to Tyson," National Journal, 18 December 1993, 3025.
63. George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Clinton Team's Similar Lines Focus on Deficit Reduction," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 January 1993, 120-3.
64. Congressional Quarterly, "Profile of Robert Reich," December 1992, 3790.
65. Ibid.; William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, vol. 1 (Washington DC: GPO, 1994).
66. Ibid.; William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, vol. 1 (Washington DC: GPO, 1994).
67. Ibid.
68. "A Better Idea on Tax Credits," New York Times, 3 July 1990; Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein, Making Work Pay: A New Agenda for Poverty Policies (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1989).
69. "A Better Idea on Tax Credits," New York Times, 3 July 1990; Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein, Making Work Pay: A New Agenda for Poverty Policies (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1989).
70. Clinton, Public Papers, 105.
71. Jon Healey, "Spending Increases Come First In Rush To Pass Package," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 February 1993, 365-9.
72. Clinton and Gore, Putting People First, 7.
73. Lydia Saad, "Economy Still Top Concern; Education, Health Care Issues Gaining," The Gallup Poll Monthly 324 (September 1992): 10-11.
74. Larry Hugick, "Clinton Transition Gains Favorable Reviews," The Gallup Poll Monthly 327 (1992): 12-15.
75. Larry Hugick, "Public Hopeful Clinton Can Solve Nation's Problems," The Gallup Poll Monthly 326 (1992): 11-18. The reported salience of the deficit in public opinion polls fluctuated over the course of the campaign and in response to small changes in question wording. For instance, Paul J. Quirk and Jon K. Dalager, "The Election: A 'New Democrat' and a New Kind of Presidential Campaign" in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1992 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), chap. 3.
76. Larry Hugick, "Public Hopeful Clinton Can Solve Nation's Problems," The Gallup Poll Monthly 326 (1992): 11-18. The reported salience of the deficit in public opinion polls fluctuated over the course of the campaign and in response to small changes in question wording. For instance, Paul J. Quirk and Jon K. Dalager, "The Election: A 'New Democrat' and a New Kind of Presidential Campaign" in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1992 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), chap. 3.
77. Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 38.
78. According to Woodward, George Stephanapoulous made three arguments in favor of abandoning the middle class tax cut: the money was not there for it; the media did not expect it and Clinton would be criticized more than praised for honoring a promise now widely viewed as unrealistic; and focus groups and polling by Greenberg suggested that the public never really expected such a tax cut. Bentsen and Panetta agreed with Stephanapoulous's conclusion that the tax cut should be dropped. Woodward, The Agenda, 97.
79. Hager and Cloud, "Clinton Team's Similar Lines."
80. George Hager, "Deficit Hawk Panetta Is Named White House Budget Director," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 December 1992, 3803.
81. Rivlin and Paul Begala, the most outspokenly populist of Clinton's political advisers, were often at loggerheads over economic policy. Frustrated after failing to persuade Rivlin and the other economic advisors, Begala wrote a memo reminding them and members of the Cabinet that: "This is an Economic Growth Package. It is not a deficit reduction package, a shared sacrifice package, or a pain package. . . . It's NOT the deficit, stupid." Woodward, The Agenda, 114, 116; Hager, "Rivlin Brings Independent Streak"; Jeff Shear, "The Numbers Runner," National Journal, 21 May 1994, 1186-90.
82. Rivlin and Paul Begala, the most outspokenly populist of Clinton's political advisers, were often at loggerheads over economic policy. Frustrated after failing to persuade Rivlin and the other economic advisors, Begala wrote a memo reminding them and members of the Cabinet that: "This is an Economic Growth Package. It is not a deficit reduction package, a shared sacrifice package, or a pain package. . . . It's NOT the deficit, stupid." Woodward, The Agenda, 114, 116; Hager, "Rivlin Brings Independent Streak"; Jeff Shear, "The Numbers Runner," National Journal, 21 May 1994, 1186-90.
