Health-promoting alliances

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 355-375

  Arce, Daniel G M ^a   Sandler, Todd ^b  

^a RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliances; Cooperative games; Core; Nucleolus; Public goods; Public health; Shapley value; Weakest link

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037654741     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00174-X     Document Type: Article

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