A dynamic theory of the transition to democracy

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-25

  Zak, Paul J ^a   Feng, Yi ^a  

^a CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Economic growth; Political economy; Regime change

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037634138     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00018-0     Document Type: Article

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