83. Rivlin and Paul Begala, the most outspokenly populist of Clinton's political advisers, were often at loggerheads over economic policy. Frustrated after failing to persuade Rivlin and the other economic advisors, Begala wrote a memo reminding them and members of the Cabinet that: "This is an Economic Growth Package. It is not a deficit reduction package, a shared sacrifice package, or a pain package. . . . It's NOT the deficit, stupid." Woodward, The Agenda, 114, 116; Hager, "Rivlin Brings Independent Streak"; Jeff Shear, "The Numbers Runner," National Journal, 21 May 1994, 1186-90.
84. Woodward, The Agenda, 69-71. Although coming from a different end of the political spectrum than Greenspan, House Speaker Thomas Foley and Majority Leader Richard Gephardt gave Clinton similar advice about the importance of focusing on the deficit. Gephardt told Clinton, "We all believe in the micro things that you've talked about - training, education, infrastructure, health care reform, and more government backing of high tech research. But we'll never get to those things unless we solve the larger economic problems." See Drew, On the Edge, 60-61.
85. Woodward, The Agenda, 69-71. Although coming from a different end of the political spectrum than Greenspan, House Speaker Thomas Foley and Majority Leader Richard Gephardt gave Clinton similar advice about the importance of focusing on the deficit. Gephardt told Clinton, "We all believe in the micro things that you've talked about - training, education, infrastructure, health care reform, and more government backing of high tech research. But we'll never get to those things unless we solve the larger economic problems." See Drew, On the Edge, 60-61.
86. For example, even as late as June 1993, Stanley Greenberg was reporting to the other political consultants that his polling and focus groups indicated that while the message of economic growth and investments was equally popular with that of deficit reduction, the deficit reduction message was cleaner and easier for the public to understand. See Woodward, The Agenda, 241.
87. Ibid., 140.
88. Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 42.
89. When Clinton's aides explained to him what had happened with the spending caps and its effect on his investment package, Clinton started shouting questions, asking how and why this had occurred. Several hours later, he remarked sarcastically, "Where are all the Democrats? I hope you're all aware we're all Eisenhower Republicans. We're Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn't that great?" See Woodward, The Agenda, 161, 165; Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," 37.
90. When Clinton's aides explained to him what had happened with the spending caps and its effect on his investment package, Clinton started shouting questions, asking how and why this had occurred. Several hours later, he remarked sarcastically, "Where are all the Democrats? I hope you're all aware we're all Eisenhower Republicans. We're Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn't that great?" See Woodward, The Agenda, 161, 165; Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," 37.
91. George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Democrats Tie Their Fate To Clinton's Budget Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 August 1993, 2122-2129.
92. The downside of an uncompromising, oppositional strategy was that the Republicans might be viewed by the public as causing gridlock when Clinton made that charge against them (Healey, "Stimulus Plan," 817). But the Republicans knew that Clinton's approval rating was declining and that the proportion of the public who thought the economic plan should be modified or rejected was growing (increasing from 43 to 60 percent between the time of his speech to Congress and the end of February). In addition, Robert Dole acknowledged that the filibuster on the stimulus bill could not become standard operating procedure. The Republicans would have to express their opposition strategically if they were to avoid the gridlock label. See Leslie McAneny, "Solid Majority of Americans Now Support Clinton," The Gallup Poll Monthly 330 (March 1993): 6-14; Chuck Alston, "The Minority Strikes Back," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 April 1993, 908.
93. The downside of an uncompromising, oppositional strategy was that the Republicans might be viewed by the public as causing gridlock when Clinton made that charge against them (Healey, "Stimulus Plan," 817). But the Republicans knew that Clinton's approval rating was declining and that the proportion of the public who thought the economic plan should be modified or rejected was growing (increasing from 43 to 60 percent between the time of his speech to Congress and the end of February). In addition, Robert Dole acknowledged that the filibuster on the stimulus bill could not become standard operating procedure. The Republicans would have to express their opposition strategically if they were to avoid the gridlock label. See Leslie McAneny, "Solid Majority of Americans Now Support Clinton," The Gallup Poll Monthly 330 (March 1993): 6-14; Chuck Alston, "The Minority Strikes Back," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 April 1993, 908.
94. Alston, "Minority," 908.
95. After four attempts, the Democrats failed to get cloture and the stimulus package died on 21 April. At that point, the Senate agreed on a voice vote to strip the bill down to one provision - a $4 billion emergency appropriation for extended unemployment benefits.
96. Jon Healey, "Republicans Slam the Brakes On Economic Stimulus Plan," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 April 1993, 817-20; Woodward, The Agenda, 158-159; Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37-38.
97. Jon Healey, "Republicans Slam the Brakes On Economic Stimulus Plan," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 April 1993, 817-20; Woodward, The Agenda, 158-159; Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37-38.
98. Jon Healey, "Republicans Slam the Brakes On Economic Stimulus Plan," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 April 1993, 817-20; Woodward, The Agenda, 158-159; Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37-38.
99. The bill had changed substantially in its passage through the House, with amendments having weakened its overall economic rationale (reducing by about half the $72 billion the original proposal was designed to raise over five years) and undermined its claim to distributive equity (with exemptions for aluminum, the airlines, and other industries). At this point, CEA Chair Laura Tyson was advising the president that from an economic standpoint there was little reason to retain the tax. See David S. Cloud, "Tyson Sees Self as 'Cautious Activist'," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 January 1993, 1458; Woodward, The Agenda, 218.
100. The bill had changed substantially in its passage through the House, with amendments having weakened its overall economic rationale (reducing by about half the $72 billion the original proposal was designed to raise over five years) and undermined its claim to distributive equity (with exemptions for aluminum, the airlines, and other industries). At this point, CEA Chair Laura Tyson was advising the president that from an economic standpoint there was little reason to retain the tax. See David S. Cloud, "Tyson Sees Self as 'Cautious Activist'," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 January 1993, 1458; Woodward, The Agenda, 218.
101. McAneny, "Solid Majority," 9; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 26 June 1993, 1670; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 24 July 1993, 1891; Steven Greenhouse, "President Gambles on Spending," New York Times, 15 March 1993.
102. McAneny, "Solid Majority," 9; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 26 June 1993, 1670; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 24 July 1993, 1891; Steven Greenhouse, "President Gambles on Spending," New York Times, 15 March 1993.
103. McAneny, "Solid Majority," 9; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 26 June 1993, 1670; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 24 July 1993, 1891; Steven Greenhouse, "President Gambles on Spending," New York Times, 15 March 1993.
104. McAneny, "Solid Majority," 9; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 26 June 1993, 1670; Editor, "Opinion Outlook, Views on the Economy," National Journal, 24 July 1993, 1891; Steven Greenhouse, "President Gambles on Spending," New York Times, 15 March 1993.
105. Hager and Cloud, "Budget Bill," 1937.
106. George Hager and David S. Cloud, "Test for Divided Democrats: Forge a Budget Deal," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 26 June 1993, 1631-5.
107. Weatherford and Mayhew, "Tax Policy," 287-330.
108. Woodward, The Agenda, 250-251.
109. Ann Devroy, "Hallelujah! for Economic Change," Washington Post, 17 July 1993.
110. In fact, Moynihan became concerned about how complicated the Btu tax would be after his staff estimated that it would likely add volumes to the tax code. Bentsen also expressed reservation about its administration and initially
111. In fact, Moynihan became concerned about how complicated the Btu tax would be after his staff estimated that it would likely add volumes to the tax code. Bentsen also expressed reservation about its administration and initially pushed a value-added tax on energy sources as a more feasible alternative. See Woodward, The Agenda, 218; Drew, On the Edge, 71.
112. Woodward, The Agenda, 319, 217.
113. Blumenthal, "Education of a President," 37.
114. For an extended analysis of the media's coverage of the policy process during Clinton's presidency, see Sinclair, "Trying to Govern."